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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement o f the Problem

Economic development has always been a top priority on national policy
agendas. According to Paul Kennedy, the strength o f nation-states depends on how
well they can manage the three demanding tasks simultaneously: “to provide military
security for its national interests, to satisfy the socioeconomic needs o f its citizenry,
and to ensure sustained growth” (1987, p. 446). If we accept his argument, it follows
that the task o f sustained grow th is the very foundation for ensuring the affordability
o f the other two required tasks: military expenses and socioeconomic needs.
In most parts o f the contem porary world, national econom ic developm ent is
characterized by globalization o f the economy. This outward-looking policy in turn
leads to a dramatic increase in the level o f economic interdependence among nations.
The increasing exposure to the international economy affects domestic politics o f
countries around the world.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for politicians to

avoid the necessary policy changes to deal with the challenges o f globalization.
Some o f those changes that are intended to lower the costs o f production to their
nation’s firms may entail significant social costs to their publics.
Trade liberalization in the current world economy m eans the removal o f bar
riers to the free movement o f goods and services between countries. Among these
1
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barriers are tariffs imposed on im ports and non-tariff such as im port quotas or quality
rules designed to limit or exclude im ports that might threaten dom estic industries.
The rationale underlying the free trade policy is based on a theory o f com parative
advantage (Moon, 2000a).

The idea is that if tariff and non-tariff barriers are

removed, local industries will be exposed to international com petition and only the
most efficient and competitive will survive. Inefficient firms and industries will be
forced to close and the capital invested in them will move to more successful indus
tries. Consequently a country’s resources and capital will becom e concentrated on
those areas in which it does best, leading to greater economic efficiency. Countries
end up, then, specializing in those areas in which they have a com parative advantage
and use the incomes earned to buy the things they no longer produce.
One o f the most remarkable features o f the contemporary w orld is the rapid
development, diffusion and application o f transportation, information and com m uni
cation technology. The intensive application o f those technologies has reinforced the
trend tow ard trade liberalization and an international division o f labor. As costs of
these technologies have fallen, producers around the world with their respective com
parative advantages now can and are more willing to operate in a global market.
They reduce the cost o f their products per unit by economies o f scale and therefore
they have incentives to expand their markets beyond national borders.
im plication o f using those technologies is the international division o f labor.

Another
Firms

spread the different parts o f their operations around the world according to where
each part can be done most cheaply.

F or example, Nike shoes are designed in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

United States, prototyped in Taiwan, manufactured in over 40 different Asian
locations and distributed to hundreds o f different markets (Korten, 1995). In some
cases, multinational companies can avoid political and legal limitations by changing
their operational strategies. For example, H onda M otors exports its U SA made cars
to Israel although Israel has an embargo on Japanese cars (Wiseman, 1998).
Although free trade theories generally imply that trade liberalization is in the
interest o f all countries, it does not necessarily benefit all groups within a country.
There is an im portant problem o f adjustm ent costs (Cohen, Paul, & Blecker, 1996).
W hen w e analyze gains from trade in a com parative advantage theory, we are com
paring an economy that has already fully adjusted to free trade with an econom y that
has restricted trade. This kind o f com parison does not take into account the social,
econom ic and political costs o f removing existing trade restrictions and making the
transition to free trade. For those workers and firms that can not compete with for
eign imports, factories are shut down and jobs are lost. Consequently the social costs
may include increased welfare dependency, family problems, and crime. No demo
cratically elected government can continuously and completely insulate the loud
pleas o f workers and firms for protection from economic dislocation. There is always
an incentive for some politicians to place limitations on the import o f goods and ser
vices in direct competition with domestic production and this is especially true if the
local constituents o f those politicians suffer serious losses from import competition.
The advances o f information technology have reinforced economic interde
pendence. M odem communication technologies now allow for the rapid movement
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o f complex financial investments and capital movement across national borders. Bil
lions o f dollars can be moved from one country to another at the touch o f the “Enter”
key.

And yet interdependence implies sensitivity or vulnerability to an external

shock. The M exican bond crisis in 1994, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the
Russian financial crisis in 1998 have provided dramatic reminders that countries that
open themselves to capital inflows become more vulnerable to large capital outflows
w hen investor sentiment turns downward. This could trigger sharp currency depreci
ation, social instability and political upheavals.

A case in point is Indonesia.

As

security threats have been lessened in the post-Cold W ar period, the legitimacy o f
some Asian leaders was based upon economic performance. The financial crisis had
tested the limitation o f that legitimacy and had forced President Suharto to step
down.
The fact that few states in the contemporary world have deliberately promoted
self-sufficiency as a national policy goal implies that the material costs o f a country
to provide all o f its needs from its own resources are simply too huge to bear. The
capital to be saved from less costly imports and the gains to be derived from exports
are too attractive to ignore. Why then is the issue o f free trade still controversial?
Indeed, over the long term, increasing global integration through trade and invest
ment will improve the well being o f both developing and developed nations. But this
process, at least in the short term, also entails difficult political, social and economic
adjustments in both developed and developing nations.
The recurring dilem m a between the propensity for globalization and the need
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for national autonomy defines much o f what happens in the contem porary inter
national political economy. This dilemma corresponds to w hat Karl Polanyi called
the "double movement" (Polanyi, 1944, p. 130): an increase in the role o f selfregulating market inevitably m eets with a self-protection response from society. For
him, m odem society must be understood both as a result o f the expansion o f the self
regulating market m echanism and the self-protection o f society against the negative
consequences the market m echanism generates.
Polanyi's double m ovem ent still dominates debates in public policy today.
Economic liberalism in general and free trade in particular have spread in most of the
countries in the world. So too have voices for protection o f unem ploym ent, inflation,
and the sharp fluctuation o f exchange rates. The pitfalls o f globalization need not
necessarily dictate nations to make a "U" turn and prom ote autarky simply because it
is too costly to do so. But w hat is then the appropriate role for nation-states to play in
an era o f globalization characterized by the interdependence am ong them?

For

Polanyi, national governm ents should play a major role in double movementfacilitating market m echanisms and protecting society from instability, including
political control (the ability to impose losses on losers) as well as redistributive
policies (social welfare).
Drawing from Polanyi's insights that markets cannot be sustainable without
embedding themselves in political and social institutions, R odrik further elaborates
by pointing out that "these institutions serve three functions w ithout which markets
cannot survive: they regulate, stabilize, and legitimate m arket outcomes" (Rodrik,
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1998, p 17-18). For a functioning society, social and political institutions regulate
m arkets by creating a level playing field for preventing unfair com petition and fraud;
they stabilize markets by m anipulating macroeconomic policies to deal with boom
and bust cycles; and they legitim ate market outcomes by providing welfare programs
for those who cannot benefit from the market.
I f we accept Rodrik's analysis, it follows that we need som e sort o f world
governm ent to regulate, stabilize, and legitim ate global capitalism.
sure, nation-states will not relinquish their sovereignty.

And yet, to be

As such the mismatch

betw een globalization and global governance is sure to create problem s o f control for
nation-states.

F or example, increasing economic interdependence has undermined

national governm ents' abilities to manage social spending.

W elfare programs are

costly but politically very popular. As Inglehart (1997) argues,.
a key reason why capitalism is thriving today is the fact that it had already
made a series o f increm ental but cumulatively massive reform s that brought
about some much needed governmental regulation o f the econom y and soci
ety and had developed extensive welfare state institutions, (p. 216)
And yet social spending may not be possible in all countries. In developing
countries, for example, social spending has been strongly affected by the necessity o f
reducing the budget deficits to avoid inflation and the negative reactions o f financial
markets.

In addition, financial liberalization has increased the m obility o f capital

which "has rendered an im portant segment o f the tax base footloose, leaving govern
m ents with the unappetizing option o f increasing tax rates disproportionately on labor
income" (Rodrik, 1997, p. 6).
Indeed, today nation-states are interconnected so that policy changes in one

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

country may produce changes in other countries.

This reality can be captured by

what Robert Jervis describes as a ripple effect; as he argues, "ripples move through
channels established by actors' interests and strategies" (1997, p. 9). As such, domes
tic policies are increasingly exposed to international scrutiny.

For example, if a

country increases its corporate tax rate, it may give its firms an incentive to relocate
their production to other countries. I f country A has stricter rules for worker safety
and environmental standards, its factories may have an incentive to move to country
B who has low requirements. For the sake o f international competitiveness, the race
to the bottom may not necessarily be the ultimate outcome, but globalization is sure
to exert strong pressures on nation-states for policy convergence.
W ithin democracies, citizens elect and put their representatives in the govern
ment and hold them accountable for our social and economic welfare. To the extent
that other people in foreign countries are making important decisions that affect their
lives, it is legitimate for them to question their government’s accountability.

If no

political party (be it right-wing, left-wing or the third way) can deliver what they
have promised, globalization is sure to be called into question.
For some people, globalization has caused a lot o f frustration and resentment.
Indeed, there is a growing global network o f non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that oppose current trends toward economic globalization and are seeking to
affect social change. NGOs are widely considered to be one o f the most important
themes in international relations today and they demonstrate a new political reality in
the structure o f global governance (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; M athews,
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1997;

Simmons, 1998). The key driving force behind the thriving o f NGOs may be the
inability or inadequacy o f multinational corporations (MNCs), national governments,
and the international economic organizations to respect and include a variety o f
development issues other than their own agendas. Technically, the advances o f infor
mation technology have helped to spread the idea o f democracy which enables citi
zens and consumers to compare their conditions with others in different places and to
question their governm ents to explain policy choices.
NGOs are increasingly targeting M NCs, national governments and the inter
national econom ic organizations to pursue social and environmental concerns.
Today, NGOs operate at every level o f the world system (subnational, national, and
international) and address every conceivable issue such as labor rights, human rights,
environmental problems, gender and economic justice. NGOs have theories to back
up their claims (Held, 1995) and they have strategies to instruct their actions (Keck &
Sikkink, 1998). The activities of NGOs can be viewed as a manifestation o f citizen
ship rights in a civil society. They use several different techniques to network advo
cates with each other and they use various strategies to exert pressures on the targets.
Some NGOs organize demonstrations while others prefer diplomacy.

Some NGOs

simplify issues to justify their campaign while others provide detailed studies to
inform policy makers. Some NGOs refuse to engage with their targets, while others
are willing to have a constructive dialogue w ith them. But in any case, N G O s are
capable o f stirring up public sentiment through various channels against their targets.
The collapse o f the OECD's negotiations over a Multilateral Agreement on
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Investment (MAI) in 1998 (Kobrin, 1998) and the W orld Trade Organization talks in
Seattle illustrate the complexity o f globalization that policymakers are up against. In
both cases, the claims o f environmental, human rights and labor groups among others
point out the structural problems with current approaches to global economic
governance.
In sum, economic interdependence advanced information technology and the
rising o f NGOs all together pose serious challenges on nation-states' maneuvering
room in terms o f policy choices.

Instead o f debating whether we are witnessing a

declining role o f nation-states, it may be more important to contemplate how nation
states respond to this com plex environment. While nation-states may be seen as pas
sively adapting to the forces o f globalization, they can also actively leam to address
these challenges collectively. W e have witnessed many international economic insti
tutions being established to facilitate economic cooperation. International economic
institutions may take different forms; it can be bilateral (for instance, Australia-New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement), regional (for instance, North
American Free Trade Agreement), or multilateral (for instance, World Trade
Organization).

Through these endeavors, nation-states are trying to harness the

complexity o f globalization.

The Purpose o f the Study

The empirical focus o f this study is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) which is a regional type o f economic integration. APEC was formed in 1989
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under the background o f the growing economic interdependence in Asia pacific
region.

APEC's membership coverage and its potential leadership in the world

economy attract a great deal attention to its development. APEC members include
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, M exico, New Zealand, Papua N ew Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia,
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam. APEC’s broad member
ship gives it a size which rivals m ajor multilateral institutions such as the EU. In
1997, nominal GDP in the APEC region amounted to US $16.8 trillion or over 55
percent o f global GDP (APEC, 1998a).
During the first four years (1989-1992) since its inception, APEC’s progress
was primarily in an exploratory mode, looking for direction and ways for economic
cooperation.

But when the United States took the chairmanship in 1993, APEC

entered a new phase.

U.S. President W illiam Clinton raised APEC’s profile by

holding the first leaders meeting in Seattle.

At the first summit, APEC leaders in

their vision statement decided to create “a community o f Asia Pacific economies”(APEC, 1995b). M ost people probably would agree that community-building
in Asia Pacific is more rhetoric than real resolve, given the facts o f cultural diversity,
different political values, mistrustful historical experiences, and different levels of
economic developm ent among some o f the key members. As Huntington (1996, p.
127) argues, "integration proceeds faster and further when it is based on cultural
commonality." But while H untington emphasizes the clash o f civilizations, Ohmae
(1995) points out industry, investment, individuals, and inform ation (what he calls
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the four T s " ) that lead us to a borderless world. Indeed some scholars, especially
economists, would echo Ohmae's observations. Eichengreen, for example, charges
that Huntington "failed to appreciate economic interdependence as a stabilizing
counterforce" (1999, p. 119).
Indeed APEC provides a laboratory to see how cultural, political, and eco
nomic forces interact.

APEC members are aware o f their cultural diversity and

political differences, but they have been trying not to politicize APEC. For example,
APEC mem bers call themselves member economies instead o f m em ber states, and
economic leaders instead o f state leaders.

A practice has been set for economic

leaders to wear casual not business suits during the summit meeting.

All o f these

gestures point out that APEC is trying to prevent political factors from complicating
the progress o f economic cooperation. To be sure, if APEC were only a transnational
business club or association, it would have no difficulty focusing on business only.
But since APEC involves governments, excluding non-economic factors is not possi
ble. This is especially true when the highest rank o f APEC gatherings has been pro
moted from the minister-level to state leaders level and APEC sets an ambitious goal
to achieve free and open trade and investment by 2010 for developed countries and
2020 for developing countries.
If APEC is a community, it is one that is “imagined” and “loosely cou
pled’^ Alder & Barnett, 1998). W hen discussing community-building at the inter
national level, scholars underline the importance of shared identity am ong commun
ity members. Deutsch (1957) discussed the development o f "we-feeling" in NATO.
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Haas (1964) stressed the need for a shift from national identities to collective identity
in European integration. Indeed shared identity is the key o f com m unity-building
because it gives members a reason or incentive to stick together. B ut w hat is the
basis o f shared identity and how does it m ake an international community cohere? Is
it cultural com m onality or economic interests?
I f the shared identity among APEC members is to be based upon cultural
commonality, it is not only difficult but also undesirable. It is difficult because there
is sim ply no shared cultural values that provide a sense o f community attachm ent for
APEC m em bers which can be readily drawn upon to settle different policy prefer
ences. N or is it desirable to deliberately create a shared cultural value because there
are many com peting cultural values in APEC; and since there is no criteria to deter
mine w hich cultural value should be promoted, any arbitrary choice is subject to
challenges.
If the shared identity among APEC members is based only upon econom ic
interests, one can expect that the cohesion o f this collective identity will be unstable.
Because, as noted above, the implications o f globalization and economic interdepen
dence have compelled governments to strike a balance between Polanyi's idea o f
double movement-facilitating market m echanism
instability.

and protecting society from

Even in prosperous times, policy preferences o f APEC m em bers may

diverge due to members' different domestic considerations, let alone in difficult
economic times.
I f basing shared identity on econom ic interests is shaky and cultural
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homogeneity is infeasible or undesirable for that matter, does that mean shared ident
ity among APEC m em ber is doomed from the start? As a sociological perspective in
IR theories, constructivism seems promising and well suited in terms o f providing a
theoretical lens to shed some light on how identities, interests, and human actions are
related (Checkel, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; W endt, 1999).

The basic idea o f con

structivism is that people are purposeful actors and their actions are guided in im por
tance, part by social identities and their corresponding interests; through interaction
actors reproduce o r transform the social structure in w hich they are embedded. Put
differently, in a given situation, what actors do is guided by who they are (identities)
and what they w ant (interests). Actors and structures are codetermined, meaning that
actors create structures which in turn shape agents' subsequent behaviors. B ut struc
tures are not fixed; they are reproduced or transformed through actors' practices.
It is im portant for constructivist theorists to understand that actors' identities
and interests are always in process; if actors' preexisting identities and interests have
not changed after interaction, the social structure is reproduced but if they have, the
social structure is transformed.

At first glance, one may question that if structures

determine human actions, how can actors transform structures? For constructivists,
the key to this question is that in a given situation, actors may have many identities;
when corresponding interests o f these different identities are in conflict, actors have
to decide which identity to evoke. And it is this choice that gives actors freedom to
reproduce or transform the social structure.
The general purpose o f this study is to investigate the relationships among
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identities, interests and international public policy in term s o f the institutional devel
opment o f APEC. Specifically, this study has two aims. First, I develop a constructi
vist model o f international regimes.

This model consists o f three parts aiming at

conceptualizing, (a) how regime members' collective identity and interests are con
structed, (b) how pre-existing identities and interests are activated during policy dis
course, and (c) how policy stability and change evolve over time that reshape mem
bers' collective identity and interests. Second, I use this model to help analyze how
APEC evolves in response to internal dynamics and external pressures in terms o f
policy stability and change. The main focus o f the study is to analyze how processes
o f interaction or practices among APEC's members reproduce or transform the social
structures that shape their identities and interests. The central claim o f this study is
that the coherence o f collective identity among APEC's members is essential to
policy learning for institutional development. The remaining chapters are to justify
this claim.

Significance o f the Problem

From the theoretical aspect, Robert Jervis (1998) raised concerns that the Inter
national Political Economy (IPE) subfield, after a strong period o f development in
1970s and 1980s, seems to be stagnating. He argues that most applications o f major
theories in international relations (IR) have been to security or general international
politics, with less attention to internal dynamics, identities, and cultures o f inter
national economic institutions. The consequence o f these developments, according to
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him, is that economists, more so than political scientists, have shaped the public de
bate on international economic policies. Indeed the complex implications of global
ization on nation-states clearly dem onstrate the need for collaboration among differ
ent fields. I share with Jervis' concerns and this study is an effort to address his call.
From the empirical aspect, the end o f the Cold W ar has heightened the grow
ing research interest in international economic cooperation.

Compared with Euro

pean economic integration, which has received considerable attention in the political
and economic research over the past decades, much less w ork has been done on the
Asia regional economic integration. This study is an attempt to address this imbal
ance.

Conducting research on international cooperation on APEC is important be

cause although it is a region with a high intensity o f econom ic interdependence, this
is also a region consisting o f nation-states with different levels o f econom ic develop
ment, different political systems, and different cultural and historical experiences. It
is interesting to understand how nation-states in the Asia Pacific region can reconcile
their differences and cooperate with each other.

Organization o f the Study

The remaining chapters o f this study will proceed as follows.

Chapter II

reviews theoretical literature on international regimes adopted in this study to analyze
APEC. It begins with a clarification o f the concept o f international regimes. The
second section reviews major approaches to international regimes in the International
Relations literature.

Specifically, I compare power-based, interest-based and
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knowledge-based theories o f international regimes and this com parison allows me to
take the next step, which is developing a model to analyze APEC. The last section
will discuss constructivism, which is one variant o f knowledge-based regim e theo
ries. Specifically, I will outline the essential elements of constructivism, explain why
constructivism is adopted as the theoretical point o f departure for this study, and
respond to criticism o f constructivism.
Chapter III introduces a constructivist model o f international regimes, which
allows me to derive a series o f propositions for empirically analyzing APEC. This
model is integrated to the extent that it also draws insights from literatures o f com
plex adaptive systems (to be discussed in the proper place). This m odel consists of
three parts aiming at conceptualizing how regime members' collective identity and
interests are constructed, how pre-existing identities and interests are activated and
may be changed during policy discourse, and how policy stability and change evolve
over time that reshape members' collective identity and interests.
Chapter IV presents a broad overview o f the changing international and
regional context for the Asia Pacific development during the postw ar years, and dis
cusses how that context has shaped economic interdependence in Asia Pacific region
over time. In the international context, I trace the evolution o f policy ideas about
international political economy in the postw ar years that have defined the statesociety relations; this survey provides us with an understanding o f different ideas on
the current debate o f globalization. In the regional context, I concentrate on the US
and Japanese roles in fostering the economic interdependence in Asia-Pacific region
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during the postw ar years.
Chapter V provides an understanding o f the establishment o f the APEC. It
begins w ith an investigation o f pre-APEC economic institution-building in the
region; this in turn gives us a profile o f factors that inhibit and facilitate the formation
o f the APEC. I then trace the initial motivations o f different key actors in the APEC
and study how these motivations might reflect on the preferences o f institutional
design.
Chapter VI studies the substantive policy issues in the APEC process. The
focus o f this chapter is to investigate what APEC members do might affect their
collective identity either positively or negatively. The policy issues to be discussed
are not randomly selected but based on the idea o f complex adaptive system (CAS).
As an open system, CAS must respond to internal dynamics and external pressures in
order to sustain.
In terms o f the internal dynamics, there are two major policy agendas in the
APEC process: trade and investment liberalization and facilitation (TILF) and eco
nomic and technical cooperation (ECOTECH). Whereas the developed member eco
nomies have tended to approach ECOTECH as a concession to the developing mem
ber economies in order to secure their commitment to TILF, the developing member
economies consider EC O TECH as a requirement o f capacity-building to fully accept
TILF.

These two ideas simultaneously exist within APEC com peting for policy

directions and priorities.

I will discuss the interaction betw een these two ideas in

terms o f policy stability and change.
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With regards to how APEC adapts to its external pressures, I will discuss two
major issues: the Asia financial crisis and the non-governmental organizations. The
Asia financial crisis was a test o f the cohesion o f collective identity among APEC
members. I will mainly focus on APEC's response to the crisis and how the impact
o f the crisis affects the members' collective identity. The other issue to be discussed
is NGOs.

In 1997, Canada proposed an idea o f global civil society for broader

engagement when it took the chairmanship. I will discuss NGO attitudes and actions
toward APEC and APEC's policy on NGOs. Chapter VII concludes with a summary
o f the study and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE

One o f the most im portant developments in the study o f international cooper
ation in American international relations has been the study o f international regimes.
In the beginning o f the 1980s regime theory was launched in part as a reaction
against what was seen as neorealism ’s de-emphasis o f the importance o f international
institutions (Krasner, 1983). Neoliberal regime analysts (Keohane, 1984) found that
even if the anarchy o f the international system poses problem s for collective action
and constrains states to cooperate, they nevertheless can w ork together on many
policy issues due to the rising interdependence am ong them.

Nation-states adopt

rules either through international organizations or informal arrangements and they
share some expectations about what behavior is preferable and what is acceptable.
Interest in international regim es also arose because theorists and practitioners ob
served that comprehensive and hierarchical international organizations were ineffec
tive and inefficient in operation.
To begin with, regim e analysts shifted attention away from specific inter
national organizations such as UN and toward a w ide range o f substantial issues.
Examples of international regimes are rules governing international telecom m uni
cations (Cowhey, 1990), for example, the Arctic Environm ental Protection Strategy
(Young, 1989), and GATT (Grieco, 1990). Since the 1990s the theoretical debate o f
19
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international regimes betw een neorealism and neoliberalism has gradually been
replaced by the contest betw een rationalism (including both neorealism and neo
liberalism) and constructivism . This shift in the debate is betw een material structures
(pow er and interest) vis-a-vis social ones such as ideas and norms (Katzenstein,
Keohane, & Krasner, 1998).

T he D efinition o f International Regim es

John Ruggie (1975) first introduced the concept o f international regimes. The
purpose for his endeavor w as that there was no proper concept for international coop
eration not performed by international organizations. As he argues:
In depicting the 'collective response' o f states to collective situations occa
sioned by science and technology, I will differentiate among three levels o f
institutionalization: (1) the purely cognitive, w hich I will call 'epistemic
communities;1 (2) that consisting of sets o f m utual expectations, generally
agreed-to rules, regulations and plans, in accordance w ith which organiza
tional energies and financial commitments are allocated, and which we are
calling 'international regim es;1and (3) international organizations, (p. 569)
Ruggie's definition o f international regimes was later m odified at a conference
chaired by Stephen K rasner.

Since then basically all discussions o f international

regimes proceed from this so-called consensus definition:
Regimes are sets o f implicit or explicit principles, norm , rules, and decision
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given
area o f international relations. Principles are beliefs o f fact, causation, and
rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms o f rights and
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.
Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and imple
menting collective choice (1983, p. 2).
According to K rasner (1983, pp. 3-4), the definition has two advantages.
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First the definition encourages analysts to pay attention to the relationships among
the various regime elements.

Second, it enables us to distinguish two levels of

regime change. If principles or norms change, a change o f the regime itself takes
place and a new regime emerges. On the other hand, changes in rules and procedures
are changes within the regime.
Although the consensus definition was designed to reconcile differences
betw een different intellectual camps, it still has received its share o f criticism.
K ratochw and Ruggie (1986), for example, challenged the internal consistency o f the
consensus definition. They argued that rules and procedures are about observable
behavior whereas principles and norms are about shared beliefs. These different ele
ments o f regimes have to be studied differently. They pointed out that the definition's
stress on convergent expectations as the basis o f regimes gives regimes an intersubjective nature. But given the dominant epistemological position in regime analysis
was positivism, their conclusion was that ontology contradicted epistemology in
regimes literature. Instead they called for the interpretive epistemology.
Other critics claim that the definition is too complex and includes too many
elements.

Instead, for example, Keohane defined international regimes as “institu

tions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets
o f issues in international relations” (1989, p. 3). To him, international regimes are
one form o f (international) institutions which are defined as “persistent and con
nected sets o f rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain
activity, and shape expectations” (1989, p. 3). International institutions come in one
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o f three forms: (1) formal intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) or transnational
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), (2) international regimes, and (3) conven
tions (informal institutions).

Keohane contends that there is a tendency tow ard

evolution from convention to regime to organization and each step forward in the
sequence is a step towards increased institutionalized.
Krasner's definition is instructive to the extent that it illustrates what different
elem ents various theorists concern them selves with. But it appears that some regime
theorists have echoed and addressed KratochwiI and Ruggie's concerns and their
efforts have made them occupy a significant place (constructivism) in American IR
theories (Katzenstein et al., 1998). K eohane’s definition is helpful to the extent that
he makes a distinction among international organization, international regime, and
conventions within the framework o f international institutions. B ut it is limited in
discussing what shared ideas, such as collective identity, might affect regime devel
opment.
Indeed, developing a definition is crucial because it is the building block o f a
theory. And yet it is premature to devote much effort at this time trying to specify a
standardized definition that is simultaneously “intuitively satisfying, empirically
rigorous, and scientifically useful” (Isaak, 1985, p. 102) when theories o f inter
national regimes have not converged into a consensus perspective.

In light o f new

observations, it is not uncommon to modify the original definition back and forth in
order to refine a theory throughout the process o f theory building.

It seems that a

minim um requirement o f a definition is to include those variables that researchers
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w ant to investigate in their theoretical perspectives.
Although the concept o f international regimes was developed in mid-1970s,
its latest development has been influenced by the new institutionalism (M arch &
Olson, 1984). Many researchers o f international regimes contend that international
regimes are international institutions (Krasner, 1999; March & Olsen, 1998; Young,
1999). According to Young, for example, "International regimes, the central concern
o f m ost contributors to the new institutionalism in international relations, are institu
tional arrangements whose members are states and whose operations center on issues
arising in international society" (1999, p. 11). In this study, I start with Young's defi
nition, but institutional arrangem ents clearly need to be further elaborated. In this
regard, I will adopt M arch and Olson's definition o f an institution w hich is sociolog
ically oriented. The main reason for the use o f their definition is that it is consistent
with the proposed model in this study. March and Olsen argue that
In a general way, an "institution" can be viewed as a relatively stable collec
tion o f practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups o f
actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in struc
tures o f meaning and schemes o f interpretation which explain and legitimize
particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them. (1998, p.
948)
This definition's em phasis on appropriate behavior for actors is related to a
distinction M arch and Olsen (1989) make between two logics o f social action: a logic
o f consequence and a logic o f appropriateness. Common in econom ic approaches, a
logic o f consequence sees actors as rational utility-maximizers. The actors come to
institutions with a fixed set o f preferences which they are able to rank. Actors engage
in a strategic exchange w ith others within the constraints set by institutional rules. If
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the institutional rules change, actors usually change their strategies but not their pref
erences. Common in sociological approaches, institutions dictate a logic o f appropri
ateness. Institutions indicate to actors w hat they are supposed to do in a certain situa
tion. Instead o f asking myself how can I maxim ize my self-interest, an actor asks,
given w ho I am (identity), how should I act in this particular situation. Putting it dif
ferently, in rational choice models o f international regimes, actors are playing a stra
tegic gam e o f exchange, whereas in sociological models actors are role-players o f a
com m unity who participate in a policy discourse.
In M arch and Olsen's definition, actors' identities are crucial for their actions.
In a given situation, human action has a tendency o f evoking an identity or role and
m atching the obligations o f that identity or role. They argue that "Human actors are
im agined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations,
approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities betw een cur
rent identities and choice dilemmas and m ore general concepts of self and situations"
(1998, p. 951). To say that actors follow rules according to the logic o f appropriate
ness is not to say, "it is irrational or stupid" (Finnemore, 1996, p. 29). In practices,
actors may find in a given situation that they have to choose from conflicting identi
ties (collective or individual) to invoke and different rules (for example, sovereignty
vs. efficiency) to follow. All o f these choice dilemmas may involve complex reason
ing process.
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25
Theories o f International Regimes

The development o f international regime theory has its roots in American IR
scholarship in the mid-1970s. Since then interest in international regimes has spread
not only in the United States but in Europe as well (Rittberger, 1993).

European

scholars divide theories o f international regimes into power-based (or realism),
interest-based (or neoliberalism), and knowledge-based (or cognitivism) approaches
(Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997), whereas American IR theorists use dif
ferent categories which are neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism respec
tively (Katzenstein et al., 1998). Looking into specific theories under these two dif
ferent sets o f categories, one finds that both American and European classifications
o f regime theories are similar in important part because most o f their overlap. I will
adopt the European classification because it intuitively points out the key variable
(power, interests, and knowledge) different theories emphasize for regime analysis.
In this section, I will describe how different theories explain regime forma
tion. It is important to understand why nation-states want to establish a regime in the
first place because it will give us a profile o f what the initial motivations o f regime
members are and it will affect the subsequent regime development in terms o f depth
and width.

Power-based Theories

The basic premise o f power-based theories o f international regime is that the
com petitive pressures o f the international structure characterized by anarchy will lead
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self-interested states to focus more on self-help than other-help. Even with the under
standing that mutual gains (absolute gains) exist, states still m ust be concerned with
the distribution o f those gains (relative gains) because o f the possibility that potential
rivals become more powerful. Therefore, international regimes are difficult to estab
lish and maintain (Grieco, 1988; Kirshner, 1999).

Nevertheless, within this diffi

culty, power-based theory point out international regimes will em erge under certain
conditions.
One variant o f power-based theories is hegemonic stability theory. Its basic
argument is that the rise o f a hegemon increases the possibility o f regime formation.
By the same logic, if the power o f a hegemon erodes, th e’ regime will decline.
Kindleberger (1973) originally proposed the hegemonic stability theory.

As he

argued, "for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one sta
bilizer" (p. 305). The theoretical foundation of his argument is based on Olson's clas
sic w ork on collective action (Olson, 1965). According to Olson, a group o f individ
uals will not work together to achieve their common interest if this interest is nonex
cludable, meaning that once the common interest is provided there is no way to pre
vent any individual from consuming it. As such, each individual sees that it is not in
her best interest to contribute her share o f the cost o f providing a public good, but to
take a free ride on those who are willing to do it. But if every individual has this
same mentality and waits for others to do it, chances are that public goods will not be
provided. But under some conditions, according to Olson, the public good will be
provided: (a) if the group is quite small, (b) if one individual or a group o f individuals
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(privileged group) is willing to provide the public good alone, o r (c) if there is coer
cion or some other special device to make individuals to pay their shares (1965, p. 2,
p. 49).
A liberal world econom y was considered as a public good by Kindleberger
(1973) and the empirical support for his argument was that B ritain played the hege
monic role in the nineteenth century, but it was exhausted after W orld W ar I. As
such, Britain was unable to provide the infrastructure for the liberal world economy.
The United States was unw illing to provide it because o f an isolationist strategy. The
consequence was rising protectionism, the Great Depression, and finally military
upheaval. Gilpin (1987) continued the argument o f hegemonic stability theory as he
pointed out that the United States used its dominant position to prom ote the GATT,
IMF, and World Bank in order to reintegrate world econom ies after W orld War II.
But as American dominance declined, the international econom ic order drifted away
from the original design o f the B retton W oods system.
Balance o f pow er is another variant o f power-based theories which argues
that the rise o f a hegemon decreases cooperation because it induces the other states to
turn to balancing against it. A ccording to Waltz (1979), there are tw o basic ways that
states can balance against a hegemon.

States can try to catch up a potential hege

mony by building up their own capabilities (internal balancing). I f they cannot go it
alone, they will seek allies against that hegemony by forming an alliance or coalition
(external balancing).

But the interesting question is why a w eaker state does not

bandwagon with but balance against a hegemon?

W altz's explanation is that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the w eaker side; for it is the
stronger side that threatens them" (Ibid, p. 126). Walt (1987) proposes another expla
nation which is an important modification o f Waltz's position, suggesting that states
tend to balance against threats rather than power per sec. These perceived threats are
derived from the assessments o f opponent's intentions. Walt argues that
in general, the weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon rather than
balance. This situation occurs because weak states add little to the strength of
a defensive coalition but incur the wrath o f the more threatening states
nevertheless. (1987, p. 29)

Interest-based Theories

The basic argument o f interest-based theories o f international regimes is that
the rising intensity o f interdependence among nation-states in many issue areas poses
strong demands for regime formation. International regimes can be considered as a
"special device" (as Olson suggests) to facilitate the provision o f public goods. Inter
national regimes emerge to solve collective action problems, m arket failure, coordi
nation problems, and transaction costs that stand in the way o f international coopera
tion. By accepting power-based assumptions of international regimes such as selfinterested states and anarchy in the international system, interest-based theorists
claim that, under certain conditions, international cooperation may nevertheless
occur. Interest-based theorists do not deny the importance o f pow er and self-interest,
but they claim that structural realists such as Waltz, Gilpin and others exaggerate the
degree to which the international system is anarchical (Keohane, 1982, 1984, 1993;
M ilner, 1997; Young, 1998). Although there is no formal hierarchy o f authority in
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international system, informal elements o f global governance exist in the form o f
international regimes.
Robert Keohane may be the most influential scholar o f interest-based theories
o f international regimes. In fact, both proponents and opponents o f interest-based
theories o f regimes have discussed his works as preface to their own research.
According to him, "Conflict may be the rule; if so, institutionalized patterns o f coop
eration are particularly in need o f explanation" (1982, p. 325). Keohane points out
that states often make individual agreements in many policy issues with other states.
As the degree o f the world economy deepens, states recognize that it is inefficient to
negotiate each bargain with different countries from scratch individually.

The pro

cess will be much more efficient if states begin with some baseline rules and then
negotiate individual agreements from there.

By performing this baseline function,

international regimes can reduce transaction costs, coordinate different expectations,
and facilitate the negotiation o f specific bargains.
In 1984, Keohane published one o f the most cited works in IR literature After Hegemony.

In this book, he tries to convey two basic main points.

First,

power-based assumptions can reach interest-based conclusions. W ithout relying on
the General Will, according to Keohane,
even on the restrictive assumptions o f Realism and game theory, gloomy con
clusions about the inevitability o f discord and the impossibility o f cooperation
do not logically follow. Egoistic governments can rationally seek to form
international regimes on the basis o f shared interests. (1984, p. 107)
Second, Keohane has demonstrated that international regimes are needed regardless
o f w hether or not a hegemon exists. He develops a functional theory o f international

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

regimes, also known later as neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1993). H e then
tests his theory by exam ining issue areas o f oil, money and trade. H e finds that even
after 1970s, when he believes the United States ceased to' be a hegemon, the
advanced industrial countries have continued to coordinate their policies in the inter
national political economy. The world has not gone back to the beggar-thy-neighbor
policies o f the 1930s (discriminatory and protective measures such as erecting trade
barriers, capital restrictions, and so on) and the world has not formed rigid economic
blocs.

Knowledge-based Theories

Knowledge-based theories explain regime formation as the result o f con
sensual knowledge or shared ideas acquired by state actors. Before states can agree
on whether an international policy issue exists and, if it does, how to deal with it,
they must reach some consensus about the nature o f the problem.

According to

knowledge-based theorists, between international structures and human agents lies
interpretation (H asenclever et al., 1997; W endt, 1987). Actors must use interpreta
tion to make sense o f the structure in which they are embedded and in turn their inter
pretation depend on their own ideas or knowledge. As such, without denying human
agents are purposive, proponents o f knowledge-based theories maintain that it is
improper for rationalists to treat actors’ interests as given because they may have dif
ferent ideas about the content o f interests. Rather, actors’ interests should be further
analyzed in order to understand where their preferences come from.
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Hasenclever et al. (1997) characterize those knowledge-based theorists such
as Peter Haas (1989, 1992) as weak cognitivists because they want to complement
but not to engage a fundam ental attack on rationalist theories. Haas emphasizes the
role o f epistemic com m unities for the creating and m aintaining o f international
regimes. He defines an epistemic community as "a netw ork o f professionals with
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (1992, p. 3).
Given the intensity o f interdependence among states and the increasingly technical
nature o f international policy issues, policymakers experience uncertainty about how
to define their interests.

As such, policymakers often dem and expert advice. The

role that an epistemic com m unity can play to help policym akers is in "articulating the
cause-and-effect relationships o f complex problems, helping states identify their
interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and
identifying salient points for negotiation" (Haas, 1992, p. 2).
In his study o f pollution abatement in the M editerranean, Haas (1989) demon
strates that epistemic com m unities not only provided the technical knowledge regard
ing the nature o f pollution in the Mediterranean, they also made the policy alterna
tives possible. Scientists successfully persuaded governm ent elites to redefine their
interests and cooperate with other members despite their initial differences in terms
o f how to deal with pollution. Although Haas stresses the importance o f epistemic
communities, he does not de-emphasize the role o f power. This is especially the case
in which "scientific evidence is ambiguous and the experts them selves are split into
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contending factions, issues have tended to be resolved less on their technical merits
than on their political ones" (Haas, 1992, p. 11). As such, if m em bers o f epistemic
communities can be promoted into formal positions o f governments, they arguably
exceed the role of advisers and can exert more influence on policy.
Another variant o f knowledge-based theories is w hat Hasenclever et al.
(1997) characterize as strong cognitivism, which not only undertakes a radical cri
tique on rationalism but also challenges it with rival perspectives. Strong cognitivists
such as Adler and Barnett (1998) and Alexander Wendt (1994, 1999) focus the role
o f collective identity in security community or international regime formation.
According to Wendt (1994) “through interaction, states might form collective identi
ties and interests, redefining the terms o f Olson's [collective action] problem alto
gether” (p. 384). Among the variables that Wendt (1999) identifies as the causes o f
collective identity formation, two variables are particularly related to international
regime formation- interdependence and common fate.

Interdependence between

states, for example, due to international trade, can encourage states to form an inter
national regime for policy coordination.

Common fate refers to the situation in

which states feel they are on the same boat. For example, states may form a regime
when they perceive a common enemy or threat that they can not protect themselves
unilaterally. As we can see the interdependence argument is basically indistinguish
able from the argument o f interest-based theories and likewise the common fate con
dition is the core tenet o f power-based theories (balance o f pow er or threat).

Yet

what distinguishes Wendt's argument o f these two conditions from that o f power-
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based and interest-based theories is that interdependence and com m on fate relate to
collective identity, not just behavior only.

Putting it differently, w hereas power-

based and interest-based theories can explain states' behavioral

cooperation,

knowledge-based theories point out a shared identity may be developed from states'
cooperation.
To conclude this section, it appears that the differences persist between
rational choice theorists who deliberately exclude details for the sake o f analytical
tractability and knowledge-based theorists who would sacrifice a degree o f formal
rigor for the sake of factual richness. Indeed parsimony is a virtue in the process o f
theory building and yet that should not be the only consideration. Excessive parsi
mony may sacrifice accuracy for clarity.

Depending on the research questions at

hands, it is the responsibility o f the researcher to explain why a particular perspective
is chosen over another.

Constructivism

In this section, I will discuss constructivism which is part o f a grow ing litera
ture on the importance o f ideas and norms in international relations (Checkel, 1998;
Copeland, 2000; Hopf, 1998; Ruggie, 1999; Wendt, 1995, 1999). In so doing I first
locate the place o f constructivism in the IR field, discuss the basic argum ents o f con
structivism, explain why I adopt this approach as the theoretical point o f departure in
this study, and finally respond to some critiques on constructivism.
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34
An O verview o f Constructivism

Constructism is one variant o f knowledge-based theories o f international
regimes (in particular) and international politics (in general). It is challenging and
sometimes confusing trying to locate knowledge-based approaches in IR theories.
D ifferent scholars use different labels to classify IR theories. The oft-cited classifica
tion is the one offered by Robert Cox who argues that there are two kinds o f theory in
IR: "problem solving theory" and "critical theory" (1986, pp. 208-209).

To Cox,

questions o f theory are inseparable from purpose. Problem solving theorists take the
existing order as given and for them the purpose o f theory is to solve the particular
problem to reproduce the status quo ante. In contrast, critical theorists are trying to
reveal the structures that make the existing order possible and identify how it may be
changed.

Based upon Cox's classification, W endt (1995) argues that critical IR

theory is a family o f theories including postm odernists, constructivists, neo-m arxists,
Frankfurt School critical theorists, and feminists.

Apparently these theorists have

quite different research agendas, but what unites them, according to W endt, is an
interest in:
how international relations is socially constructed which involves tw o basic
claims: the fundamental structures o f international politics are social rather
than strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these struc
tures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a
claim that opposes rationalism). (1995, pp. 71-72)
W endt identifies him self as a constructivist and argues that social structures o f inter
national politics have three elements: “shared knowledge, material resources, and
practices” (1995, p. 73).
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The first element o f social structures o f international politics is shared know
ledge, expectations or understandings.

In a given structure, actors use their inter-

subjective understanding to define a situation and the nature o f their relationships.
W endt uses a comparison between a security dilemma and security community to
dem onstrate how shared knowledge works. A security dilemma emerges when states
interpret each other as an enemy that leads to a structure in which worst case assump
tions are made about the intentions o f other states; subsequently they define their
interests in self-help terms. A security community, instead, is a social structure based
upon shared understandings in which states consider each other as a partner and trust
each other; as a result they are willing to settle their differences peacefully without
resorting to violence.
The second element o f social structures o f international politics is material
resources such as oil and nuclear weapons.

But unlike rational choice theorists’

“desocialized” view o f such capabilities, constructivists maintain that “material
resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure o f shared
knowledge in which they are embedded” (1995, p. 73). Thus, according to Wendt, it
is a w rong question to ask when ideas m atter as opposed to material resources such as
pow er and interest, “ideas always matter since power and interest do not have effects
apart from the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such” (1995, p. 74). For
exam ple, consider nuclear weapons.

Constructivists contend that it is not nuclear

w eapons them selves that matter but who holds them. Apparently the United States
will not worry much about nuclear weapons held by the UK. However, the United
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States is very much concerned about the possibility that North Korea might possess
just one or two nuclear weapons.
The third element o f social structures o f international politics is practices.
Social structures are produced, reproduced, or transformed by what actors do.

As

Wendt argues:
Self-help and pow er politics do not follow either logically or causally from
anarch y ...If today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to pro
cess, not structure. There is no “logic” o f anarchy apart from the practices
that create and instantiate one structure o f identities and interests rather than
another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Selfhelp and pow er politics are institutions, not essential features o f anarchy.
Anarchy is what states make o f it. (1992, pp. 394-395)
In other words, what Wendt suggests is that power politics and self-help are
not inherent properties o f the international system but rather it is an intersubjective
understandings based on past experiences o f actors’ practices that makes the system
work the way it does now. This insight has important implications for constructivist
theorizing because it enables constructivists to account for the process o f structural
change that redefines actors’ identities and interests.
Contemporary constructive research has been influenced by scholarly works
such as, Berger and Luckmann's ideas o f the social construction o f reality and the
structuration theory o f Anthony Giddens among others. For Berger and Luckmann
(1967), social construction involves objective, subjective and intersubjective know
ledge. Constructive research in IR investigates how the objective features o f inter
national politics (for example, international regimes) are constituted or defined by
subjective meanings o f actors (for example, regime members) and intersubjective
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processes such as discourses in social interaction.
Following Giddens' contributions, constructivists m aintain that constructivism
is ontologically structurationism/holism not individualism /reductionism (Giddens,
1984; Isaak, 1985; Ruggie, 1999; W endt, 1987, 1999).

Structurationism contends

that explanations o f political phenom ena are not reducible to agent or structure.
Instead, constructivism suggests a process through which agents and structures
coevolve and mutually shape each other through interaction or practice. Agents cre
ate structures which in turn shape agents' subsequent behaviors. But structures are
not fixed; they are reproduced or transform ed through agents' practices.

The Rationale for Taking a Constructivist Approach

Several reasons can be identified to support the adoption o f a constructivist
approach as the theoretical departure in this study. According to Green and Shapiro
(1994), a major weakness o f rational choice theorizing stems from "a method-driven
rather than problem-driven approach to research, in w hich practitioners are more
eager to vindicate one or another universalist model than to understand and explain
actual political outcomes" (p. 33). In other words, formal precision is followed and
the cost is a loss o f relevance for the com plex world in w hich we live.

Rational

choice theorists have applied sophisticated models and fine statistical estimation tech
niques, but the complexity o f the empirical world remains hidden from scientific
view. By assuming states’ preferences are exdogeneously given, power-based and
interest-based theories o f international regimes assum e states have the same interests,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

be it absolute gains or relative gains. However, before defending national interests in
the international regimes, m em ber states have to define their national interests in the
first place.

It is reasonable to assum e that states want to m axim ize wealth.

But

w ealth for whom? For multinational corporations or small-medium sized enterprises
o r average citizens? Even if m ost econom ists agree that free trade is the best eco
nom ic policy, they are describing the macro aggregation, not the m icro distribution.
Globalization is indeed a contested w ord for different people.
Some states view one another as enemies; others see one another as allies.
A ccording to Stein (1999), models o f strategic choice "decontextualize" the relation
ship between states. He poses a question that "Because the alliance problem is a pri
soner's dilemma and the arm am ent choice between enemies is also a prisoner's dilem
ma, does that mean there is no difference between alliances and rivalries in inter
national politics" (p. 222)? For instance, the complex relationship between Taiwan
and China clearly demonstrates the point that there may be a gap between econo
m ists' consensus views on what is econom ically rational and governm ent elites' per
ceptions o f what is politically rational. From the economic angle, the Taiwan gov
ernm ent has every reason to remove the restrictions set to discourage investments in
China, but politically it is not rational to do because, based on past historical experi
ences and practices, governm ent elites in Taiwan believe China is still hostile to
them. There is always a risk that China will use Taiwan's econom ic dependence on
her to force Taiwan to make political concessions.

Identity and history matter

indeed.
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In order to translate research problems into a determinate system o f equations,
research strategies for both power-based and interest-based theories are based on
rational choice theory which can be defined as: (a) self-interested actors (b) utilitymaximizing behavior, (c) stable preferences, and (d) market equilibrium (Green &
Shapiro, 1994; Morrow, 1994).

State representatives com e to a negotiation table

(market) to play a strategic game o f bargaining (exchange); they use various strate
gies, such as issue-linkage, side-payment, or bottom line, until a deal is done, that is,
an equilibrium is reached when no actor can improve its position on its own. To de
scribe the sam e situation, knowledge-based theorists o f international regime instead
use different words like policy discourse, deliberation, identity, persuasion, or social
learning. W hether or not rhetoric is important in politics is debatable, but why worry
about such elusive concepts as identity or ideas if in the end w e can explain or predict
the same policy outcomes with a "simpler" model?

I f this is the case, parsimony

would compel us to choose power-based or interest-based approaches. As Kenneth
Waltz argues, "A scientific assumptions cannot be true or false, only more or less
instrumental for the purpose o f theory-building.

The trick is to explain much by

little, not much by much" (cited in Mouritzen, 1997, p. 77). B ut knowledge-based
theorists do claim that a simplified situation does damage to our understanding o f the
complex situation and turns our intellectual efforts in the wrong direction.

For

instance, W endt (1995, p. 80) argues that:
Indeed, what is so striking about neorealism is its total neglect o f the
explanatory role o f state practice. It does not seem to m atter w hat states do:
Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Zhirinovsky, what difference does it make? The logic
o f anarchy will always bring us back to square one. This is a disturbing
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attitude if realpolitik causes the very conditions to which it is a response; to
the extent that realism counsels realpolitik, therefore, it is part o f the problem.
W endt's warnings may be interpreted as the problem o f what R obert M erton
(1968) describes as a self-fulfilling prophecy. I f w e define situations as real, they are
real in their consequences. If we always treat our counterparts as rivals o r enemies,
they may becom e rivals and enemies eventually.

Since power-based and interest-

based approaches treat states as self-interested and utility-maximizing actors, the
consequences o f policy prescriptions from both approaches may becom e the prob
lems they want to cure. Knowledge-based theorists are not naive to assum e states are
always other-regarding and they do not deny states' behaviors are intentional or pur
posive either. But they add a theoretical step by problem atizing states' preferences~a
crucial step that expands their theoretical leverage in terms o f explaining both inter
national conflict and cooperation.

Criticism o f Constructivism

The problem o f causality: Kowert and Legro (1996) argue that constructivists
typically take norms as a key independent variable when conducting empirical
research. But in doing so constructivists violate their own assumption that actors and
structure are mutually constitutive.

In other words, if structures are so rigid that

agents feel compelled to follow the norms, then w here is agents' autonomy?
It is ironic when some constructivists respond to rational choice theorists' call
for establishing independent idealist variable to influence states' behavior; now the
accusation

is

internal

inconsistency

within

their

models

ontologically

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

if

constructivists choose to do so. Neither way will satisfy rational choice theorists.
Nevertheless the accusation is not totally incorrect.

I would argue that since con

structivists take structurationism as the ontological position, they have to accept the
theoretical implication o f indeterminacy. Constructivism is a theory o f process.

For

constructivists, by assum ing that structure and actors are codetermined, meaning that
neither structures nor agents have ontological priority, the question o f which (struc
ture or actors) has the causal primacy cannot be theoretically predetermined. But this
is not necessarily a drawback. The mentality o f prediction and control that preoccu
pies positivists has com pelled them to search for a determ inate model.

But if the

rationale behind this m entality is based on the demand for policy prescriptions, con
structivists have something to recommend too (for example, the diplomatic idea o f
constructive engagement).
The problem o f value: M earsheimer (1995) contends that critical theories
(including constructivism) are value-laden and therefore they are not scientific
approaches.

On the other hand, as a postmodernist, Jam es Der Derian (2000),

questions that "If we do indeed construct the world we live in, if our theories are
inextricably interdependent with our practices, why do w e go on reproducing so
much o f its violence, criminality, and outright evil" (p. 781)7 This is indeed a serious
and powerful normative question. I agree with W endt's argum ent (1995, p. 74) that:
"If critical theories fail, this will be because they do not explain how the world works,
not because o f their values". Still, there is a distinction between postmodernists and
modernists. Constructivists are modernists who adopt the scientific methodology to
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falsify their propositions w ith evidence. Therefore, Checkel (1998) points out that
"constructivists have rescued the research o f identity from postmodernists. By argu
ing for its importance using methods accepted by the majority o f scholars, they have
been able to challenge mainstream analysts on their own ground"(p. 325).
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CHAPTER IE

A CONSTRUCTIVIST M ODEL OF INTERNATIONAL REGIM ES

Identities and Interests

Constructivists have charged rationalists on the position o f treating actors’
interests as given, but what are their alternatives?

The answer is identity.

Most

constructivists claim that actors’ interests have been in an im portant way guided by
their identities. Although there are many definitions o f identity, most start with the
understanding o f oneself in terms o f others (Alder & Barnett, 1998). In other words,
identity can be divided into individual and collective identity and they are co
constituted because individual identity receives social meaning only with reference to
the identities o f others through interaction. Therefore Weller (2000, p. 50) suggests
that we can “conceive o f a concept o f collective identity that treats the individual as
the bearer o f identity and uses the term ‘collective identity’ for the relation o f corre
spondence between the individual identities o f the members o f this group.” To fol
low his suggestion, the very basic question is to ask who is the individual bearer o f
identity we want to investigate. The individual bearer o f identity, namely the unit o f
analysis, can be a state or a coalition o f states. For example, one can discuss the indi
vidual identity o f APEC and its collective identity as a coalition within WTO. Or
one can analyze the individual identity o f United States and its collective identity as a
m em ber o f APEC.
43
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Alexander W endt (1992, 1994, 1999) has discussed the relationship between
identities and interests in the analysis o f state-as-actor in international politics and I
will draw from his insights to develop a proposition. Wendt's basic argum ent is that
"Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it
knows who it is (1999, p. 231). According to W endt, states have two kinds o f identi
ties: corporate (or individual) and collective (or social).
Corporate identity is defined as “the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that
constitute actor individuality”(1994, p. 385). W endt (1999) suggests that the corpor
ate identity o f the state has four corresponding interests (the same as national inter
ests to him): (1) physical survival, (2) autonomy, (3) economic well-being, and (4)
collective self-esteem. States must m eet these four basic needs in order to reproduce
themselves. To Wendt, these four basic interests or needs do not entail self-interest
to the extent that self presupposes an other or others and these four basic needs have
to be satisfied with or without interaction with others. I f states do interact with other
states, then states' self-interests becom e meaningful for analysis. W hen states inter
act, how a state meets its corporate interests depends on how it perceives its relation
ship with other states and this is w here collective identity fits in. Collective identi
ties, according to Wendt, involve an "identification" with the fate o f the other. Ident
ification refers to "a continuum from negative to positive-from conceiving the other
as anathem a to the self to conceiving it as an extension o f the self' (1994, p. 386).
Self-interest and collective interest are effects o f the degree to which a state identifies
with other states. Just as self-interest implies w hat a state wants, collective interest is
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w hat states w ant as a group or community. Exactly how collective interest will be
m aterialized is a matter o f degree, depending on how much a state extends the boun
dary o f se lf to include others.
To illustrate the relationship betw een state identities and their corresponding
interests, W endt (1999) has discussed three (Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian) cul
tures o f anarchy. In so doing, he dem onstrates that as a corporate interest o f states,
physical survival can be pursued in many different ways, depending on intersubjective ideas o f collective identities am ong states. In a Hobbesian culture, states view
each other as enemies; violence is employed as a basic tool for physical survival. In
a Lockean culture, states perceive each other as rivals which has characterized the
m odern state system since the Treaty o f W estphalia; states may use violence to pur
sue their interests, but they refrain from elim inating each other. In a Kantian culture,
which has emerged only recently in relations between democracies, states conceive o f
each other as friends; states do not use force to settle conflicts and w ork as a com
m unity against security threats.
Interestingly, as a critique to W endt's constaictivist claims in the analysis o f
anarchy, M ercer (1995) draws on social identity theory (SIT) to reach the neorealist
conclusion.

Social identity theory suggests that actors engage in categorization,

identification, and comparison in their construction o f a self-image (Tajfel & Turner,
1986). First, on the basis o f sim ilarities and difference, we divide the social world
into categories for the sake o f cognitive econom y. Second, we identify the categories
or groups to which we perceive ourselves as belonging. Third, we then com pare the
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in-group (the group to which we belong) and the out-group (a rival group); to the
extent that the in-group is perceived to be better than the out-group, our social identi
ties are enhanced.

Because o f the need for positive social identity, social identity

theory contends that in-group members have the tendency to positively stereotype
their group and negatively stereotype their rival group members.
Applying social identity theory to analyze anarchy in international system,
M ercer suggests that social identity has a nature o f “the double-edged sword-in-group
identity promotes intergroup discrimination” (1995, p. 245). He argues that there is
grow ing empirical support for the proposition that collectivist culture and intergroup
discrim ination are positively related. In other words, the more collectivist the cul
ture, the stronger the in-group social identity, and the stronger the intergroup dis
crimination. Using ethnocentrism as evidence, M ercer (1995) claims that “it seems
likely that the more collectivist the culture, the more applicable SIT. To the extent
that SIT has been confirmed using predominately male Western individualists, it has
passed the hardest test” (p. 246). He then equates intergroup with interstate relations.
To Mercer, competition between states is not necessarily triggered by security or eco
nomic concerns; “instead, competition results from categorization, comparison, and a
need for a positive social identity” (1995, p. 246). His conclusions is that “groups are
inherently competitive; this supports the neorealist claim that the principle o f action
in anarchy is self-help” (1995, p. 247).
At first glance, Mercer is correct that in-group members have a tendency to
devalue outgroup members, according to social identity theory. But a closer look at
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his argum ents might reveal that he only emphasizes one aspect o f the whole complex
situation and fails to take other equally important aspects into account.

For one

thing, M ercer equates intergroup with interstate relations; namely the boundary o f
categorization is drawn along the lines o f the state system. But the state as an actor
can use many different categorizations to perceive the world. In a world dominated
by states, domestic politics and cultural ethnocentrism clearly reinforce a national
identity. But with the end o f the Cold War, the perceptions o f states are increasingly
affected by other institutions that offer alternative categorizations for forming collec
tive identity (for instance EU as a community o f states or NAFTA as a trading bloc).
I am not arguing that national identities are not dominant expressions in international
relations today, but it is theoretically unjustified to exclude the possible influence
from other categorizations o f in-group and out-group that states find themselves in.
For another thing, even if w e equate intergroup with interstate relations, the
cultural barrier o f ethnocentrism has to be somehow discounted by the efforts of
intercultural communication and the spread o f democratic values around the world.
Because o f different historical experiences, every country has its own unique social
and political culture. As such, it is not difficult to find that an appropriate behavior in
one country is deemed inappropriate in another country. But culture is socially con
structed and therefore is subject to change. W hile some cultural characteristics are
reproduced, others are transformed. It can be argued then that whether ethnocentrism
will be manifested to cause interstate conflict is historically contingent, depending on
what states do to each other in the past and current practice.
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Put differently,

ethnocentrism may be considered as an intervening variable; it will recede into the
background if no other independent variable inhibits interstate cooperation and it will
manifest to worsen the situation if other independent variables do exert influence to
cause interstate conflict.
Theoretically, W endt’s constructivist perspective on interstate relationships is
not incompatible with the arguments o f social identity theory. It can be argued that
W endt’s conception o f corporate identity has taken care o f M ercer’s concerns that
competition and self-help inherently characterize interstate relations.

In addition,

although state sovereignty and domestic politics clearly play a crucial role in rein
forcing a national identity, they are moderated by the state's participation in inter
national society.

"As the ability to meet corporate needs unilaterally declines, so

does the incentive to hang onto the egoistic identities that generate such policies, and
as the degree o f common fate increases, so does the incentive to identify with others"
(Wendt, 1994, p. 389).
W endt's theoretical perspective clearly has more explanatory leverage than
M ercer's, but what about states' identities that are in conflict in a given situation?
W endt emphasizes that if different identities are in com petition w ith one another,
there is no way to predict a priori which identity states will evoke. Still, he suggests
a general hypothesis: "in any situation the solution to identity conflicts within an
actor will reflect the relative' salience' or hierarchy o f identity com m itm ents in the
S elf' (1999, p. 230). Clearly this hypothesis does not take us very far; it needs fur
ther specification. Ironically, W endt argues that in terms o f identity hierarchy, if a
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state's corporate and collective identities are in conflict, corporate identity will tend to
be selected.

W endt's apparent concessions to the rationalist theories do not mean

corporate identity will always be dominant. For example, the state can learn to be
other-regarding. I will discuss the process o f learning in the next part o f the model.
In terms o f identity salience, it can be argued that the solution to states' identity
conflicts will be resolved by the degree to which a state is com m itted to a particular
relationship. For example, if the United States values APEC, it may go against some
im portant domestic interest groups in terms o f policy choices where the cohesiveness
o f APEC is at stake.
Proposition 1: In a given situation, if a state's corporate and collective identi
ties are in conflict, corporate identity will tend to be selected.
Proposition 1.1: The more a state is committed to maintaining interstate rela
tionships, the higher the salience o f its collective identity relative to corporate
identity.

Policy Discourse: Policy Learning and Communicative Action

Rational regime theorists assume that actors’ interests and identities are con
stant, as such their models are unable to explain how actors may change their identi
ties and interests during policy discourse or interaction. In contrast, many constructi
vists have paid attentions to the social or policy learning to explain how actors' ident
ities and interests might be changed. Before discussing the crucial role o f learning in
constructivism, it is important to specify the dynamics through which states' identities
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50
can be changed during policy discourse.
Drawing from Mead's idea o f reflected appraisal, Wendt argues that "identi
ties and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to
how actors are treated by significant others" (1999, p. 327). To illustrate his argu
ment, W endt assumes two actors, Ego and Alter, in the process o f interaction to play
an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. W hile Axelrod's (1984) strategy o f Tit-for-Tat
can explain why interaction between two self-interested actors can lead to behavioral
cooperation, W endt emphasizes identity effects through the game. W endt's under
standing o f how collective identity might be changed in the process o f collective
action between Ego and Alter bears quoting at some length (1999, p. 346):
W hen people choose to "defect" in a social dilemma they are simultaneously
choosing to reproduce the egoistic identities that constitute that dilemma.
And conversely for prosocial behavior: by choosing to cooperate in a social
dilemma Ego implicitly takes a collective identity, acting "as if' he cares for
Alter, even if this is initially for selfish reasons, and signals to Alter, "I expect
you to do the same in return" (altercasting). If Alter reciprocates then Ego's
tentative new identity will be reinforced, leading to further cooperation and,
over time, an internalization o f collective identity on both sides. On the "we
are what we do" theory o f social interaction, in other words, by acting as if it
had a new identity, and teaching the Other what it must do to help sustain that
identity, each actor erodes his previous identity and learns to see him self in
the m irror o f the Other, changing his conception of who he is.
After explaining the learning process o f how actors’ identities might be
changed, W endt then draws references from Nye (the conceptions o f simple/complex
learning) and Haas (the conceptions o f adaptation/learning) and suggests that "Learn
ing sometimes goes no deeper than these behavioral effects ( ‘sim ple’ learning), but
constructivist approaches highlight the possibility that learning may also have con
struction effects on identities and interests (‘complex’ learning)" (1999, p. 327). His
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strategy is to use simple learning to capture the process o f structural reproduction and
to use com plex learning to explain the social structure change. Y et a closer look at
both Haas and N y e’s original definitions, one can not find the explicit connection
between interests and identities change.

N ye (1987, p. 380) makes a distinction

between simple and com plex learning in explaining foreign policies:
Simple learning uses new information merely to adapt the means, without
altering any deeper goals in the ends- means chain. The actor simply uses a
different instrum ent to attain the same goal. Complex learning, by contrast,
involves recognition o f conflicts among means and goals in causally com pli
cated situations, and leads to new priorities and trade-offs.
Haas (1990, pp. 23-24; pp. 33-34) distinguishes adaptation and learning
which captures the same difference between simple and complex learning, but refers
more specifically to the internal dynamics o f international organizations:
By "learning" I mean the process by which consensual knowledge is used to
specify causal relationships in new ways so that the result affects the content
o f public policy. Learning in and by an international organization implies that
the organization’s members are induced to question earlier beliefs about the
appropriateness o f ends o f action and to think about the selection o f new
ones. ..A daptation, in our context, is the ability to change one’s behavior so as
to meet challenges in the form o f new demands without having to reevaluate
one’s entire program and the reasoning on which that program depends for its
legitimacy.
The distinction between simple and com plex learning is useful to the extent
that it underlines actors’ interests and preferences can be changed during policy dis
courses.

W hereas rational regime theorists can only explain simple learning, con

structivists remind us that states can change causal beliefs not only on policy means
but ends as well through complex learning.

Yet the connection betw een complex

learning and collective identity is unspecified.

Does it mean that when complex
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learning occurs in an international regime, the collective identity o f regime m em bers
will becom e more coherent? I would argue that basing constructivist explanations o f
interests and identities change on complex learning is incomplete because it cannot
capture tw o im portant situations: (1) complex learning occurs but it does not affect
actors' preexisting collective identities, or (2) com plex learning does not occur but
actors' collective identities have been changed during policy discourses.
The first situation is when complex learning does occur but has less to do
with a change o f collective identity. For example, Finnem ore (1996) argues that the
W orld Bank provides a setting in which states are socialized to redefine the m eaning
o f econom ic developm ent. The rising GNP used to be the only policy ends o f eco
nom ic developm ent in the Third World. But in the late 1960s, the meaning o f eco
nom ic developm ent expanded to include distributional concerns. In this case, states
have learned to accept new policy goals and new values w ithout necessarily changing
their collective identities.
The second situation is the possibility that actors' actions in policy discourses
contribute to their collective identity positively w ithout complex learning or changes
in beliefs about ends. Indeed to some researchers and practitioners o f public policy,
it is very difficult for political actors to go beyond simple learning. For example, in
discussing the policy learning in the advocacy coalition framework, Sabatier &
Jenkins-Sm ith (1999) contend that certain policy debates between two coalitions are
irreconcilable because each coalition holds a different ‘belief system’ and it is im pos
sible to find a compromise. A typical exam ple is the debate between the economy
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and ecology. Clearly, some issues in international policy discourse such as environ
mental protection or labor standard is contested between developed and developing
countries. But if at the end o f interaction, two coalitions holding incompatible belief
systems can agree to disagree without imposing their own respective values on each
other, they can leave the negotiation table without resentment.

In this case they

might reinforce their positive collective identity due to mutual respect to their differ
ences or at least keep the current collective identity at the same level without degen
erating into a worse one.
I would suggest that constructivists could draw insights from what Risse
(2000) calls a logic o f arguing to accommodate both the idea o f complex learning and
the two situations I describe above. Basing his study on Haberm as’s theory o f com
municative action, Risse proposes a logic o f arguing which refers to social actions
when “actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative
statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding o f a
situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action”
(2000, p. 7).
According to Risse (2000, p. 6), a logic o f arguing is compatible with a logic
o f appropriateness and in fact the former is an elaboration o f latter. Most constructi
vists followed the logic o f appropriateness to describe actors’ social actions in their
models (Finnmore, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996; March & Olsen, 1998). Although the
logic o f appropriateness is often associated with a structural approach to the study o f
social actions, as previously noted, March and Olsen also mention rule-guided
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behavior as a conscious process. In a given situation w hen actors’ identities are in
conflict or there are different rules to choose from, actors have to make a choice. The
introduction o f a logic o f arguing into March and O lsen’s model makes the actors
become more active.
In a discourse, communicative action based on the logic o f arguing or com
municative rationality is oriented toward consensus by persuasive arguments. When
actors deliberate in a discourse, they try to reach com m unicative or “reasoned” con
sensus on two issues:
(1) whether their assumptions about the world and about cause-and-effect
relationships in the world are correct (the realm o f theoretical discourses); or
(2) whether norms o f appropriate behavior can be justified, and which norms
apply under given circumstances (the realm o f practical discourses). (Risse,
2000, p. 7)
W hen communicative actions prevail, actors do not search to maximize their fixed
interests and preferences but are prepared to change their own views in light of a con
vincing or better argument.
In contrast, strategic action based on the logic o f consequence or instrumental
rationality is oriented tow ard an agreement or a compromise through positive or neg
ative incentives (March & Olsen, 1989, 1998). W hen strategic actions take control in
a discourse, actors do not change their preexisting identities and interests, even in
light o f a better argument; instead they use threats or rewards or both to reach an
agreement.
In a policy discourse, there are several preconditions for actors to conduct
communicative actions in order to search for reasoned consensus: (1) "actors requires
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the ability to empathize, that is, to see things through the eyes o f one's interaction
partner"; (2) actors need to share a ‘common life world' which consists o f "a shared
culture, a common system o f norms and rules perceived as legitim ate and the social
identity o f actors being capable o f communicating and acting"; and (3) "actors need
to recognize each other as equals and have equal access to the discourse, which must
also be open to other participants and be public in nature" (Risse, 2000, pp. 10-11).
At first glance, one may quickly dismiss such preconditions as ideal and the
notion o f the "ideal speech situation" simply does not exist in practice, especially in
international policy discourses.

But a closer look at these preconditions, one may

have a second thought. Let me first describe what aspects are indeed more difficult
and then point out what aspects are more realistic in terms o f observing and applying
preconditions o f communicative actions in practice or for a research purpose.
In the first precondition, w here actors have an ability to empathize, communi
cative actions are self-evident. But it is difficult to distinguish betw een cheap talk,
deception and rhetoric from com m unicative action in practice. In addition, to some
constructivists who have tried to operationalize Habermasian notions in this aspect,
the task is viewed as "daunting" (Checkel, 1999). For research purposes, students o f
constructivist regimes may be advised not to follow this path.
The aspect o f a shared culture in the second precondition is too strict in terms
o f a requirement for communicative actions. W ithout doubt, actors w ith a shared cul
ture tend to have the same world view and this is conductive to m utual understand
ings.

But as previously noted, a deliberate or intended prom otion o f a particular
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cultural identity is unfeasible and undesirable. As such one should not overburden
actors with a precondition o f a shared culture in order to conduct com municative
actions. The fact that people in modern democracies characterized by multiculturalism can live peacefully together is not because their shared or social identity is based
upon a particular culture (by definition). Instead their shared identity is based upon
dem ocratic legitimacy and I think it is this aspect o f Habermas's contributions that is
prom ising and well-suited for further research.
It is not surprising then that many critical theorists (on Cox's classification),
including constructivists, have turned to the Habermasian notions o f equal access,
legitim ate rules, and broader public participation (Bohamn, 1999; Dryzek, 1996;
Held, 1995; Hurd, 1999; Wendt; 1999). But even realists cannot underestim ate the
pow er o f legitimacy. For example, as Schweller and Priess (1997, p. 24) argue, "If
the hegem on adopts a benevolent strategy and creates a negotiated order based on
legitim ate influence and m anagement, lesser states will bandwagon with, rather than
balance against it."

For another example, Stephen Krasner (1999), a prominent

realist, proposes an idea o f "organized hypocrisy". According to him:
Organized hypocrisy occurs w hen the logic o f appropriateness and the logic
o f consequences are in conflict. To secure resources from the environment,
rulers must honor, perhaps only in talk, certain norms but at the sam e time act
in ways that violate these norms, if they hope to retain power and satisfy their
constituents...Political organizations win legitimacy and support through a
logic o f justification as well as through a logic o f justification as well as
through the provision o f resources. A ruler might pay o ff his clients through
import licenses and at the same tim e claim to a wider group o f voters that he
was protecting his country from the depredations of global capitalism, (pp.
64-66)
Krasner's point is well taken but it only reconfirms the power o f legitimacy.
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B ecause it is difficult in public discourses to justify one’s claims on self-interested
grounds.

Even rhetorical arguments that try to justify self-interests must refer to

com m only accepted norms. If the im portance o f legitimacy is agreed upon between
rationalists and constructivists, do they have the same idea about what legitimacy
refers to? Legitimacy can be defined as “the normative belief by an actor that a rule
o r institution ought to be obeyed” (Hurd, 1999, p. 381). For this study, it may be use
ful to follow Scharpf (1997) to draw a distinction between two types o f legitimacy:
input-oriented and output-oriented. W hereas input legitimacy is based on “the agree
ment o f those who are asked to comply”, output legitimacy is based on effective per
form ance to the extent that “effective policies can claim legitimacy if they serve the
com m on good and conform to criteria o f distributive legitimacy” (Scharpf, 1997, p.
153). In other words, input legitimacy emphasizes procedural fairness while output
legitim acy is more concerned with policy performance.
In discussing the case o f EU, given many different ideas competing for policy
directions, Scharpf him self goes for the output legitimacy on the grounds that it
reduces the transaction costs associated with unanimous rule and increased general
w elfare can be redistributed. Proponents o f input legitimacy would argue that institu
tions are not only instruments for technical performance, they are part o f a political
order that make it possible for different groups in conflict to coexist peacefully in the
first place (M arch & Olsen, 1995). In other words, it is not only what you do but
how you do it that matters. Obviously input legitimacy is compatible with the pre
conditions o f communicative actions.

As such constructivists are more oriented
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58
tow ard input legitimacy whereas rationalists are more oriented tow ard output
legitim acy.
I would argue that constructivists should not underestimate the connection
betw een output legitimacy and collective identity among regime members for reasons
I will explain in the next section. Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual fram ework o f how
regim e mem bers interact with one another during the policy discourse and here it is
sufficient to derive a series o f propositions based on analysis above.
Proposition 2: Communicative action is positively correlated to collective
identity am ong regime members. The m ore the regime members conduct com m uni
cative actions, the more the cohesiveness o f regim e collective identity.
Proposition 2.1: The more an international regime is based upon legitimacy,
the higher the probability the regim e m em bers comply with the regime norms, and

T he Nature of Collective Identity

Ideas of
Member or
Coalition A

Action Modes of Discourse

Positive
Identities

Communicative
Actions

Policy O utcom es

N egative
Identities

Strategic
Actions

Policy O utcom es

Intersubjective understanding
o o ss e sse d by M em oer or
Coalition A and B

Ideas of
M ember or
Coalition B

Figure 1. A Constructivist Model o f International Regimes.
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the more the cohesiveness o f regim e collective identity
Proposition 2 .2 : The more the regime decision-making processes involve all
decision-affected actors, the more the regime is based upon legitimacy, the higher the
probability the regime m embers comply with the regime norms, and the more the
cohesiveness o f regime collective identity.

Institutional Development: Policy Stability and Change

Constructivists have good reasons to focus more on input than output legiti
macy. They study policy issues, but concentrate more on norms, procedural rules,
and practices than policy competence, policy change and substantive issues.

This

imbalance, I would argue, is unnecessary because there is a connection between
policy perform ance and collective identities am ong regime members. Regim e con
structivists treat states as actors and assign them w ith corporate and collective identi
ties. I f w e take it one level higher, it follows that an international regime can be also
considered as an actor with its own corporate and collective identities.

As such, an

international regime, just like a state, must satisfy its corporate needs o r interests in
order to survive. For example, what is APEC (corporate identity)? W hat does APEC
want (corporate interests)?

This is where the output-oriented legitim acy becomes

connected to collective identities among APEC members. Input legitim acy is impor
tant to serve as a buffer to lessen the negative consequences o f policy failure, but if
the policy failure continues for extended periods such that the corporate needs are not
provided in time, the fate o f APEC is doomed. I f APEC decays or even disbands, the
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collective identities among its members are surely damaged. Therefore both inputlegitimacy and out-put legitimacy are important to collective identities among regime
members. So, I would argue constructivists should also look into the relations among
identities, interests and institutional development.
Constructivists have been strong on theoretical foundation, but the devil has
been in the details. For example, Wendt is one o f the leading constructivists today
because he provides a solid theoretical perspective to rival rationalist ones. He con
nects identities with interests to explain political actions (corporate/collective identi
ties) and explain how collective identities among states might be changed (a logic o f
reflected appraisal). But in terms o f probability o f structural change, this is what he
says:
It is true that one reason for emphasizing processes o f social construction is to
highlight possibilities for change that might otherwise not be seen, but it is no
implication o f the argum ent here that change is easy. Indeed, I am impressed
with how resilient the state is. No matter how much transnational actors grow
in importance, no m atter how much state autonomy is undermined by inter
national regimes o r economic interdependence, state keep trying...to repro
duce themselves. (W endt, 1999, p. 238)
Wendt’s concessions to the realist conclusion that states are still jealous o f
their sovereignty do not mean states cannot learn to be more other-regarding. As he
argues, "If self interest is not sustained by practice it will die out. The possibility o f
structural change is born out o f that fact" (1999, p. 369). Still, his contributions are
more o f a theoretical nature. I suggest constructivist regime theorists can view states’
practices as different policy ideas negotiating for policy choices.

In this way, they

can step into both procedural and substantive policy and investigate the relations
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between collective identities and policy change. I would argue that without violating
the basic tenet o f constructivism (shared ideas, practices, and structurationism),
constructivists are well equipped to elaborate institutional and policy change. W hat
they need is to learn from other fields or disciplines to develop a theory o f institu
tional selection. Below I will address this important element.
As previously noted, constructivists contend that explanations of political
phenomena are not reducible to agent or structure. Instead, they point out a process
o f interaction through w hich agents and structures are codetermined. Agents create
structures which in turn shape agents' subsequent behaviors. But structures are not
fixed; they are reproduced or transformed through agents' practices. This ontological
structurationism o f constructivism is particularly suggestive o f the model o f complex
adaptive system (CAS) which is one version o f complexity theory more associated
with evolutionary biology. In this study, CAS refers to an open system consisting o f
many agents who (a) interconnect and interact with one another and with their envi
ronment through feedback loops, (b) act on local knowledge, and (c) are capable o f
adapting their actions based on experience (Anderson, 1999; Rosenau, 2000).
Although complex theory was developed from natural sciences, in recent years its
applications have been found in political science (A xelrod & Cohen,

1999;

Cederman, 1997; Jervis, 1997; March & Olsen 1998; Pierson, 2000; Rosenau, 2000;
True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 1999). The model o f CAS helps researchers understand
the process o f a system ’s evolutionary trajectory. As Jam es Rosenau argues:
Like any com plex adaptive system in the natural world, the agents that com
prise world affairs are brought together into system ic wholes that consist o f
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patterned structures ever subject to transformation as a result o f feedback pro
cesses from their external environments or from internal stimuli that provoke
the agents to break w ith their established routines. (2000, p. 41)
I think the CAS model can help constructivist regime theorists elaborate the
dynamics o f institutional selection.

Generally students o f political science use the

m etaphor o f path-dependence (Pierson, 2000) or punctuated equilibrium (True et al.,
1999) to explain the process o f institutional and policy change. I would argue that
the CAS model could accom m odate these two important concepts within its para
m eters for an integrated understanding. To justify my argum ent, clarifications o f key
elements in a CAS are in order.
Feedback/Interconnection/Interaction: When agents in a CAS interact with
one another, they will adjust their behaviors based on the feedback they receive from
their interconnected structures or loops. Feedback is the key to understand the evolu
tionary trajectory. Feedback is usually seen either as negative or positive. Feedback
is positive "when a change in one direction sets in motion reinforcing pressures that
produce further change in the same direction" (Jervis, 1997, p. 125).

Feedback is

negative "when the change triggers forces that counteract the initial change and
return the system" (Jervis, 1997, p. 125). In other words, w hereas negative feedback
reduces or cancels out any deviation from a given state, positive feedback would
amplify it or widen the gap. A typical example o f negative feedback is the theory of
balance o f power. No state can dictate the international political order by itself. An
ambitious hegemon is always subject to counterforce by an alliance o f less powerful
states.

Another example is a central heating system.

W hen one sets the room
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tem perature at, say, 75-degrees, if the tem perature goes below a certain degree, an
adjusting mechanism is set in motion, which turns the heating on until the 75-degrees
is attained. The gap between the required and the actual temperature is thus closed.
Examples o f positive feedback can be illustrated by two fam iliar old stories.
One is how the Sony Beta machine w as out competed by the VHS format machine,
despite its technological superiority. Both machines provided the same function, but
due to a network effect (more VHS tapes in rental video shops) Beta was eliminated
from the market due to refusing to share technology. Apple C om puter made a similar
mistake with its operating software and lost market share to the less user-friendly
DOS operating system. The point is that once DOS locked in the market, M icrosoft
could spread its costs over a large base o f users.

The result o f the competition in

these two examples was not predictable in advance. Once both DOS and VHS got
ahead, they locked in the market.

These two examples are typical illustrations o f

econom ic interpretation o f path dependence (I will describe the constructivist one
shortly).

Both examples cast doubts on the ideal efficiency o f agents' rational

choices. There might be a more efficient path, but once derailed the cost o f getting
back on that path are prohibited (Arther, 1994; North, 1990; Pierson, 2000).
Self-organizing/Emergent properties: N ow when agents in a CAS interact and
m utually adapt to each other through feedback loops, there is no w ay for agents to
know in advance which feedback (positive or negative) will apply because agents
only have local but not global knowledge to understand the structure or network o f
interconnectedness and other interconnected agents' responses o f their initial actions.
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And it is this indeterminacy that characterizes the CAS with emergent properties.
Com plex adaptive systems with emergent properties resist reductionist determinism,
because feedback loops preclude holding some agents constant in order to study
others; namely it is "interaction not additivity" (Jervis, 1997). Agents self-organize
them selves based on their experiences and form an overall system property, and no
single agent has a complete knowledge o f whom he has interconnected with, and
unlim ited resources to dictates the collective behavior o f the system. For example, a
comprehensive reform may have short-term effects, but its sustainability is unpredict
able because reformers cannot have com plete knowledge about who might have been
affected by reform programs and their feedback effects.
Hierarchical/Open system/Coevolution: CASs are said to be hierarchical to
the extent that each level o f an emergent CAS serves as an agent o f a higher level
CAS. For example, relevant agents (say, NGOs, MNCs, governments) self-organize
them selves to form an emergent CAS (the United States) which in turn serves as an
agent in a CAS o f higher level (APEC). The hierarchical nature o f a CAS gives us a
general idea about the structure or network o f interconnection o f agents in a CAS. As
an open system, agents in a CAS not only interact with other agents within their
CAS, they also interact with their environment. N ow the idea o f coevolution charac
terizing a CAS takes the concept o f Darwinian evolution to the next level. Instead o f
adapting to a stable environment, agents in a CAS are facing a changing environment
which consists o f many other CASs and agents doing the same thing o f adapting. If
we understand the idea o f coevolution, it is not difficult then to follow that there are
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two types o f coevoltion: micro and macro (M cKelvey, 1997).

Whereas m icro

evolution refers to mutual adaptation between agents within a CAS, m acroevolution
points out m utual adaptation between a CAS and its environment with interconnected
CASs and agents. The importance o f coevolution to a CAS is underlined by Jam es
Rosenau (2000, p. 42)
Human system s face challenges from w ithin or without, and the adaptive task
is to m aintain an acceptable balance betw een their internal needs and the
external dem ands. At the same time, in the process o f changing as they adapt,
systems coevolve with their environments. Neither can evolve in response to
change w ithout corresponding adjustm ents on the part o f the other. On the
other hand, if a system is unable to adjust to its environment's evolutionary
dynam ics and thus fails to adapt, it collapses into the environment and
becom es extinct.
Path dependence/Punctuated equilibrium /Regim e competency:

Now w e are

in a position to explain how the CAS model could accom m odate these two im portant
concepts, path dependence (PD) and punctuated equilibrium (PE), for an integrated
understanding o f institutional and policy change.

Scholars who adopt either PD or

PE all use the ideas o f positive or negative feedback but in different ways to explain
institutional and policy change. Let me be specific. Proponents o f PD use positive
feedback to explain institutional and policy stability, and they use misfit between an
institution and its environment to explain abrupt change. Proponents o f PE, on the
other hand, use negative feedback to explain policy stability and positive feedback to
explain rapid change in a short transition period.
M arch and Olsen (1998) portray inefficient history o f institutional develop
ment as “path dependent in the sense that the character o f current institutions depends
not only on current conditions but also on the historical path o f institutional
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development” (p. 959).

In other words, institutional change is not always fast

because institutional history may prevent institutions from quickly responding to
environmental pressures. M arch and Olsen evoke the idea o f positive feedback to
explain why institutions are relatively robust against environmental change:
The rules, norms, institutions, and identities that drive human action are seen
as developing in a way that cannot be predicted from prior environmental
conditions. They co-evolve with the worlds in which they act. They are
subject to local positive feedback that traps them at local optima. Rules are
understandable only by understanding their histories. (1998, p. 958)
On the other hand, True et al. (1999) also evoke the idea o f positive feedback,
but interestingly they use it to explain rapid policy change instead of policy stability.
According to them, in the United States different interest groups or coalitions are
completing to shape the image o f policy issues. W hen one coalition become dom i
nant in shaping policy image o f a particular issue, they then occupy so-called policy
monopolies.

They use negative feedback to explain the continuance o f a policy

monopoly and they use positive feedback to explain its collapse.

As they argue,

"Macropolitics is the politics o f punctuation-the politics o f large-scale change, com 
peting policy images, political manipulation, and positive feedback. Positive feed
back exacerbates impulses for change: It overcomes inertia and produces explosions
or implosions from form er states" (True et al., 1999, p. 102).
Because o f the limit o f our sights in time (at a particular moment) and space
(at a particular location), we tend to describe this change in system either gradually or
abruptly. In other words, our local knowledge makes us unable to see those forces
that are behind the scene waiting to surface. From the CAS model, agents in an open
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system are always coevolving with other agents and their environments.

If the

system is reproduced, this ostensible stability is dynamic, not an immovable one.
The state or property o f system at "stable" time can be explained by path dependence.
However, the old ideas never die but recede below the surface; they have a possibility
to reappear under different condition.
To return to the beginning o f this section, I argue that there is a connection
between policy performance and collective identity among regim e members. Now I
w ould follow M arch and O lsen's ideas o f exploration/exploitation to derive a series
o f propositions to analyze the coevolution o f a regime's path-dependent capability
with the regime's environment.

The importance o f their ideas lies at a connection

between microcoevlution and macrocoevolution.
When an international regime has been established, its members have to
decide the identity o f the regime, namely, what does the regime stand for? Now there
may be many ideas com peting for that identity and it surely involves arguing, inter
pretation and reinterpretation.

At some point when regime members have reached

consensus of regime identity, they begin to develop procedural rules, substantive
policy issues, and programs for implementation. As times go by, regime members
accumulate experience with existing practices and rules as they try to adapt to their
internal dynamics and their external environments.

At some point in a regime's

development when a particular set o f rules and practices have been used repeatedly,
members become familiar and competent in using them and as such regime member
tend to use them further. N ow this is when the local positive feedback kicks in and
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produces what March and Olsen call the competency trap: "the tendency for a system
to become firmly locked into a particular rule-based structure by virtue o f the devel
opm ent o f familiarity with the rules and capabilities at using them.

These refined

capabilities strengthen a system in the short run and make it resistant to change"
(1998, p. 964).

The implication o f com petence trap is that as the environment

changes and requires institutional adjustments, the current regime competency
becomes the enemy of adaptation. As M arch and Olsen argue:
The accelerating development o f competence with particular institutional
arrangements and practices is a major feature o f institutional history and is
one o f the more obvious reasons why history is path dependent. The local
optima produced by competence elaboration are resistant to new opportuni
ties. For that reason, they are also potential precursors to long run obsoles
cence and to the discontinuous, contested, and problematic change associated
with "punctuated equilibria", "critical junctions", and "performance crises".
(1998, pp. 964-965)
On the other hand, the opposite extrem e is the incompetency trap, which refers to the
situation in which institutions have too many undeveloped ideas and too little compe
tence.

In order to get out o f the com petency and incompetency traps, March and

Olsen (1995, 1998) suggest an organization should balance between exploration o f
new possibilities and exploitation o f old certainties. Exploration is associated with
experimenting new ideas, strategies and knowledge to find new alternatives that are
better than current practices, whereas exploitation involves improving existing capa
bilities, elaborating upon agreed ideas, and measuring performance. The returns from
exploration are distant in time and uncertain whereas the returns from exploitation are
im m ediate in tim e and more certain. As such M arch and Olsen (1998) contend:
It is not easy for an organization to justify experimentation that, at least in the
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short run, does not make sense in terms o f immediate local return. W hat is
required is a w illingness to engage in experimentation that is unlikely to
succeed and particularly unlikely to be rewarding in the temporal and spatial
neighborhood o f the experiment. Unfortunately, although too little experi
mentation is likely to be disastrous in the longer run, too much experim enta
tion is likely to be disastrous im m ediately...Few organizations do well with
the problems associated with balancing exploitation and exploration, and
there is little reason to think that international organizations will be particu
larly clever about it. (p. 965)
The following propositions derive from the implications o f the analysis above
o f exploration/exploitation for regime adaptations over time:
Proposition 3 : In a stable environment, regimes’ exploitation adaptation is
likely to exceed exploration adaptation.
Proposition 3.1: Expectations for exploitation adaptations are m ore likely to
be used as operational goals to produce measurable performance outcomes.
Proposition 3 .2 : Expectations for exploration adaptations are m ore likely to
be used to achieve non-operational learning outcomes such as new ideas and capa
bilities.
Proposition 4 : In turbulent times, regimes’ adaptation to the environm ent is
likely to be both enabled and restricted by the regime unique historical path depen
dence o f exploitation and exploration adaptations.

Research M ethodology

As mentioned previously,

Kratochw and Ruggie (1986) suggest that

researchers should use interpretive epistemology to study regimes.

B ut since

constructivists claim to stand in the middle o f postmodernists and positivists, they
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should not rely solely on interpretive methodology. Indeed, collective identity is an
intersubjective understanding that is manifested in regim e members' consciousness,
rather than a material entity that can be measured quantitatively. It is therefore not
easy to prove that a particular actor shares a collective identity w ith others (Cronin,
1999). F or example, how do you know in a given case whether a collective identity
exists and whether this identity affects subsequent policy choices? But if construc
tivists fall back on behavior only to infer collective identity, it is not reliable either.
F or exam ple ju st as success to reach consensus does not necessarily confirm positive
identity, failure to do so can not necessarily confirm negative identity between
regim e members.
Recognizing these potential problems, I would rely on both empirical obser
vations and counterfactual arguments to examine the nature o f discourse that charac
terizes the interactions among APEC members. The empirical investigation o f this
study seeks to answer three questions:
1. H ow are APEC members' collective identity and interests constructed?
2. How are pre-existing identities and interests activated during policy dis
course?
3. How do APEC's policy stability and change evolve over time that reshape
m em bers' collective identity and interests?
To answ er these questions, as discussed above, I have developed a set o f propositions
for further investigation.
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CHAPTER IV

TH E HISTORICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOM Y IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The purpose o f this chapter is to place the changing international and regional
context o f the Asia-Pacific economic development in an historical perspective and to
discuss how that changing context has shaped econom ic interdependence in AsiaPacific region over time. In the international context, I trace the evolution o f policy
ideas about international political economy in the postw ar years that have defined the
state-society relations; this survey provides us with an understanding o f different
ideas on the current debate o f globalization which in turn might shed some light on
policy preferences o f different APEC members. In the regional context, I concentrate
on the U.S. and Japanese roles in fostering the economic interdependence in the AsiaPacific region during the postwar years. Historical analysis is com plex because there
may be a num ber o f interpretations for virtually every event.

W hat is presented

below is one o f the interpretations that seems to me to be more important and plausi
ble in terms o f where and when the analysis begins and what factors and events are
highlighted.

71
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W inds o f Change

From Embedded Liberalism to the W ashington Consensus

In The G reat Transformation, Karl Polanyi w rote that "for a century the
dynamics o f modem society was governed by a double movement: the market
expanded continuously but this movement was met by a counterm ovem ent checking
the expansion in definite directions" (1944, p. 130). Polanyi's argum ent is that a self
regulating market cannot sustain itself without embedding in social and political
institutions. He traced and interpreted the economic instability o f interw ar period—
the collapse o f the gold standard, the rise o f economic nationalism, and the Great
Depression o f the 1930s—as the effects o f society's self-protection from the negative
impact o f laissez-faire liberalism.
The collective experience o f the turmoil during the interw ar period had
formed a shared idea among postw ar economic planners that redefined the statesociety relations. Drawing from Polanyi's insights, Ruggie (1983) labels this shared
idea as "embedded liberalism" which was a compromise: "unlike the economic
nationalism o f the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism
o f the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon
domestic interventionism" (p. 209).
At the end o f World W ar II, the United States emerged as the dom inant actor
in the international political and economic system. As such any historical account o f
the postwar international political economy must explain the role o f the U.S. in terms
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o f the transform ation o f the global econom ic order. Despite the historical isolation
ism o f the United States, postwar Am erican foreign economic policy sought to create
a functioning and multilateral global economic system (M oon, 2000b).

American

leaders were preoccupied with traum atic experiences during interw ar period and
W orld W ar II finally convinced them that a multilateral w orld economy, based on
institutions to regulate international trade and finance, was necessary to prevent
destructive political conflicts among nations. The key question o f global economic
order for postw ar planners was how to protect national economies from external dis
turbance without sacrificing the benefits o f international economic interdependence.
And it was this context that enabled the idea o f embedded liberalism to become dom
inant in shaping the original principles and design o f postw ar international economic
institutions: the Bretton W oods system.
In order to ease the tensions both within and between nations, postwar plan
ners had come to a consensus on two general principles on the econom ic order: a
welfare system within nations and a free multilateralism between them (Kapstein,
1999). The connection between these two principles was that free trade promoted
prosperity through the increased efficiencies arising from the international division o f
labor. But at the same time postw ar planners recognized that a welfare system was
necessary to protect those who were economically dislocated by the free trade policy.
A welfare system was strongly influenced by the Keynesian idea that govern
ment policy can effectively im prove the economic conditions in society (Tanzi &
Schuknecht, 2000).

Prior to the Keynesian thesis o f assigning a greater role for
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governm ent, the dominant paradigm o f classical economics was pro-market. But the
K eynesian ideas effectively invalidated the optimistic belief in the capacity o f market
system for automatic or fast adjustment tow ards equilibrium in the years o f the Great
Depression. As such the desirability o f state intervention designed to maximize eco
nom ic grow th and full employment became the dominant view among postwar plan
ners. In fact the enormous impact o f Keynesian ideas on national policymaking con
tinued for three decades since the end o f the World W ar II that made this period the
Keynesian era.
In term s o f international economic relations, in 1944 representatives o f 44
nations met in the town o f Bretton W oods in the United States to discuss the pro
cesses and institutions that would govern the postw ar economy (Moon, 2000a;
Ruggie, 1995; Underhill, 2000). This led to the establishment o f the three key inter
national econom ic regimes o f the postwar period collectively known as the Bretton
W oods system: the World Bank, the International M onetary Fund (IMF) and the
General Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The W orld Bank was initially established to help finance the postwar recon
struction o f the European economies. However, this task was primarily undertaken
through the Marshall Plan.

This program involved direct financial assistance to

European countries provided by the United States. The World Bank’s role increas
ingly became one o f fostering economic developm ent in Third World and less devel
oping countries through the provision o f loans and the promotion o f free market eco
nom ic policies.
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The IMF was established to help maintain the stability o f international
exchange rates by assisting countries that were having temporary problems with their
current account balance.

It also strengthened monetary systems by overseeing the

Bretton W oods system o f fixed exchange rates. The problem o f liquidity was solved
by the agreement o f using a combination o f gold and the U.S. dollar, which were
linked by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s com m itm ent to freely exchange gold and dollars
at the rate o f $35 per ounce. The IMF was given the authority to set mem bers’ cur
rency values in relation to gold, approve changes in that value, and oversee member
econom ic policies that might affect currency values. It is important, however, to note
that IMF allowed national governments to impose control on capital flows.
In the area o f the international trade, the International Trade Organization
(ITO) was initially proposed as a multilateral trading regime to establish and enforce
a more comprehensive set o f rules on a number o f issues to avoid repeating the type
o f protectionism that existed in the interwar period. However, agreement on this was
not reached in 1944 and it took until 1995 for a similar institution, the World Trade
Organization, to be established. Meanwhile, the compromise was the GATT which
provided an institutional framework for negotiations about tariffs and trade in the
postw ar years. It is important to note that the GATT contained a number o f national
safeguard measures or escape clauses that recognized the inherent tension between
the trade liberalization and other domestic economic goals.
In sum, the IMF helps states in short term adjust the imbalance o f the national
current accounts; the World Bank helps states deal with long-term economic
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developm ent problems; and the GATT with some national safeguard measures regu
lates and facilitates trade liberalization. The Bretton W oods system thus attempted to
strike a balance betw een the liberal world market (free multilateralism between
states) and the dom estic responsibilities o f states (a welfare system within states). As
M oon argues:
W ithout the flexibility it provided, nations would neither have agreed to the
obligations implicit in acceptance o f Bretton W oods initially nor would they
have been capable o f meeting them subsequently. At stake was the very polit
ical legitimacy o f the state itself, which must not only achieve economic pros
perity but also maintain enough control over the domestic political economy
that its claim to being responsive to the citizenry is seen as plausible (2000b,
p. 344).
This com prom ise o f embedded liberalism sustained three "golden" decades o f
econom ic grow th and social progress in many countries since the end o f the World
W ar II. The point was that the embedded liberalism enabled nations to reap the bene
fits o f integration while stili left them enough autonom y to pursue different paths o f
economic developm ent. Hence, western European nations decided to integrate them
selves and to pursue a system o f welfare states. Japan caught up with the W est using
a mixed economy that combined a number o f efficient export sectors with inefficient
and protected sectors such as service and agriculture. Taiwan and South Korea cre
ated their econom ic miracles relying on industrial and trade policies that have since
been illegal under the current rules o f the WTO.

And until the middle o f 1970s,

some developing nations in Latin America, the M iddle East and even Africa had gen
erated unprecedented economic growth rates and they had done so with their import
substitution policies that insulated them to a large extent from the world economy
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(Rodrik, 2000).
However, the Bretton W oods system was largely abandoned since the middle
o f 1970s and the balance betw een market (efficiency) and society (legitimacy) started
to lean toward the former. The increasing propensity toward the idea o f neoliberal
ism reached its peak in the late 1980s with what John W illiamson (1990) called the
W ashington Consensus o f the IMF, W orld Bank, and GATT/W TO. The Washington
Consensus prescribes the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) for the national eco
nom ic development through liberalization o f trade and investment, deregulation o f
governm ent control, privatization o f state-owned enterprises and fiscal discipline
among others— in a word, the opposite o f the Keynesian ideas. How and why did
this happen? The matter will be long debated. It is, however, possible to identify
som e key factors o f this transformation from the perspectives o f both developed and
developing countries.
From the perspective o f developed countries, the United States acted as over
seer o f the Bretton W oods system until the early 1970s. During the 1950s and 1960s
the strength o f the United States economy led to the U.S. dollar being treated as the
de facto international currency. But as Underhill (2000) argues:
The world economy needed an ample supply o f dollar liquidity to ensure
growth and trade, yet the more dollars there were the more shaky would be
the ability o f the United States to honor its pledge to convert unlimited
amounts o f dollars to gold on demand at the fixed price o f $35 an ounce, (pp.
109-110)
Due to the costs o f financing the Vietnam War, the declining competitiveness
o f foreign trade, and the outflow o f foreign direct investment, the United States had
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contributed to swell the dollar holdings o f foreign countries.

As such, by the late

1960s there was increasing international concern about the ability o f the United
States to meet its international financial commitments. In 1971 the British govern
ment requested that payments be made in gold rather than U.S. dollars. In response,
President Richard Nixon broke the connection between U.S. dollars and the price o f
gold.

By adopting floating exchange rates, the United States had thus broken the

Bretton W oods agreement.

Before long most nations followed suit by letting the

national currencies float. The adoption o f floating exchange rates and the increasing
liberalization o f capital control and trade had considerable consequences in the sub
sequent international economic order.

These actions together made it difficult for

nations to manage their economies. As investors begin to seek preferred investment
locations in terms o f low inflation, higher interest rates and less strict labor standards,
nations may find their preferences o f econom ic and social policies incompatible with
that o f investors (Rodrik, 1997; Underhill, 2000).
As noted above, the Keynesian ideas had dominated the economic and social
policies in many countries in the first three decades in postwar years.

The role o f

states is crucial in the Keynesian economics. States could use budget to correct any
tendency to deflation.

In times o f recession, public investments can be used to

encourage demand and foster economic growth, whereas in times o f strong economic
growth, the government debt can be paid o ff through increased tax revenue and there
fore inflation can be prevented. But when two oil crises occurred in 1973 and 1979,
many nations were unable to bring the deficit and inflation under control. It could be
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argued for example that one o f the factors contributing to the election victory o f
President Ronald Reagan in 1980 was the economic troubles o f the late President
Jim m y C arter years. As the inflation and unemployment were going up at th e same
tim e (known as stagflation) in late 1970s, the Keynesian ideas were called into ques
tion which thus paved the way for the neoliberalism or monetarism or supply-side
econom ics associated with policy prescriptions such as lower tax rates, cuts in gov
ernm ent spending and deregulation o f governm ent control (Mundo, 1999).
In term s o f international trade and investm ent liberalization, the propensity o f
the United States to turn to the aggressive unilateralism became salient since the
m iddle o f 1970s. In order to reduce the trade deficit, the U.S. government passed a
series o f trade acts, seeking to not only negatively reduce imports but to actively
increase exports as well. As a result, the United States increasingly put pressure on
nations that depended on the U.S. market to liberalize, privatize and deregulate their
economies.

To the U.S. trading countries, the most controversial measure is the

“Super 301” provision o f the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness o f 1988.

The

main purpose o f the “Super 301” was to select foreign countries who adopt “unfair”
trading practices and to set a deadline for these countries to correct them. The United
States Trade Representative (USTR) has, under “Super 301”, established a “Priority
W atch List” o f major violators and a “W atch List” for minor offenders.

To those

countries in the list, the message was clear: elim inate trade practices or face retalia
tion. To the United States, these aggressive actions were justified by the principle o f
reciprocity and fairness.

Though a number o f countries have complied w ith U.S.
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demands, many U.S. trading countries have questioned the legitimacy o f these intru
sive U.S. trade policies (Dunkley, 2000; M oon, 2000a). The policy im plications o f
U.S. aggressive unilateralism will be further discussed in the next section.
From the perspective of developing nations, one o f the important factors con
tributing to the swing to the W ashington Consensus was the problem o f debts.

As

m ore and more developing nations faced debt problems that required financial assis
tance from the IMF and World Bank, especially in the early 1980s, these institutions
used their leverage to push national policies in a neoliberal direction. As a condition
for granting loans, they required that borrowing countries liberalize the international
trade, deregulate capital control and dismantle barriers to investment flows. In addi
tion, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were being treated as
exemplars o f the success o f the pro-market model, whereas the economic failure o f
governm ents in Latin America and Africa was increasingly represented as evidence
o f the shortcomings o f the import substitution policies. As such, because o f the suc
cess o f these nations in East Asia in exploiting the opportunities offered by globaliza
tion, many debt nations did not greatly resist this pressure, and others even embraced
the W ashington Consensus with enthusiasm.

According to Rodrik (1999), the

W ashington Consensus was embraced enthusiastically by policy makers in Latin
Am erica and post-socialist Eastern Europe, while the acceptance was more cautious
in Africa and Asia.
M any developing countries had undertaken im port substitution industrializa
tion (ISI) as economic development policies in first three decades since the end o f
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World W ar II. At first ISI worked rather well and it brought unprecedented eco
nomic growth to many developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and
Africa.

According to R odrik’s survey (1999), more than 40 nations’ economic

growth rate exceeded 2.5 percent per capita from 1960 to 1973. But then came the
two oil shocks which subsequently had serious repercussions on the economies o f
many oil-importing developing countries, despite their attempts to insulate them
selves from global econom ic fluctuation.

The oil crisis suddenly made fuel

extremely expensive and undermined economic growth.

Dollars were being bor

rowed to fund the industrial development. And yet the debt problems became even
worse by the fact that most loans were floating-rate based.

If rates went up, debt

countries would owe far more than they had borrowed. The interest rates did go up
during the late 1970s and early 1980s and subsequently the increased cost o f loans
made it more difficult for the debt countries to repay the loans (Haggard & Maxfield,
1996).
In sum, rising oil prices and interest rates were two blows against oilimporting countries; consequently debt problems became widespread.
countries then turned to the IMF for assistance.

Many debt

To qualify for the loan, debt

countries had to sign agreem ents with the IMF, promising to implement IMFapproved SAPs. This would be the beginning of the policy change o f debt countries
from state-led and inward-looking industrialization toward market-led and outwardlooking reforms.
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From W ashington Consensus to Post-Washington Consensus

The IMF and World Bank-approved SAPs were prescribed to the developing
nations to dismantle inefficient strategies associated with strong state intervention
and were said to be a means o f exploiting the opportunities o f globalization. How
ever, since the late 1990s the W ashington Consensus has been called into question as
it failed to deliver on its promise. For example, in Latin America where the SAPs
w ere implemented most enthusiastically throughout 1990s, the results were discour
aging in terms o f growth, poverty reduction, income distribution, and reduced unem
ploym ent (Rodrik, 1999; Stiglitz, 1998). Furthermore, the M exican bond crisis in
1994, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the Russian financial crisis in 1998 have
dem onstrated that financial liberalization could be the source o f severe macroeconom ic instability.
In reaction to the Asian financial crisis and the IMF response to the crisis, the
form er chief economist o f the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, suggests many ideas for
the Post-W ashington Consensus. Although a Post-Washington Consensus has not yet
emerged, according to Stiglitz (1998, p. 33), "whatever the new consensus is it cannot
be based on Washington".

It should be noted however that many ideas about the

Post-W ashington Consensus do not oppose the Washington Consensus per sec but its
incompleteness. As Stiglitz suggests,
The post-W ashington consensus recognizes both that a broader set o f instru
ments is necessary and that our goals are also much broader. We seek in
crease in living standards—including improved health and education~not just
increases in measured GDP. We seek sustainable development, which in
cludes preserving natural resources and maintaining a healthy environment.
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W e seek equitable developm ent, which ensures that all groups in society, not
ju st those at the top, enjoy the fruits o f development. And w e seek democra
tic development, in w hich citizens participate in a variety o f ways in making
the decisions that affect their lives. (1998, p. 30)
One crucial aspect o f incompleteness o f the W ashington Consensus is that it
tends to focus attention on the policies o f removing market distortions caused by gov
ernm ent intervention but to de-em phasize the positive role o f governm ent in the situ
ation o f market failure.

Instead, the Post-W ashington Consensus emphasizes the

need to improve the institutional capacity o f a developing country. It is often the case
in developing nations that the political and economic institutions are too weak to
absorb the disruptive forces released by structural adjustment policies.

And since

econom ic liberalization will expose nations vulnerable to external shocks that may
trigger domestic instability, it is insufficient to adopt structural adjustment policies
indiscrim inately without counting the social costs. Therefore ideas such as capacitybuilding, institution-building, and social safety nets have emerged in the debate o f
globalization as a new focus (Rodrik, 1999).
Adding to the complexity o f "ideas battle" about globalization is the rising
salience o f NGOs, a trend that reflects the increasing democratization around the
world.

The proportion o f nations with some form o f democratic government rose

from 26.9 percent in 1974 to 61.3 in 1997 as illustrated in Table 1. As citizen partici
pation in politics grows, so does the number o f NGOs. NGOs assume a crucial role
in articulating people’s voice and pressure governments to respond. While foreign
policy was once the exclusive dom ain o f government officials, in recent years we
have witnessed a proliferation o f NGOs that have their own views on international
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Table 1
Electoral Democracies, 1974 and 1990-1997

Y ear

Num ber
o f All Countries

N um ber
o f Democracies

Democracies as
Percentage o f all Countries

1974
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

145
165
183
186
190
191
191
191
191

39
76
91
99
108
114
117
118
117

26.9
46.1
49.7
53.2
56.8
59.7
61.3
61.8
61.3

Source: Diamond, L. (1999, p. 25). Developing democracy: Toward consolidation.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

affairs. In this regard, the actions o f NGOs can be considered as a civil society's self
protection from the force o f market mechanism to which the government is unable or
unwilling to respond. Importantly, these NGOs not only have a growing influence on
the foreign policies o f their own countries, they also link with counterparts in other
countries and create transnational coalitions on various issues such as on labor right,
human right, environmental problems, gender and economic justice.
Although N G O s may or may not affect the contents o f global public policy,
they have dem onstrated that economic globalization is not an inevitable and unstop
pable force. A halt o f the OECD "secret" negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement
on Investm ent (MAI) in 1998 and the chaotic situation o f the W TO meeting in 1999
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were evidence o f NGOs' capabilities (Kobrin, 1998; Najam & Robins, 2001).
To some observers, the significance o f a breakdown o f the W TO meeting is
that "Seattle changed things fundamentally, not by resolving the issue but by making
its further postponement impossible" (Najam & Robins, 2001, p. 60). At the heart o f
the debate is the legitimacy crisis o f the WTO. Outside o f the conference building,
NGOs demonstrated their critique o f globalization in general and the W TO in partic
ular, while inside, delegates from developing nations expressed their frustration about
their exclusion from decision-making processes. Even though outside and inside pro
tests were based on different perceptions o f the WTO, both questioned the input and
output legitimacy o f the organization. Indeed, not every argument made by protests
is accepted universally, yet the claim that citizens or nations have a basic right to par
ticipate in the decision-making process that affects their fates is difficult to dismiss.
Commenting on the aftermath o f the WTO Seattle meeting, a prominent free
trade scholar w rote that:
There has, in consequence, been a sense o f despair among some o f the pro
trade groups in the United States: if trade is such a difficult case to sell at a
time o f unprecedented prosperity and employment, what could happen when
the economy turns down, as it almost certainly will, someday? (Bhagwati,
2001, p. 15)
It can be argued that the free trade argument is difficult to sell because no matter how
logical the W ashington Consensus may prove to be, a given actor’s acceptance o f it is
socially constructed. In other words, NGOs' claims may or may not be empirically
sound, but the question is that they act upon what they believe. As Robert Cox put it:
The state remains a site of struggle for those who would challenge the social
consequences o f globalization. History does not end with globalization o f the
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economy despite illusory pronouncements by some ideologues. H istory goes
on and has the potential to shape new structures o f thought and political
authority. The opportunity now opens to develop the forms o f knowledge
conductive to such innovation (2000, p. 25).
In sum, from the embedded liberalism to the Washington Consensus and now
to the post-W ashington Consensus, the contestation between self-regulating market
and society’s self-protection continues. As John Ruggie argues (1995, p. 509), “In
some respects the world today finds itself faced with a challenge which is not unlike
the one it faced in 1945: devising compatible forms o f intematipnal liberalization and
domestic stability.” While Ruggie’s point is well taken, at the same time it m ust be
noted that the environment nations find them selves in today is qualitatively different
and changing.

H ow the process o f international political economy evolves will be

shaped by the interaction among international institutions, national governm ents,
M NCs and NGOs and other forces.

Economic Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region

The historical trajectories o f the emergent economic interdependence in the
Asia-Pacific region after World W ar II will be explored here from two different
directions. The first direction is to focus on the American role in prom oting regional
economic integration in the context o f the Cold War. The second direction will exa
mine the Japanese role in terms o f its expanding overseas manufacturing investm ent
in East Asia, which has profound impacts on the consolidation o f econom ic interde
pendence in the region.
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The U.S. Role: The Commitment to Containing Communism

After the World W ar II, the United States stepped into the Asia-Pacific region
as the leading economic and military power replacing Japan's regional dom inance
acquired since the late 19th century. The Cold W ar came to Asia in 1949, follow ing
the Chinese Com m unists’ defeat of the Chinese nationalists who retreated to Taiwan.
W ith the division o f East Asia into two antagonistic blocs, different developm ent
trajectories emerged. W hereas Japan and most o f its form er colonies were in the U.S.
bloc, China, North K orea and North Vietnam w ere in the Soviet bloc.

It can be

argued that the dramatic economic growth o f an increasing number o f nation-states in
N ortheast and Southeast Asia after 1945 was grounded in the geo-political and geoeconomic interests o f the United States. The U.S. com m itm ent to containing com 
munism led to American involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars. Am erican
aid, military procurement, and the American open m arket helped the postw ar eco
nomic take-off and subsequent economic growth o f many Asian nations (B ow ie &
Unger, 1997).
Basically in the initial years after World W ar II, U.S. policy toward E ast Asia
had two goals: the reconstruction o f Japan and the containment o f Communism.
Japan was the center o f American strategic policy in Asia.

In the beginning, the

American Occupation authorities in Japan under the leadership o f General M acA rthur
focused on dismantling “twin evils”-imperial militarism and military conglom erates
(zaibatsu). The American occupation authorities believed these twin evils were
responsible for the expansion o f Japanese imperialism into Northeast and Southeast
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A sia in previous years (Cumings, 1987). But after having concluded that the m ajor
challenge to U.S. security interests in Asia would com e from the Soviet and China,
the U.S. encouraged the restoration o f the zaibatsu; it committed U.S. forces to
relieve Japan o f the limiting o f defense spending to 1 percent o f the GNP; it fostered
Japanese reindustrialization; and it opened the U.S. m arket to Japanese exports.
Recognizing that Japan would not be able to balance its trade with the United
States, American policymakers sought alternative sources o f raw materials and export
m arkets for the Japanese economy. The U.S. policymakers understood that in the
prew ar years, Japanese colonies were important to Japanese economy; as such
restoration of these links was critical to the Japanese recovery. But since China and
N orth Korea were under the communist rule by late 1949, Southeast Asia therefore
becam e especially important in the minds o f Am erican and Japanese policymakers.
And it was against this backdrop that in late 1949, President Truman authorized N SC
48/1- “a policy position paper that envisioned a triangular structure, with Japan
situated between the U.S. core and the Southeast Asian periphery”(Bowie & Unger,
1997, p. 28). In this structure, Japan would supply manufactures while the Southeast
Asian nations would supply raw materials and the U.S. dollar would be the medium
o f exchange for all activities. The importance o f Southeast Asia to Japan had been
underlined by Japanese Prim e Minister Yoshida in a speech in 1953:
I do not think it is necessary to dwell upon the importance o f our relations
with Southeast Asia, since we cannot expect much from trade with China.
The government desires to extend every possible cooperation for the prosper
ity o f the countries o f Southeast Asia in the form o f capital, technique, ser
vice, or otherwise, in order to thus further the relations o f reciprocal benefit
and common prosperity, (cited in Bowie & Unger, 1997, p. 31)
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The Korean W ar heightened the urgency for U.S. policymakers o f restoration
o f Japan's economic ties with Taiwan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations.
According to Chalmers Johnson (1972), the Korean W ar w as the equivalent for Japan
o f the Marshall Plan because it provided a key stimulus to industrial production in
Japan as a result o f the dramatic increase in the military spending by the U.S.

In

1951, Japanese exports to Korea and U.S. procurement from Japan accounted for
nearly h alf o f all Japanese exports and produced over one-fourth o f total Japanese
dollar earnings (Bowie & Unger, 1997).

Southeast Asian nations also benefited

greatly from the Korean W ar as the price o f war-related raw materials soared. The
U.S. confrontation with North Korean and Chinese com m unists led to huge demand
for military procurements to fight the war and to build the stockpiles against the pos
sibility that the war would spread. This resulted in a boom in commodity prices. For
example, the price o f rubber went up from $0.40 per pound in 1949 to $2.20 per
pound in 1951 (Bowie & Unger, 1997).
In terms o f Taiwan and South Korea, the U.S. military and economic aid also
went to both countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The United States established formal
m ilitary ties with Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, but unlike Japan, massive U.S.
m ilitary aid did not play an obvious role in fostering national economic development
in Taiwan and South Korea since both countries had to maintain significant military
capabilities.

However, U.S. economic assistance especially in planing and imple

m enting the postwar land reforms in Taiwan and South Korea provided both coun
tries the basis for economic development. The main purpose o f land reforms was to
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thwart communism by w idening the ownership o f lands. The emphasis was on pro
viding the lower class w ith basic economic resources and thus reducing the gap
between the poor and the rich.

Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1970s, under U.S.

assistance, Japanese com panies relocated their operation to Taiwan and South Korea
due to the rising cost o f labor in Japan, which contributed to the industrial develop
ment o f both countries.

Like Japan, both Taiwan and South Korea also gained

privileged access to the U.S. market and at the same tim e the U.S. tolerated South
K orea and Taiwan's protected markets and their governm ents' tight controls on
foreign investment (W iegersm a & Medley, 2000).
In terms of China's reintegration into the world economy, by the end o f 1960s,
the shift o f U.S. strategic considerations began to pave the way for the end o f China's
econom ic isolationism. In 1969 in what became known as the Nixon Doctrine, the
President Richard Nixon declared the necessity to w ithdraw American forces from
Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine was linked to the second "Nixon Shock" (ending fixed
parity o f dollar/gold being the first one) derived from N ixon's historic visit to China
in 1972. Later, during the C arter administration, the United States eventually broke
diplom atic relations with Republic o f China on Taiwan and established them with
People's Republic o f China in Beijing in 1978. With the rise o f Deng Xiaoping in the
late 1970s, China's econom ic policy shifted gradually from the central planning sys
tem toward a more m arket-oriented direction. As China opened its door, it became a
m ajor recipient o f foreign capital and thus a unified regional economy in Asia Pacific
began to emerge.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
From the analysis above, the United States clearly played a major role in
assisting the economic developm ent o f many East Asian nations and fostering the
economic integration in A sia Pacific region. Therefore as the U.S. economy w or
sened in the early 1970s, it w as understandable that in the opinion o f the U.S. Senate
Finance Committee, the m isguided trade policies distorted by the security concern
were mainly responsible for the declining economy.
Through most o f the postw ar era, U.S. trade policy has been the orphan o f
U.S. foreign policy. Too often the Executive has granted trade concessions to
accomplish political objectives. Rather than conducting U.S. international
economic relations on sound economic and commercial principles, the Execu
tive has set trade and m onetary policy in a foreign aid context. An example
has been the E xecutive’s unwillingness to enforce U.S. trade statutes in re
sponse to foreign unfair trade practices. By pursuing a soft trade policy, by
refusing to strike swiftly and surely at foreign unfair trade practices, the
Executive has actually fostered the proliferation o f barriers to international
commerce. The result o f this misguided policy has been to permit and even to
encourage discrim inatory trading arrangements am ong trading nations (cited
in Eckes Jr., 1999, p. 85).
It was against this perception that the U.S. Congress passed the Trade Reform
Act o f 1974. Under the provisions o f Section 301 in the T rade Reform Act o f 1974,
the President is given broad authority to act against foreign “unfair” trade practices.
The President can authorize the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate suspect for
eign trade practices to detect unfairness and, if found, the President must alert the
foreign country in question that retaliatory measures will be undertaken by a certain
date unless the practices are corrected.

No public announcem ents o f threats were

required and thus these could be handled by quiet diplomacy. But since the passage
o f the 1974 trade act, Congress began to recognize that from tim e to time the
President had acted discreetly to make concessions to U.S. trading partners.
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As a

result, Congress legislated the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness o f 1988 to rein
force the effectiveness o f the 1974 trade act. Under the 1988 trade bill the USTR is
no longer authorized by the President to act, but is formally required to act by law.
As M undo argues:
The 1988 bill sharpened the teeth o f U.S. trade law. It strengthened and ex
panded Section 301 o f the 1974 trade bill, transferring authority to administer
it formally from the president to the USTR in hopes that the latter’s constant
contact with groups with interests in trade would cause it to implement the
provisions o f Section 301 more aggressively than the president had. More
over, Congress reduced discretion in the use o f Section 301, again in hopes
that doing so would cause it to be used more effectively. (1999, p. 121)
To the proponents o f unilateral actions, U.S. efforts at opening up foreign
markets through the use o f Section 301 o f the 1974 and Super301 o f the 1988 Trade
Act may be necessary because w ithout these efforts, the American politics o f trade
liberalization cannot work. The President will not be able to manage the pressures of
import-competing producers coming through Congress to reduce access to the U.S.
market (Cohen et al., 1996).

Therefore, according to Moon (2000b, p. 346), "By

playing on the ambiguity o f free trade and fair trade, these policies have enabled the
United States to champion free trade and deny its disruptive impact, yet simultane
ously protect the most vulnerable American industries."
Yet a wide range o f critics consider the idea o f fair or managed trade through
aggressive unilateral actions unjustifiable because the definition o f “unfair trade prac
tices” is broad and vague, because the USTR has the arbitrary pow er to interpret and
make decisions, and because U.S. unilateral actions have bypassed the disputesettlement-mechanism o f W TO/GATT.

Furthermore even if the trade dispute
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between the U.S. and its trading partners has been taken to the W TO/GATT, the strict
tim etable imposed on the U.S. trading partners by USTR does not give W TO/GATT
enough time to complete its investigation before a USTR decision is m ade (Dunkley,
2000). As Jagdish Bhagwati argues:
[The] idea of fair trade guides U.S. trade policy, instilling officials w ith a
false sense of moral authority that sparks impatience and unilateral threats and
actions. Protection-seeking lobbies love the concept because it is elastic and
arbitrary enough to make virtually any trade look unfair if the going gets
tough...L ook at each trade skirmish and you will find Am erican suspicion o f
“unfair trade.” At times, this prompts a rush to unilateral action-as in the
banana dispute with the EU, in which Washington refused to wait for the
legal process at W TO to run its course. (2000, pp. 106, 108)
In sum, the U.S. commitment to containing Communism in the Cold W ar per
iod allowed the U.S. Asian allies to rely on the United States for security. The U.S.
governm ent helped its East Asian allies directly with vast amounts o f financial and
military assistance and indirectly with military procurement.

As such the United

States laid the foundation for the postw ar take-off and later economic developm ent in
East Asia. W ith China's policy change by adopting the open door strategy in late
1970s, the prototype o f Asia Pacific econom ic integration began to emerge. For the
first three decades since the end o f W ar World II, the U.S. was benign towards its
allies in terms o f trade policies, letting them reap the benefits o f trade liberalization
w ithout reciprocal opening o f their markets.

During these decades, U.S. economic

interests were subordinated to security concerns. But since the middle o f 1970s, U.S.
policy has changed and economic interests have come to the fore. The rise o f U.S.
aggressive unilateralism in the 1980s and 1990s would have to be regarded as a
reaction triggered by the declining security concerns and the unsustainable trade
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deficits with East Asian nations.

The Japanese Role: The Expanding Overseas Investments

The economic interdependence in Asia-Pacific region has increased steadily
over years due to the intraregional trade and foreign direct investments (FDI).

As

illustrated in Table 2, from 1962 to 1994 the intraregional trade within APEC
increased from 53 to 74 percent o f the total regional trade. For the same period the
intraregional trade within East Asia, which com prises the ASEAN-6 (Association o f
South East Asian Nations-Brunei, Indonesia, M alaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand), Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China, also increased from
33 to 50 percent (Frankel, 1997). The Japanese role in fostering the increasing intra
regional econom ic interdependence, especially in East Asia, is substantial to the
extent that not only Japan has enormous FDI in the region but its unique production
networks characterized by the Keiretsu (enterprise groups) system as well. The point
is that through a series o f FDI in East Asia, Japanese corporations have been able to
establish international production networks in the region which have increasingly
integrated East Asian nations economically. The analysis below will elaborate this
point and its policy implication for APEC.
The role o f Japanese FDI has been im portant in deepening the econom ic inte
gration in East Asia. There are many factors contributing to the flow o f Japanese FDI
to the region: the substantial appreciation o f the Japanese yen, rising dom estic pro
duction costs, and the increasing protectionism in the U SA and W estern Europe. In
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Table 2
Intra-regional Trade as a Share o f Total Trade o f the Region, 1962-94

Group

1962

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1994

APEC

0.53

0.55

0.60

0.57

0.59

0.68

0.69

0.74

East Asia

0.33

0.30

0.29

0.31

0.36

0.38

0.44

0.50

ASEAN-6

0.31

0.23

0.18

0.14

0.14

0.18

0.17

0.21

N A FTA

0.36

0.37

0.40

0.38

0.34

0.40

0.38

0.43

EU

0.65

0.68

0.70

0.69

0.69

0.70

0.74

0.73

Source: Adapted from Frankel, J. (1997, p. 22). Regional trade blocs in the world
economic system. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

terms o f host countries for FDI, Japanese M NCs initially concentrated on Newly
Industrializing Economies (NIEs)- South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singaporein 1970s.

In 1980s as rising wage rates made N IEs less attractive sites for invest

ment, Japanese M NCs began to concentrate on ASEAN-4 which were in turn over
taken by China in 1990s. In terms o f quantity o f investment, despite American FDI
in the East Asia remains substantial, Japan becomes the largest source o f FDI in the
region (Ozawa, 1999; Gilpin, 2000).
Starting from the early 1970s, Japan becam e a major investor in the East Asia
region when the first wave of Japanese FDI occurred in response to the negative
impact o f a rise in the price of the yen caused by the "Nixon shocks", which ended
fixed parity at 360 yen to a dollar (see Table 3). Japanese companies were moving
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Table 3
Japanese FDI in the Asia-Pacific (in U.S. $m)

Hong
Kong

Sing
apore

1973-76

64

146

292

111

0

71

154

550

78

1977-80

85

467

295

134

1

120

251

643

143

1981-82

30

323

59

96

8

99

77

476

55

1983-84

19

342

69

130

22

118

227

268

20

1985-86

66

198

178

385

46

112

97

93

57

1987

108

268

247

339

30

210

148

295

na

1989

116

678

257

360

206

784

471

167

na

1990

114

270

147

513

161

714

592

536

na

1991

92

240

130

405

251

807

880

576

100

1992

73

210

105

292

500

657

704

610

60

Period

South Taiwan China
Korea

Thai
land

M alay Indo
sia
nesia

Philip
pines

Source: Japanese M inistry o f Finance (1992) reprinted in P. Gangopadhyay (1998, p.
33). Patterns o f trade, investment and migration in the Asia-Pacific region.
In G. Thom pson (Ed.) Economic dynamism in the Asia-Pacific. London:
Routledge.

overseas in order to reap the benefits of the rising yen to set up low-cost export bases
in the East Asia. The biggest wave of Japanese FDI followed the sharp appreciation
o f the yen after the Plaza Accord o f 1985. The value o f yen appreciated from about
250 yen to a dollar in April 1985 to about 150 yen to a dollar in July 1987. With the
dramatic appreciation o f yen, the price competitiveness o f Japanese home-based
production and exports were abruptly reduced which speeded up the relocation o f
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Japanese MNCs production. The exchange rate o f the yen against the dollar contin
ued to rise from about 145 yen to a dollar in 1990 to around 100 yen to a dollar in
late 1994 which further fostered the regionalization o f Japanese firms.

In fact, the

grow ing regionalization o f Japanese manufacturing production is reflected in the
increasing concerns o f industrial hollowing-out within Japan (Gangopadhyay, 1998;
H ook, 1996; Itoh, 2000).
Economically Japan through FDI stands in a superior position in the East Asia
region and yet looking at the data o f Japanese FDI in the region alone is only part o f
the story. To complete the picture, one must understand Japanese M NCs' production
networks in East Asia. Since the mid 1980s, Japanese M N Cs have been building ver
tically integrated production networks which have made a substantial contribution to
the grow th o f manufacturing industries in East Asian econom ies. These networks are
replications and extensions o f the keiretsu (enterprise groups) in Japan in which
parent Japanese com panies (as the center) network with Japanese affiliates and sub
ordinate local companies throughout the region in long-term relationships (Hatch,
2000; Hatch & Yamamura, 1996).
Japanese keiretsu-type production networks traditionally have been hierar
chically organized to ensure that parent companies in Japan retain the control o f
decision-making authority and technological capability.

This hierarchical networks

have resulted in tight control over foreign affiliates and the creation o f relatively
closed production arrangem ents that have tended to exclude business ties with nonaffiliated local and foreign suppliers.

In terms o f technology transfer, Japanese
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M NCs tend to have low-end manufacturing being done in Asia, with higher value
added final production rem aining in Japan. Japanese firms are less likely than those
o f other countries to transfer technology to the host country. However, affiliates o f
Japanese M NCs are more likely to gain access to the Japanese market. For example,
according to Ito (1992), the top nine o f keiretsu-typed Japanese M NCs accounted for
65 percent o f overall Japanese imports in the later 1980s, giving them enormous
pow er over foreign trade.
Regionalization o f the keiretsu system through creation o f regional production
networks enables Japanese manufacturing firms stay competitive. As Robert Gilpin
put it:
The home-based firms in these regionalized Keiretsu export high-tech and
high-value-added com ponents to their affiliates in the region for assembly
into finished goods for local consumption, export back to Japan itself, and /or
export to the West. Such a corporate strategy enables the parent Japanese
firm to cut costs and maintain the high returns on the firm ’s investments in
technological innovation for as long as possible, there by retaining Japan’s
monopoly and com parative advantage in high-tech industries. (2000, p. 273)
Furthermore, in attem pting to build and strengthen regional production net
works in East Asia, Japanese M NCs receive strong support from their own govern
ment. As such Japanese M N Cs have entrenched their position within the region and
have generally proved to be formidable competitors. Japan provides by far the larg
est amount o f official developm ent assistance (ODA) to Asian economies. Japan’s
ODA had been deliberately used to support the expansion o f Japanese production
network. As Itoh argues:
Most o f Japan’s O D A is offered to projects for which there are processes o f
application and screening.
From the stage o f constructing project
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applications, Japanese giant trading companies, in cooperation with other
Japanese firms, appear and attach strings aimed at furthering their business
opportunities. Thus, Japanese O D A often works in practice as a subsidy to
their multinationalization o f Japanese firms, especially in Asian countries.
(2000, p. 123)
In terms o f the govem m ent-business relationship, no W estern nation assists
its own corporations to the extent that Japan does. One may suspect whether or not
Japan is intentionally pursuing a state-led neocolonialism or something similar to its
pre-world war II effort to create an East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. For example,
Gipin (2000, p. 271) implicitly suggests that "Japan is attempting again to create an
E ast Asian empire or exclusive sphere o f influence, albeit this tim e through the
peaceful tools o f trade, finance, and investment rather than military conquest". But it
can also be argued that the Japanese expansion of FDI and the setup o f production
netw orks in East Asia are responding to the market force and the changing environ
ment; and indeed East Asian countries do benefit from increasing regional integration
through the Japanese FDI. The more interesting question is why East Asian nations
are willing to depend on or even “embrace” Japanese FDI.
According to Hatch and Yamamura (1996) Asian firms are enjoying the bene
fits o f "embraced development." Asian economies are benefiting from the increasing
econom ic presence o f Japanese production networks because being affiliates of
Japanese MNCs, Asian com panies will gain access to Japanese capital, technology,
better paying employment opportunities, and increasing opportunities to produce and
export manufactured products.
In terms o f trading patterns, the spread of Japanese FDI in East Asia has
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erected industrial export platforms.

Japanese M NCs’ affiliates in the region are

inclined to import from the parent company and export to third country markets
especially the U.S. market.

This is one explanation why most industrializing

countries in East Asia have a deficit in trade with Japan and a major surplus in trade
with the United States. In this sense, Japan co-ordinates a production netw ork that
links firms engaging in production and distribution in Asian Pacific region.

Yet if

im ports from the U.S. decline, it may pose serious challenges to the econom ies o f
East Asian countries. Therefore as John Ikenberry suggests:
Over the last several decades, governm ents in East Asia tended to adopt
Japan’s export-led model o f development, and this has had the ironic im plica
tion o f making these Asian countries dependent on markets outside o f Asia—
particularly the American market. This in turn has leveraged Am erican influ
ence in the region and the United States has used that influence to send a mes
sage: if we are going to import your goods, you must liberalize your markets
and financial systems. A m erica’s market dominance helps explain why
APEC has shifted its emphasis in recent years toward policies prom oting glo
balization, deregulation, and market openness. (2000, p. 36)
Still there are a number o f ways in which the East Asian countries could cope
with these challenges. For example first, these nations could enhance their econom ic
integration, and the diversity between them will make increased integration a possi
bility.

Second, Japan may increase its imports from this region (Gangopadhyay,

1998). In fact, the intraregional trade in East Asia is enhancing.

In 1996, as illu

strated in Table 4, for a majority o f Asian APEC member economies, the most
im portant export market destination is the E ast Asian region.
In term o f the implications for policy direction in APEC, I cannot agree with
Ikenberry’s interpretation.

Because, for one thing, being a crucial
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Table 4
Main Export Shares o f APEC M em ber Economies (Year 1996; %)
United
States

W estern
H em isp h ere
Canada
Chile
M exico
Peru
United
States
N o rth east
A sia
China
H ong Kong
Japan
K orea
Taiwan
S o u th east
A sia
Brunei
Indonesia
M alaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
O ceania
Australia
New
Zealand
Papua New
Guinea
Russia

Japan

America
APEC

Asia
APEC

EU

80.9
16.6
83.8
19.7

4.1
16.2
1.4
6.6
11.0

0.7
4.0
3.2
6.4
32.2

4.6
16.8
1.2
17.0
18.0

5.7
23.9
3.7
26.6
20.9

4.0
22.5
6.8
23.7
17.9

17.2
21.2
27.3
22.6
23.0

19.9
6.5
21.3
11.7

1.6
1.9
2.4
3.0
1.9

35.3
46.6
44.8
19.6
41.5

15.4
14.9
15.4
14.4
13.5

10.7
8.8
10.1
19.1
8.4

1.9
13.7
18.2
33.9
18.4
18.0
4.1

53.5
26.0
13.4
17.9
8.2
16.8
12.4

0.0
1.2
1.0
1.4
0.7
1.3
0.7

21.1
35.2
45.5
26.2
49.5
34.4
53.7

17.6
15.0
13.7
17.9
13.0
15.9
11.1

5.9
9.0
8.1
2.7
10.1
13.5
18.0

6.5
10.2

20.2
15.3

2.1
2.3

46.8
43.1

10.9
14.6

13.5
14.5

6.8

15.0

0.0

51.0

16.7

10.5

7.2

3.5

0.2

8.7

32.4

47.7

Source: Adapted from APEC (1999, p. 94).
Singapore: the APEC Secretariat.

Rest o f
the W orld

1999 APEC Economic Outlook.
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controlling and providing capital and technology for East Asian countries and poten
tially a large absorber o f their exports, Ikenberry may have underestimated Japan and
over-estimated the United States in terms o f leverage in shaping the policy prefer
ences o f Asian members o f APEC. The point is not that the East Asian countries will
always side with Japan instead o f the U.S. in policy discourse in APEC since the
American market is still im portant to them. It does suggest that if the U.S. is not
sensitive to their concerns and continues to apply aggressive unilateralism, East
Asian nations do have a fallback alternative.
Furthermore it becom es a second nature for Japan to keep a low-profile in for
eign affairs in East Asia for fearing that any aggressive move would probably bring
back East Asian countries' memories o f antagonism on Japan's imperialism. Japan's
tendency to taking a m ore conciliatory stance in foreign affairs makes Japan more
acceptable to Asian countries. For example, Japan was one o f the founders o f the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966. But to avoid resistance from other nations
fearful o f Japanese domination, Japan waited patiently until other Asian nations took
the initiative in supporting the establishment of the ADB. Despite Japan's generous
financial contributions to the development funds, the headquarter o f the ADB is
located in Manila instead o f Tokyo. More importantly in terms o f conditionality o f
loans, unlike American propensity toward promoting the W ashington Consensus in
the ADB, Japan is more w illing to accommodate domestic conditions o f Asian devel
oping countries and approve loans with less string attached.

In fact, the Japanese

M inistry o f Finance has m ade efforts to assign fluent English-speaking officials who
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can argue with American counterparts more adequately in defending Asian views the legitimacy o f government intervention.

Japanese overall actions in the ADB

explain why Asian members have not formed any coalition against Japan's leadership
(Wan, 1995).
In sum when East Asian nations face, on the one hand, Am erican aggressive
dem ands for opening their dom estic markets and on the other hand Japanese adapta
tion to their domestic conditions, it is difficult not to conclude that if they have to
choose most East Asian nations are more willing to accept a Japan-dom inated region
than one in which the United States would be the major power.
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C H A PTER V

ASIA PACIFIC ECONOM IC COOPERATION:
REGIM E FORM ATION AND DESIGN

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding o f regim e forma
tion o f APEC.

It begins with an investigation o f pre-APEC econom ic institution-

building in the region; this in turn gives us a profile o f factors that inhibit and facili
tate the construction o f collective identity o f APEC. I then trace the initial m otiva
tions o f different key actors in joining APEC and study how these m otivations might
reflect on the preferences o f institutional design. Finally by using the constructivist
model o f international regimes, I will discuss theoretical and policy im plications o f
regime formation and regime design o f APEC.

Regime Formation

Pre-APEC Economic Institution-Building

APEC was established as an intergovernmental ministerial forum in Canberra
in 1989 at the initiative o f the Australian government. The original group was made
up o f twelve countries: the six ASEAN countries, Japan, South K orea, Australia,
New Zealand, Canada and the United States. In fact, APEC is the first regional eco
nomic regime to bring the governm ents o f the Asia-Pacific region together in one
forum. However, ideas to promote the economic institution-building in the region
104
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have predated APEC at least two decades. One can argue that track two or unofficial
efforts involving academics (the Pacific Trade and D evelopm ent Conference or
PAFTAD in 1968); business circles (the Pacific Basin Econom ic Council or PBEC in
1968); and then academics, business circles, and governm ent officials acting in their
private capacities (the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council or PECC in 1980) have
been able to socialize the idea o f economic cooperation in the region and thus paved
the w ay for the form ation o f APEC.

In fact, even today these non-governmental

initiatives are still active in providing input for the APEC process (W oods, 1995).
Historically,

the lack o f region-wide econom ic

institutions

for inter

governmental cooperation in Asia Pacific before the birth o f APEC was not surpris
ing. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Cold W ar imposed a division o f the
region into two camps with different ideologies and econom ic systems. It had less
time and scope to develop a sense o f regional identity am ong Asia Pacific countries.
However, the Cold War imperative cannot completely capture the negative forces
inhibiting intergovernmental institution-buildings, for it would imply that with the
end o f the Cold War, the form ation o f international regimes like APEC should follow
automatically as economic interdependence increasingly deepens.
It should be emphasized that the legacy o f im perialism before the Cold W ar
still has m ajor impact on many Asian countries even today (Morrison, Kojima, and
Maull, 1997). An implication o f this common experience o f colonialism is that those
Asian countries once occupied by imperialists such as Japan value sovereignty
strongly.

And it is this preoccupation with the protection o f sovereignty that in
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important part explains why many Asian developing nations were suspicious to ideas
proposed by major power to establish economic regimes in the region, for fears o f
renewed domination. Indeed, given these historical experiences and constraints, it is
understandable then that in order to reflect the desirability o f closer economic coop
eration, the pre-APEC economic institution-building would have to be materialized in
the form o f track two or unofficial initiatives.
In 1967, believing that the formation o f the European Common Market might
have a negative impact on its economy, Japan's Prime M inister Miki floated an idea
o f forming a Pacific Free Trade Area among Japan, U.S., Canada, Australia and N ew
Zealand. Prime M inister Miki asked Professor Kiyoshi Kojima to prepare a confer
ence to explore his idea, which led to the first P AFT AD conference held in Tokyo in
1968. M iki’s idea also encouraged the Japanese and Australian business leaders to
form PBEC in 1968 which reflected that the success o f Japanese economic recovery
increased the need for expanded business opportunities and investment through per
sonal networking and the exchange o f information among the Pacific-basin nations
(Katzenstein, 1997).
In contrast to PBEC, the PAFTAD is very much an epistemic community
because participants in the conferences have predominantly been policy-oriented
economists and scientists in universities or research institutions.

PAFTAD’s con

tribution has been to discuss how to enhance the economic development o f the Asia
Pacific economies.

It generates ideas and concepts regarding desirable ways o f

regional economic cooperation and provides policy proposals.

Initially only five
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advanced industrial nations (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and
Canada) participated in PAFTAD, over time, participation has expanded to include
most countries in the Asia Pacific region. With a sim ilar academic background and
less political sensitivities, participants in the PAFTAD setting are less difficult to
reach a body o f consensual knowledge. In terms o f policy ideas, PAFTAD is much
more optimistic but this innovative advantage is also a disadvantage to the extent that
without governmental input, the feasibility o f these policy ideas is uncertain. There
fore participants increasingly felt needs for more direct governmental involvement
(Patrick, 1997).
As discussed in the previous chapter, Japanese firms began a series o f FDI
flowing into the region since 1970s and as such Japan felt an increasing need to
develop dialogues with its trading partners for policy coordination.

In 1978 the

Japanese Prime M inister Masayoshi Ohira made a proposal for a Pacific community
which led to the establishment o f PECC in 1980. The unofficial nature o f PECC pro
vides it a greater flexibility to promote regional economic cooperation while avoiding
politically sensitive concerns. For example, it was clearly recognized that participa
tion o f the ASEAN nations was essential for any form o f Pacific Community. But at
first ASEAN member states were not positive in supporting the formation o f PECC,
because they were afraid o f losing their identity and coherence (Ichimura, 1998).
Indeed the fear o f being dominated by major power still haunted ASEAN. And yet
the unofficial nature o f PECC was instrumental in greatly lessening the pressure for
ASEAN to participate.

For government officials, PECC provides a non-committal
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venue o f exploration o f policy ideas and thus they are inclined to conduct communi
cative instead o f strategic actions in the PECC setting.
In sum, PBEC, PAFTAD, and PECC were important as channels for preAPEC discussions o f regional econom ic cooperation. They provide forums through
which participants interact with and learn from each other. And due to their unoffi
cial nature, PBEC, PAFTAD, and PECC provide a non-threatening setting in which
communicative actions are easier to take place. To the extent that policy ideas gen
erated through these unofficial econom ic institutions are increasingly shared among
participants, collective interests have been identified which in turn has been conduc
tive to the subsequent attempt at official cooperation, namely, APEC.

The Establishment o f APEC

As governments came increasingly in the 1980s to recognize the forces of
market-driven economic integration among the Asia Pacific economies, the desir
ability o f more formal governm ent cooperation became increasingly salient.

How

ever, despite the persistent efforts o f track two in the economic institution-building in
the Asia Pacific region, the formation o f APEC was not without problems. A discus
sion o f major actors’ motivations for joining APEC will reveal that the final move to
establish APEC was not smooth o r inevitable.
From the Australian perspective, the motivation o f the Australian government
to propose the formation o f APEC is mainly a defensive reaction to avoid economic
marginalization in the changing context o f the global economy.

Both the United
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States and the European Comm unity w ere engaged in building up regional trading
blocs at that time which threatened to exclude the East Asian countries and Australia.
Australia was also disturbed by A m erican unilateralism in international economic
issues.

At the same time, the U ruguay Round o f the GATT looked like breaking

down.

Thus, the Australians saw APEC as a fallback mechanism if the Uruguay

Round o f the GATT were to fail and inward-looking pressures in N orth American
and European trading blocs were to become more prominent.’ To counter the USCanada Free Trade Agreement and European Community; logically, then, the U.S.
and Canada would have to be left out. Therefore, in a speech in Seoul on January
1989, when Australia's Prime M inister Bob Hawke suggested the idea o f the AsiaPacific Econom ic Cooperation forum, he deliberately excluded the U.S. and Canada
for participation.

Furthermore, by excluding the U.S. and Canada, Australia saw

APEC as a good way to gain Australia's acceptance in Asia as the degree o f eco
nomic interdependence with East Asia continued to deepen (M cDougall, 1999;
Ravenhill, 1998).
From the Japanese perspective, given the enormous economic stakes it has in
the Asia Pacific region, Japan was very concerned with the increasing U.S. aggres
sive unilateralism and the conclusion o f the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. O f
all m ajor actors in APEC, Japan has been the most persistent in prom oting the eco
nomic institution-building in the region. Like Australia, Japan wanted to establish a
counterweight to defend the threats o f exclusion o f its exports from markets in North
Am erica and Europe. But unlike Australia, Japan wanted to include the United States
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in APEC at least for two reasons. First, Japan was very sensitive that any economic
regim e that excluded the United States would make East Asian countries reluctant to
participate for fears o f Japanese economic domination. Second, by including the U.S.
in APEC, Japan hoped that the pressure o f U.S. aggressive unilateralism could be les
sened. Thus the initial Japanese reaction to Australia's proposal was to wait for the
Am erican response. Following U.S. willingness to join APEC, the Japanese govern
m ent has come to give the full support for the establishment o f APEC (Funabashi,
1995; Yam am oto & Kikuchi, 1998).
In 1989, the United States was preoccupied with the US-Canada Free Trade
Agreem ent and Uruguay Round o f the GATT.

The idea of APEC somehow sur

prised the U.S. because it underestimated the unintended consequence o f the USCanada Free Trade Agreement it would receive from other nations in the region
(Funabashi, 1995). The newly inaugurated Bush administration was put in a rather
uncom fortable position o f having to react to a proposal in which it was not even
included as a proposed invitee (Baker, 1998). The initial reaction from the U.S. was
to wait and see. At that time, the U.S. had reservations on APEC. It was understand
able because American preference was to deal with the countries o f the region on a
bilateral basis, given its huge market. But once the U.S. knew the establishment o f
APEC w as inevitable, it insisted on being one o f its founding members. The U.S.
agreed to join APEC because it feared being left out o f an economic institution in the
region that might become Japan-centered.

In the words of U.S. Secretary o f State

James Baker (Baker & Defrank, 1995):
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I was determined that any move toward economic integration in East Asia
include the United States. At State, I would try to check any m ove by the
E ast Asians to exclude us, gently if I could, not gently if I m ust...P rim e
M inister Bob Hawke publicly proposed the idea o f an East A sian group to
prom ote free trade in the region. His proposal did not include the United
States, but we had no difficulty persuading Hawke, a good friend o f the
U nited States and George Bush, to extend us an invitation to a N ovem ber
1989 meeting o f the forum for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in
Canberra, (p. 609)
In the beginning, the ASEAN nations were ambivalent about the establish
ment o f APEC. On the one hand, they w ere cautious about the creation o f a regional
agreem ent that might in the end come to be dominated by the major actors such as
Japan, China and the United States. They feared that participation in such an agree
ment m ight increase the opportunities for foreign intervention in their domestic
affairs. On the other hand, they also feared that failure to join such an arrangem ent
would leave them isolated and vulnerable.

One o f the most im portant factors

contributing to ASEAN’s willingness to join APEC was the position adopted by
Australia who guaranteed that the ASEAN states would be the core o f APEC and that
APEC would maintain the non-binding nature o f any principles agreed. These pro
mises to ASEAN significantly shaped the evolution o f APEC (Funabashi, 1995;
M acIntyre, 1997).
Like other actors, both China and Taiw an were facing an inward-looking eco
nomic environm ent in 1989; but the fact that they are not WTO members even now
makes them especially vulnerable to the aggressive unilateralism and inward-looking
protectionism. They thus have strong econom ic incentives to join APEC. According
to Bob Hawke, leaving China out o f APEC is "like getting married w ithout having a
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bride" (Funabashi, 1995, p. 65). Still China was not invited to the first APEC meet
ing due to the Tienanmen incident in June 1989. In order not to offend China, the
Australian governm ent did not invite Taiwan either. And it is this reason that the sig
nificance o f joining APEC is much more than an economic considerations for
Taiwan. According to a Taiwan's official o f the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, "From
the outset, in order to increase our international recognition, w e w ant to join APEC at
any cost except using the title o f membership as Taiwan, China" (personal interview).
In 1991, both China and Taiwan were accepted as m em ber "economies" and offi
cially Taiw an was named "Chinese Taipei".
From the analysis above, motivations for joining APEC varied am ong
nations, but all were concerned with a threat. It can be argued that the formation o f
APEC was in important part a reaction to the comm on threat o f the intensified
inward-looking regionalism in North America and Europe.

As the Cold W ar was

com ing to an end in the late 1980s, economic issues becam e more salient. Negotia
tions in the Uruguay Round o f the GATT were stalling. Countries feared the aggres
sive unilateralism o f the U.S. The deepening o f the European Community and o f the
U S-Canada Free Trade Agreement reinforced the perception o f the world breaking
into defensive trading blocs. It was in this context that many countries in the Asia
Pacific region felt com pelled to form a regional arrangement o f their own.

The Com peting Identities: APEC vs. EAEC

Given the perceived threat that trade blocs emerged in Europe and North

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113
America, many Asian political leaders naturally thought about creating a correspond
ing one to defend themselves. The establishment o f APEC apparently did not change
their uneasiness since they doubted that APEC, with the inclusion o f the U.S. and
Canada, was adequate in addressing the particular needs o f East Asian economies.
As a Malaysian scholar argues,
As a concept, ‘A sia-Pacific’ makes little sense. Unlike East Asia or South
Asia or Southeast Asia, it has no shared history or common cultural traits.
Asia-Pacific is not even an accepted geographical entity. The U.S. has vast
economic ties with Europe but is not part o f the European Community which
jealously protects its own historical, cultural and political entity. Similarly,
Japan is deeply involved in the U.S. economy but is not part o f the North
American Free Trade Agreement. It is only in the case o f Asia, more spe
cifically East Asia that there is a concerted attempt to suppress its collective
identity and thw art its legitimate quest for a common identity, (cited in
Higgott, 1995, p. 91)
Indeed, if East Asian countries are treated as outsiders by the EC and
NAFTA, it is only natural for these outsiders to form a group o f their own. This has
led to two proposals: ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1991 (AFTA) and East Asian
Economic Group in 1990 (EAEG). Whereas AFTA is not big enough to threaten the
major actors in the Asia Pacific region, EAEG is much more controversial due to its
proposed membership.

In Decem ber 1990, Malaysian Prime M inister M ahathir

floated an idea o f EAEG. The group would consist o f the ASEAN countries, Japan,
Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. EAEG was originally interpreted as a pref
erential trading bloc to counteract the NAFTA and EC. In order to mitigate excessive
suspicions, the name o f EA EG was changed to East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC)
at the ASEAN Economic M inisters' M eeting in Kuala Lum pur in October 1991 and
was endorsed by the ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992.
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proposed membership list o f EA EC removed Taiwan and H ong Kong due to China's
opposition (Leong, 2000). Currently the EAEC is also known as ASEAN plus Three
(Japan, Korea, and China). In terms o f the identity o f EAEC, M ahathir clarifies the
concept at the Asia Society Conference in Tokyo in M ay 1993:
In proposing the East Asian Economic Group we are not only not proposing a
closed, inward-looking trading bloc for East Asia but w e are not even propos
ing any kind o f trading bloc for East Asia... We are not advocating a preferen
tial trading arrangement or an economic union for East Asia. W hat we wish
to see is the establishment o f a loose consultative forum for the economies of
the region. This forum should have both a regional agenda and an extraregional agenda... We are not particular about the name o f this process. When
Indonesia proposed a change from East Asian Economic G roup to East Asian
Economic Caucus, M alaysia saw absolutely no problem. W e initially chose
the word Group because o f our acquaintanceship with the Cairns Group,
which you know, is the Group o f agricultural exporters who have played a
most substantial role in the Uruguay Round, (cited in Leong, 2000, pp. 5960)
Despite Mahathir's clarification o f EAEC, it was simply unacceptable for
those who were excluded from the group. Indeed, it was not so much the nature of
EAEC, but its membership that caused anxieties for outsiders. From the very begin
ning the United States opposed it most forcefully for fearing that EA EC might turn
into an anti-Western coalition. To quote U.S. Secretary o f State James Baker again:
[Agitation] for an exclusively East Asian trading bloc refused to go away.
Malaysian Prime M inister M ahathir bin Mohamad, in particular, continued to
hawk his idea o f an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) along the line o f the
EC. Mahathir was not seen as particularly pro-American and was considered
likely to cause m ischief if crossed, so I took a moderate line on his idea in
public. In private, I did my best to kill it...A t the meeting in Seoul, Korean
Foreign M inister Lee Sang Ok suggested his country might support
Mahathir's proposal out o f Asian solidarity. I reminded Lee that it was
Americans, not M alaysians, who had shed their blood for K orea forty years
before. My message was simple: All countries are not equal. The South
Koreans got it, and did not press for an EAEG (Baker & Defrank, 1995, pp.
610-611).
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For the United States, however, it would be the unambiguous endorsem ent o f
Japan not K orea to make the EA EG proposal to be o f any significant threat. Initially
Japan felt am bivalent when the idea o f EA EG began to float. Japan could neither
accept nor reject M ahathir’s proposal.

On one hand, the EAEC evokes an Asian

identity in the minds of many Asians including the Japanese.

According to

Funabashi (1995), some Japanese fear that “if Japan rejects the EAEC today, it may
suffer tom orrow if or when the United States disengages from the region and China
dominates it” (p. 208). On the other hand, if Japan accepts the EAEC, there might be
economic and security repercussions. From the economic perspective, as noted in the
previous chapter, although Japan’s trade with Asia has suppressed the trade with the
United States since 1990s, the Japanese economic tie with the U.S. remains signifi
cant. For Japan, a move towards the EAEC might further American protectionist ten
dency and trade retaliation. In terms o f security, Japan feared that an economic divi
sion between East and West might weaken America’s security comm itment.

In

September 1995, for example, Assistant Secretary o f Defense Joseph N ye issued an
explicit warning as saying that East Asian nations had rejected the EA EC because
they understood that if they had embraced the EAEC, “we would probably withdraw
our security presence” (cited from Grieco, 1999, p. 329).
Logically, Japan would like to avoid a choice between Asia and the United
States, and APEC is important precisely because it contains both.

Therefore, the

Japanese government did not embrace the EAEC from the beginning. Japan's reluc
tance disappointed the Malaysian government. In an August 1994 meeting, M ahathir
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told Japanese Prime M inister M urayama that "Japan should stop apologizing for
W orld W ar II and start being a world leader" (cited in Funabashi, 1995, p. 206).
M ahathir's encouragement implicitly indicated that the ASEAN's fears o f Japanese
dominance o f the region have somewhat subsided.
Still, Japan continued to refrain from embracing the EAEC. In July 1995, in
response to the question why Japan continued to avoid the EAEC at a press confer
ence, spokesperson for Japan's Foreign M inister stated that "As you know the United
State is still very much opposed to the idea o f the EAEC' (cited in Grieco, 1999, p.
329). One month later, at a press conference after an ASEAN meeting in Brunei, a
Japanese official o f M inistry o f Foreign Affairs stated that the Japanese government
"firmly believes that the EAEC should be launched with the blessings o f all APEC
countries.

Any attempt to divide APEC countries should be avoided" (cited in

Leong, 2000, p. 78).
But it would be incorrect to assume that the idea o f EAEC enjoys little sup
port in Asia.

Mahathir's idea o f EAEC made him quite a figure in many Asian

countries, notably Japan. To quote Dr. M ahathir again:
The United States created NAFTA and it wants to use APEC to hold back the
East Asian countries. American support for NAFTA but not EAEC is quite
illogical. If W ashington favors one, then it ought to be in favor o f both. You
cannot justify N A FT A and APEC and reject the EAEC. That is hypocrisy. It
is like saying, "I can do what I like, but you may only do what I let you."
(cited in MacIntyre, 1997, p. 238)
W ithout considering the motivations behind Mahathir's claims, it is indeed
difficult to justify that the United States opposes Asian nations' search for their own
collective identity (EAEC) when it has one (NAFTA). Although no meetings have
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ever been held under the name o f EAEC, the core idea o f such a more exclusive
identity continues to be discussed. In fact, the vision o f EA EC was brought a step
further in the form o f the first Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM ) in Bangkok in M arch
1996 (MacIntyre, 1997). The ASEM resembles APEC summits, but includes only
the seven ASEAN states plus Japan, South Korea, and China with the fifteen states in
the EU. Prior to the ASEM Bangkok Summit, ASEAN held preparatory meetings
with Japan, South Korea, and China; together these countries are identical to those
proposed by M ahathir for the EAEC. It should be noted that initially Japan insisted
that it would attend the ASEM only if Australia and N ew Zealand would attend when
the idea o f ASEM was proposed by Prime M inister Goh Chok Tong o f Singapore in
January 1995 at the World Economic Forum (Funabashi, 1995; Higgot, 1999).
Japan's policy change within six months indicated that Japan is cautiously expanding
its low-key regional role.

Regime Design

Regime Identity

As previously discussed, when an international regime has been established,
its members have to decide the identity o f the regime and then develop procedural
rules and structures to proceed its operation. From the very beginning, the idea o f
open regionalism has been adopted as the regime identity to articulate the concern o f
APEC members regarding any prospective breakdown o f the liberal international
trading order and the emergence o f exclusionary regional trading blocs in Europe and
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N orth America.

Asian countries realized that their econom ic success was largely

based upon the post-war liberalization of GATT. D espite the increasing intra-Asian
trade, Asian countries recognize that a large proportion o f their trade occurs with
countries outside the region. Therefore, it is not in the interests o f these countries to
form an inward-looking trading bloc because the risks from trade diversion and
retaliatory closure o f export markets outside the region is great (Lawrence, 1996;
Petri, 1999).
The joint statem ent o f APEC's first ministerial meeting in Canberra in 1989
affirmed that, "Every econom y represented in Canberra relies heavily on a strong and
open multilateral trading system, and none believes that Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation should be directed to the formation o f a trading bloc" (APEC, 1995b, p.
35). The 1991 Seoul D eclaration has reconfirmed the idea o f open regionalism that
"Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation should serve as an exemplary model o f open
regional cooperation" and should "develop and strengthen an open multilateral
trading system in the interest o f Asia Pacific and other economies" (APEC, 1995b, p.
62).
But what does open regionalism mean? W ithin APEC there has been a heated
debate over the meaning o f open regionalism since APEC members committed them 
selves through the 1994 B ogor Declaration to create a region o f free and open trade
and investment. At the heart o f the debate is the preference over the conditional or
unconditional MFN (M ost Favored Nation) in terms o f the trade liberalization. There
are two basic ways to define the idea o f open regionalism in terms o f the relationship
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betw een APEC and W TO/GATT.

To be consistent with W TO/GATT, APEC can

base itself on the principle o f either non-discrimination o r reciprocity.

I f APEC

adopts the principle o f non-discrim ination (Article 1 o f GATT), any trade benefits
granted to one contracting party should be applied to all other contracting parties
unconditionally. On the other hand, if APEC decides to base itself on the principle o f
reciprocity (Article 24 o f GATT), APEC has to set itself up as preferential trade area
(PTA) along the line o f N A FT A (Lawrence, 1996; Yanai, 2000).
Asian members o f APEC reject the establishment o f a PTA because different
APEC members are at dram atically different levels o f econom ic development, and
have dramatically different economic systems (for example, the role o f the govern
ment). However, the United States, Canada and some other members are unwilling
to extend on an unconditional non-reciprocal basis any reductions in trade barriers to
others, notably the European Union, because o f the problem o f free rider.

As

Lawrence (1996) argues:
most proponents o f regional economic programs for Asian economies gener
ally advocate some form o f “open” regionalism. One approach would be for
APEC nations to negotiate tariff reductions that would then be extended on a
most favored nation basis to all trading partners. A PE C ’s trading partners
would undoubtedly welcome such an initiative, but some APEC nations them 
selves might find it hard to justify extending “free-rider” benefits to nations
from outside the region, (p. 93)
Because the somewhat ambiguous language o f the B ogor Declaration (free
and open trade and investment), the two ideas (conditional vs.unconditional) are
competing to dominate the interpretation o f open regionalism in the APEC process.
H ow APEC has been coping with the differences among members will be elaborated
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in the next chapter.

Decision-M aking Process

As previously noted ASEAN’s support for APEC was premised on a gradual
and flexible approach; and ASEAN was promised a prom inent role by Australia. In
the Joint Statement o f the First Ministerial M eeting in 1989, ASEAN’s institutional
preferences were reflected:
Ministers also expressed their recognition o f the important contribution
ASEAN and its dialogue relationships have played in the development to date
o f APEC, and noted the significant role ASEAN institutional mechanisms can
continue to play in supporting the present effort to broaden and strengthen
regional economic cooperation. (APEC, 1995, p. 35)
Following APEC's first meeting in Canberra, A SEAN countries work out the
so-called Kuching Consensus (Linnan, 1995) as their principles for participation in
APEC:
preserving the identity and cohesion o f ASEAN w ithout diluting its coopera
tive relations with its dialogue partners and third countries; basing APEC on
principles o f equality, equity and mutual benefit, taking into account differ
ences in stages o f economic development and sociopolitical systems; avoiding
formation o f an inward-looking economic or trading bloc, and seeking instead
to strengthen the multilateral trading system; em ploying APEC as a consulta
tive forum on economic issues, rather than adopting mandatory directives for
any participant to undertake or implement; facilitating mutual cooperation to
promote APEC members' common interests in larger multilateral forums; and
proceeding gradually and pragmatically with APEC rather than seeking rapid
institutionalization, (p. 826)
The Kuching Consensus clearly indicates what the ASEAN nations fear and
what they want from the APEC. The ASEAN nations fear APEC would become a
closed trading bloc since they benefit from the GATT/W TO principle o f non
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discrimination. What ASEAN nations want from APEC is a loose consultative insti
tution to enhance economic cooperation so that they can keep their governm ents’ dis
cretion in dealing with domestic conditions. But what does the United States want
from APEC? Was the United States willing to go along with A SEA N ’s preferences?
At the initial years o f the APEC process, the United States took a conciliatory posi
tion on the issue o f regime design. In the words o f U.S. Secretary o f State James
B aker (1995, p. 610):
APEC might possess limitless long-term potential. B ut in the short-term, it
would have to choose its issues carefully. Anything too far ranging~for
instance, a move to transform it rapidly into a free-trade zone—could divide
APEC’s members and doom it in its infancy. In the beginning, at least, our
focus would be less on issues than on institutionalization. W e needed first to
regularize meetings, form alize consultation, and build trust. To assist in this
regard, we agreed that an ASEAN nation would host every other annual
meeting. Before APEC could run, it would have to walk.
Since its inception, APEC has been taking a gradual and flexible approach in
term s o f the procedural rules. It is gradual because decisions are made by consensus
and it is flexible because decisions are non-binding and voluntary. Agreement in the
APEC process is reached by consensus. However, APEC's consensus-based rule o f
decision-making process differs from that one adopted by international organizations
such as the United Nations. The procedure rule o f the UN is to make legally binding
decisions through either m ajority-vote or unanimity-vote.
voting system.

APEC does not have a

Consensus is reached through deliberation step by step (Hirano,

1996). APEC’s focus on consensus-based decision making was critical to winning
support for the regime in its early stages, but unanimity is becom ing increasingly dif
ficult to maintain as it addresses more substantive issues.
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Consistent with the idea o f voluntarism, commitments are not binding on
APEC's members. They do, however, represent statements o f serious intent and are
expected to guide the policy form ulation o f APEC governments.

APEC does not

directly regulate its member's economies. There is no formal dispute resolution pro
cess and APEC has no enforcement powers. Instead peer pressure is adopted to push
governm ents to implement their com m itm ents. In the initial years o f the APEC pro
cess, there was no controversy in term s o f the non-binding rule since APEC activities
had been confined to recommendations or policy statements indicating the direction
that APEC should take. However since the 1993 Seattle Summit, conflicting views
regarding the non-binding rule o f APEC have surfaced as APEC increasingly deals
with concrete issues such as the reduction o f trade barriers for goods and services
(Janow, 1996).
In terms o f leadership, it is im portant to recognize that the prevailing APEC
institutional structure implies that the leadership in APEC is provided by the host
governm ents that alternates annually.

Individual governments have their particular

interest that they want to promote through APEC, and it is the host government that
usually has a major influence on the agenda o f APEC in a particular year. The rotat
ing chair thus prevents any one m em ber from constantly inserting its preferred ideas
into the process.

However, it is expected that these governments will continue to

prom ote the activities that they had initiated when they were in the APEC chair
(Khanna, 1996).
APEC

was designed w ith

a minimal regime

structure
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and

APEC’s

institutionalization has been undertaken in a pragmatic way. Yet over the past twelve
years, there has been a significant institutionalization o f the APEC process. In 1992,
APEC members agreed to establish a small permanent Secretariat located in
Singapore.

Although the Secretariat has expanded over the years, it continues to

function as a clearinghouse. Initially, the Ministerial M eeting was the main forum
for form ulating the policy direction o f APEC.

Since 1993 the APEC Summit has

taken over the task o f directing A P E C ’s developments. To im plem ent the Leaders
agreem ents, APEC Ministers rely o n the Senior Officials' M eetings (SOM ).

The

SOM are expected to provide coordination for the work programs and budgets o f
APEC committees, working groups and expert groups; to make recom m endations to
M inisters; and to carry out their decisions (APEC, I999d). Figure 2 illustrates the
regim e structure o f APEC.

Discussion: Im plications for Constructivism and APEC

W ith regards to regime form ation, ideas to promote the econom ic institution
building in the region were discussed for more than two decades before APEC was
created.

These fora identified the need for and socialized the ideas o f economic

cooperation. Yet apart from unofficial cooperation in the form o f PBEC, PAFTAD,
and PECC, there was little support fo r formalizing regional economic cooperation at
the governmental level. M oreover w hile economic interdependence in Asia-Pacific
developed rapidly in the early 1980s, APEC did not occur until 1989.

Therefore,

econom ic interdependence is a necessary but not sufficient factor for the creation o f
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APEC. N ow that ideas and interests o f regional cooperation have been identified,
some other crucial catalysts are needed to go beyond historical constraints and foster
the formation o f APEC. The U.S. aggressive unilateralism, the negotiation o f the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the EC towards a single market, and the fear
o f possible failure o f GATT Uruguay Round were those crucial catalysts in A P E C ’s
formation.

It can be argued that APEC was in crucial part bom in response to

common threats.
From the constructivist perspective, the formation o f collective identity
derived from a common threat says little about the cohesiveness o f that collective
identity. It would be incorrect to assume that once a collective identity is formed,
states' corporate interests would subside or their collective interests would necessarily
follow. There is no expectation that the initial cooperation among states produces
mutual trust. Creating a collective identity is only the first step, but w hether or not
this collective identity will be consolidated depends on states' subsequent interaction.
A policy implication for APEC is that a common threat may be strong enough to
form a collective identity among APEC members; and yet eventually APEC members
must face their own internal dynamics in terms o f regime development.

This is

especially true for APEC since one o f the common threats, namely the United States,
was included in the regime which made APEC a hard case to prove there is a collec
tive identity between regime members from the outset. Indeed it is difficult and yet
not inherently impossible.
In contrast to rationalist assertions, the constructivist model points us to the
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possibility that collective identity can be constructed and reinforced through prac
tices.

In other words, identity and its corresponding interest are emerging out o f

interaction, not prior to it. And it is this argum ent that Japan's position on the com 
peting identities between APEC and EAEC is so instructive in analyzing Proposition
I: in a given situation, if a state's corporate and collective identities are in conflict,
corporate identity will tend to be selected; and Proposition 1.1: the more a state is
committed to maintaining interstate relationships, the higher the salience o f its col
lective identity relative to corporate identity.
The U.S. signaled to Asian members that joining EAEC would divide APEC
into competing coalitions and thus would hurt collective identity among APEC m em 
bers. Therefore, if Japan embraces EAEC, it would imply that Japan evokes corpor
ate identity instead o f collective identity in terms o f its relationship to the U.S. C on
versely, if Japan rejects the idea o f EAEC, the theoretical implication is that Japan
evokes collective identity in order to maintain its relationship with the U.S.
Both rationalist and constructivist models can explain why initially Japan
rejected the EAEC and embraced the APEC. Given that the United States is still a
m ajor absorber o f East Asian exports, the Japanese government recognizes that a
self-contained East Asian economic bloc is not feasible.

Furthermore, Japan fears

that an economic division between East and W est is likely to weaken A m erica’s
security commitment to its East Asian allies. The rationalist model, however, cannot
explain Japan's policy change in favor o f EAEC within the space o f six months. A
rationalist could not use the data to explain the policy change because over six
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months the data did not change significantly. Security concerns remains unchanged,
economic interdependence is still present.
Instead, the constructive model can provide a m ore coherent explanation.
Without rejecting rationalist explanations, a constructivist interpretation goes deeper
and would argue that the idea o f EAEC came too early. The newly established APEC
began a new chapter in the relationship between Japan and the U.S. Despite recent
historical experiences o f A m erican aggressive unilateralism , Japan would like to give
itself and the U.S. another chance to improve their relationship. If, however, the U.S.
continues to take aggressive actions, it is only a m atter o f time before Japan will turn
to the EAEC. The reason why Japan did not initially em brace the idea o f EAEC was
in part because that the U.S. took a more conciliatory stance in the early APEC pro
cess. In the next chapter I will empirically dem onstrate how the policy discourses
between the U.S. and Japan might lead to Japan's policy change towards the reception
of the EAEC.
The constructivist model contends that collective identities are learned and
reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant others. In the case o f
EAEC, an Asian collective identity is constructed and reinforced in response to how
the U.S. (a significant other) treats the East Asian region.

Following this logic, a

policy implication is that the future o f EAEC in part depends on how APEC members
treat each other. H iggott (1998b) contends that "It is the identification o f European
economic space and policy positions and American economic space and policy posi
tions that is fostering the identification of (differing) Asian understandings o f space
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and policy positions" (p. 57). I am not arguing that the EAEC process has deepened.
N either do I wish to suggest that there is no contradiction within the EAEC. After
all, it is difficult to imagine that China would allow the EAEC to become Japancentered, given the historical experience between these two countries. These are not
issues here. The point to be made is simply that an idea o f Asian identity, no matter
how loose, has significance to the extent that EAEC satisfies the psychological need
o f Asian countries to have a regional group o f their own in response to being treated
as outsiders by NAFTA and EU.
With regards to regim e design, in order to accommodate ASEAN's prefer
ences, APEC was created to be informal consultative processes characterized by
voluntary, consensus-based and not-binding rules.

This trust-building and input

legitimacy oriented approach is deliberately compatible with state sovereignty. As
Acharya (1997, p. 13) argues: "informal and nonlegalistic procedures are preferred by
proponents o f the Asia-Pacific Way because they create a nonthreatening atmosphere
for exploring ways o f problem-solving." If APEC's procedural rules had not been
based upon in-put legitimacy, it would have been difficult to accommodate the politi
cal, economic, and social diversity o f APEC members in the first place.

In other

words, voluntary, consensus-based and not-binding rules have been an essential pre
condition for holding such diverse countries together and, in particular, o f reducing
Asian members' anxieties about the possibility o f American dominance.
The input legitimacy oriented rules of APEC are relevant here for analyzing
Proposition 2.1: the more an international regime is based upon legitimacy, the
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higher the probability the regime members comply with the regim e norms, and the
more the cohesiveness o f regime collective identity. It can be argued that the more
conciliatory stance that the United States took in the initial years o f the APEC pro
cess was conductive to lessening the fears o f Asian member, which in turn positively
enhanced the collective identity am ong APEC members. A lthough input legitimacy
is crucial, probably no international regime would want to rest its reputation on pro
cess alone. Output legitimacy or tangible policy results are im portant too, especially
for members who have preferences over outcomes, but not over social relations. A
complication is that input legitimacy and output legitimacy do not necessarily coin
cide. For example, to many APEC observers (Gallant & Stubbs, 1997; MacIntyre,
1997) the problem over the medium to long term is that without the benefits normally
associated with a rules-based regime emphasizing reciprocity, it m ay be difficult to
maintain the interest o f the United States. However, to many A sian members proce
dural fairness and practices may become valued beyond their technical-functional
performances. To them, then, APEC is not only an instrument for the policy achieve
ments; it is part o f a political order m aking it possible for different m embers with dif
ferent ideas to coexist peacefully. The interaction between input and output legiti
macy has important policy implications for the APEC process.
At least two policy implications o f APEC's decision-m aking style can be
identified. First, unlike international hard law or treaties which often reflect a narrow
and lowest common denominator o f collect interest, APEC's non-bonding rules are
more flexible and bold in terms o f policy agenda. The 1994 B ogor Declaration is a
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good case in point. The B ogor Declaration to achieve free and open trade and invest
m ent in APEC by 2010/2020 has been widely viewed as A PE C ’s m ost significant
moment. It was a bold move by APEC members and would have been difficult to
achieve if APEC's decisions had been binding.

This does not necessarily mean

APEC countries do not expect to implem ent the commitment, but it simply means
that they w ant to keep the governm ental discretion in hands to protect sovereignty in
case domestic conditions do not perm it them to continually pursue such commitment.
W ithout doubt, it is also possible that the Bogor Declaration is only a cheap talk. But
at the minim um level, it indicates two things. First APEC m embers all endorse a
m arket-led open regionalism instead o f closed one. Second, the coherence o f collec
tive identity among APEC members accumulated in previous years has been condu
cive to generating such commitment.
The second implication is that the consensus-based rules may generate vague
decisions (acceptable for every m ember) that conceal underlying disagreements. In
other words, the APEC decision-m aking style may allow internal contradictions to
accumulate without effective resolution.

This would not be problem atic if agree

ments were only about statements o f members' intention. However, w hen the time
comes to deal with concrete issues, APEC members may have different interpreta
tions on agreements. For example, what does free and open trade and investment
m ean in the Bogor Declaration?

Does it mean a zero end point?

Is every sector

included in trade liberalization? These issues will be further discussed in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER VI

APEC: SUBSTANTIVE POLICY ISSUES

The purpose o f this chapter is to investigate what APEC members m ight do to
affect their collective identity either positively or negatively, by looking at the sub
stantive policy issues in the APEC process. Based on the idea o f complex adaptive
systems, the policy issues to be discussed in this chapter are selected to see how
APEC responds to its internal dynamics and external pressures.

Internal Dynamics

APEC raised its profile in 1993 w hen President W illiam Clinton initiated an
annual APEC Summit in Seattle, and state leaders agreed to envision an Asia-Pacific
com m unity.

The following year in Indonesia, APEC leaders, through the Bogor

Declaration, committed themselves to creating a region o f free and open trade and
investment, by the year 2010 for developed countries, and by 2020 for developing
countries.

In order to implement the B ogor Declaration, APEC has identified and

endorsed two m ajor policy agendas in a 1995 economic leaders meeting (known as
the Osaka Action Agenda): (1) trade and investm ent liberalization and facilitation
(TILF), and (2) economic and technical cooperation (ECOTECH).

130
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Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation (TILF)

The Idea o f TILF

It may be the case that, to the extent that APEC is known outside o f the APEC
community, it is mainly because o f the TILF agenda. The Osaka Action Agenda con
sists o f two parts. Part I deals with TILF w hile part II covers ECOTECH. Pan I
starts with nine general principles to guide TILF activities: (1) comprehensiveness;
(2) W TO-consistency; (3) comparability; (4) non-discrimination; (5) transparency;
(6) standstill; (7) simultaneous start, continuos progress, differentiated time-tables;
(8) flexibility; and (9) cooperation (APEC, 1995). The TILF action agenda has more
extensive coverage o f areas than is usual in W TO initiatives. These are: (a) tariffs,
(b) non-tariff measures, (c) services, (d) investment, (e) standards and conformance,
(f) customs procedures, (g) intellectual property rights, (h) competition policy, (i)
government procurement, (j) deregulation, (k) rules o f origin, (I) dispute mediation,
(m) mobility o f business people, (n) Uruguay Round implementation, and (o) infor
mation gathering and analysis (APEC, 1995a).
In terms o f implementing the TILF agenda, APEC members agree to adopt
the modality o f concerted unilateral liberalization through their individual action
plans (IAPs). The implementation modality is unilateral to the extent that individual
APEC members will announce their own liberalization and facilitation programs
voluntarily and members will then implement them according to their domestic rules.
It is concerted to the extent that their unilateral efforts will be discussed and reviewed
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within APEC, in accordance with the nine general principles for cooperation. The
whole process relies on peer pressures so that unilateral efforts are encouraged
(Yamazawa, 1998).
The factual descriptions o f the TILF agenda and its modality cannot reveal the
process o f serious debates leading to its outcomes.

Am ong the most contentious

issues, the principles o f comprehensiveness and non-discrim ination stand out. First,
the principle o f com prehensiveness was difficult to resolve due to a debate on
whether agriculture w ould be included in the liberalization sectors. At the July and
September 1995 senior officers’ preparatory meetings for the Osaka APEC summit,
Japan, with support from South Korea, Taiwan and China, indicated to exclude the
agricultural sector from liberalization on the grounds that domestic conditions would
not allow farm and fisheries sectors for further liberalization.

However, Australia

and the United States, among others with strong agricultural export interests, con
tested this view and strongly insisted the importance o f comprehensiveness in imple
menting the Bogor com m itments (Khanna, 1996; Langdon, 1997).

As Australia

Prime M inister Keating argued:
Australia's position is clear. The Bogor Declaration is unambiguous on the
question o f com prehensive coverage...It does not say 'free trade except for
agriculture'. W e all have sensitive sectors - for Australia, these might include
automobiles and textiles, clothing and footwear. The effect o f any APEC
m em ber excluding one sector from coverage o f the free trade commitment
would be that others would also look for exceptions. This would paralyze
A P E C ...T he 15-25 year time period leaders set in Bogor for the achievement
o f the free and open trade and investment goal provides ample scope for
m em ber econom ies to undertake any necessary adjustm ents, (cited in Woods,
1995, p. 4)
The U.S. am bassador to APEC, Sandra Kristoff, expressed the same concerns,
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but in an aggressive tone: "for m any o f us, to provide for sectoral exclusion because
o f domestic sensitivities would be to turn Bogor on its head and to call into serious
question the continued interest o f m any o f us to participate" (cited in Gallant &
Stubbs, 1997, p. 210). The im passe over an agricultural exception was passed from
the senior officials over to the ministers. Japan was under strong pressure. As the
host country, Japan wanted the APEC Osaka meeting to be successful but it also
needed to address the domestic concerns. It was at this time that Japan felt a strong
need to align more with Asian members. And Japan got it.
A t the end o f the Osaka Economic Leader meeting in N ovem ber 1995, Japan,
along with the ASEAN nations, Taiwan, South Korea, and China, was able to achieve
an acceptable result: com prehensiveness with flexibility. APEC m em bers agreed that
the principle o f com prehensiveness was upheld while its im plem entation were
allowed to be flexible with consideration given to the sensitive areas o f each APEC
member.

The final wording o f comprehensiveness and flexibility in the Osaka

Action agenda are as follows: comprehensiveness means that "[t]he APEC liberaliza
tion and facilitation process w ill be comprehensive, addressing all impediments to
achieving the long-term goal o f free and open trade and investm ent" (APEC, 1995a,
p. 5); and flexibility means that "[considering the different levels o f econom ic devel
opm ent am ong the APEC econom ies and the diverse circum stances in each economy,
flexibility will be available in dealing with issues arising from such circumstances in
the liberalization and facilitation process" (APEC, 1995a, p. 6).
The other controversial issue is regarding to the principle o f non
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discrim ination.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the different views competing

for the definition o f open regionalism became salient as APEC began to enter the
im plem entation phrase. The debate was whether APEC should or should not develop
as a preferential free trade agreement or whether APEC liberalization should be on an
unconditional Most Favored Nation (MFN) basis. A preferential free trade agree
m ent would mean that non-members would only benefit from liberalization by APEC
members, if non-members made reciprocal liberalization measures. MFN-based lib
eralization would mean that non-members could benefit without having to take any
reciprocal liberalization measures. There had been concerns that the United States
m ight have difficulty agreeing to anything more than a preferential agreement, for the
concerns o f the free rider.
A sian members o f APEC have shown a clear preference for adherence to the
M FN principle and preferred the model o f concerted unilateral liberalization leaving
each country to determine its own plan in a manner that was voluntary and flexible.
The United States opposed this approach as too open-ended and instead proposed a
com prehensive, reciprocal and binding liberalization which would turn APEC into a
preferential free trade agreement. There was intensive deliberation on how to recon
cile these two approaches. As Khanna (1996, p. 262) states: "the 'Asian' inclination
to evolve and the 'American' inclination to resolve."
A t the Osaka leaders meeting, the Asian approach prevailed.

APEC has

adopted the principle o f non-discrimination and chosen its modality as concerted uni
lateral liberalization. Arguably, the concerted unilateral liberalization can address the
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concern o f the free rider problem and can be consistent with Article 1 o f the GATT/
WTO as well.

According to proponents o f the concerted unilateral liberalization

(Yanai, 2000), the free rider issue may be overcome through the principle o f flexi
bility, which can be interpreted as leaving the implementation o f trade liberation to
the discretion o f each APEC member. Because APEC members m ust have consid
ered the possibility o f free riders when they decided to reduce trade barriers, the con
cerns about free riders were somewhat diminished.

Still, the final wording o f the

non-discrimination principle o f the TILF agenda was ambiguous enough to accom 
modate the principle o f reciprocity (Article 24 o f the GATT/WTO).
APEC economies will apply or endeavor to apply the principle o f non
discrimination between and am ong them in the process o f liberalization and
facilitation o f trade and investment. The outcome o f trade and investment
liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region will be the actual reduction o f barriers
not only among APEC economies but also between APEC economies and
non-APEC economies. (APEC, 1995a, p. 5)

The P olicy Evolution o f TILF

1996 Information Technology Agreement fITAT The United States was frus
trated with the contents o f individual action plans because members' commitments
were too distant and too general. As an alternative, the United States proposed a sec
toral negotiations approach. The rationale underlying this approach is based upon a
concept o f critical mass. According to Okamoto (2000), "if the mass o f participants
o f an agreement reach a critical level, the motivation for non-participants to jo in the
agreem ent would get stronger, because the cost o f not joining would surpass that o f
joining" (p. 8).
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The idea o f ITA was initially proposed by the United States at the Quadri
lateral Trade M inisters’ Meeting among the United States, the European Union,
Japan and Canada in December 1994. The object o f this agreement was to eliminate
tariffs on a list o f IT products (including computers, software, telecom equipment,
semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipments and scientific instru
ments) by the year 2000 (Yanai, 2000). However, an agreement could not be reached
because o f the EU's objection. The EU was displeased with the bilateral preferential
agreem ent in several IT products between the United and Japan that excluded other
nations. At the Quadrilateral Trade M inisters’ M eeting in Kobe in April 1996, how
ever, the EU conditionally endorsed the ITA, which was to include the EU in any
agreem ent on IT products between Japan and the United States. Three months later,
Japan and the U nited States agreed to end the bilateral agreement.

Following the

Japan-U.S. decision, the EU began to strongly support the ITA. At the September
Quad M eeting, a basic coalition for the ITA am ong the United States, Japan, the EU
and Canada was established. The total value o f the IT trade o f the coalition was
about two-thirds o f the world total, which was a m ajor step toward reaching critical
mass, defined as more than 90% o f sectoral trade (Bergsten, 1997; Okamoto, 2000).
Following the September Quad M eeting, the United States started to push the
ITA in the APEC setting. However, not every APEC m ember agreed to endorse the
ITA without reservation.

For example, the Trade M inister o f M alaysia said “you

cannot expect every country to undertake market-opening measures at the same time,
at the same pace and over the same product sectors”(cited in Okamoto, 2000, p. 7).
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In the end, the Leaders’ Declaration stated that:
Recognizing the importance o f information technology in the 21st century,
APEC Leaders call for the conclusion o f an information technology agree
m ent by the W TO M inisterial Conference that would substantially eliminate
tariffs by the year 2000, recognizing need for flexibility as negotiations in
G eneva proceed. (APEC, 1997, p. 4)
The ITA was adopted by the APEC leaders and then forwarded to the WTO
M inisterial M eeting in Singapore less than one month later and was adopted as a
WTO agreement.

Fifteen APEC members signed the agreement and have imple

mented it since April 1997. Although economies such as China, Malaysia, Thailand
and the Philippines had concerns about the Agreement and did not sign at Singapore,
they joined after observing a critical mass o f economies had participated in the
agreem ent (Okamoto, 2000). It was a glory moment for APEC, as a Canadian APEC
related official, "it was the momentum boost to the ITA that seems to have made
those outside o f APEC circles sit up and take note" (personal interview).
The experience o f the ITA process set a precedent for APEC's trade liberali
zation as an alternative model as opposed to lAPs.

In this model, APEC reached

voluntary agreement on a set o f liberalization measures and then forwarded the result
to the W TO to be converted into a binding agreement. In retrospect, several factors
can be identified to explain why supporters o f the ITA were able to form a critical
mass. First, interests were balanced. W ith the promise between the United States
and Japan to put the bilateral agreem ent to an end, the EU softened its stance so that a
m ajor coalition was able to form. Second, the contribution o f IT products to eco
nomic developm ent was widely recognized; and the changing pace o f IT products is
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so fast that the protection o f them is counterproductive for the domestic IT industry.
Third, the application o f the principle of flexibility was instrum ental in winning the
support from the developing members of APEC.

1997-1998 Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization fEV SLL Encouraged by
the success o f the ITA, the Leaders Meeting o f 1996 called for a "Early Voluntary
Sectoral Liberalization" (EVSL) initiative. The idea o f EVSL was originally con
ceived to identify a few sectors to be agreed upon more easily and implemented ear
lier in addition to the IAPs, thereby maintaining the m om entum o f liberalization
within APEC. ITA was a good precedent. Sixty-one sectors were proposed as can
didates for EVSL in 1997, and 15 sectors were identified as priorities for action
through the discussion among member economies at the 1997 Vancouver economic
leaders meeting (Yamazawa, 1999). These 15 sectors were further classified into two
categories: “Front 9” and “Back 6”. The Front 9 were agreed upon for immediate
actions, which included chemicals, forest products, energy, fish and fish products,
environmental goods and services, medical equipment and instruments, a telecom
munications mutual recognition agreement, toys, and gems and jew elry sector. The
Back 6 consisted o f the sectors which needed more discussions for liberalization:
food, oilseeds and oilseed products, rubber, fertilizers, autom otive, and civil aircraft
sector (Yanai, 2000). It was also recognized that the EVSL initiative should be com
plemented not only by trade liberalization but also by trade facilitation and economic
and technical cooperation (Okamoto, 2000).
It was scheduled so that APEC members would agree on how to implement
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EVSL throughout 1998. But as soon as officials tried to put specific proposals to the
nine priority sectors, the problem with EVSL began to surface. At the heart of the
problem was the different interpretation o f the principle o f flexibility. Japan inter
preted flexibility as the right to accept only partial elements o f the EVSL sectors, or
the right not to participate in any o f the nine sectors altogether. On the other hand,
the United States interpreted flexibility to mean the time period over which agreed
upon liberalization commitments would be implemented and insisted on a package
deal (Pau, 1999). The package deal is a classic style o f the GATT/W TO negotiation
and departs far from the IAPs on a voluntary basis. The process leading to the final
decision o f the EVSL agreement became difficult as both sides refused to compro
mise.

An interesting debate between the two sides was described by Okamoto

( 2000 ):
The package deal group argued that, as the commitm ents taken at the highest
level for EVSL should not be treated lightly, participants should undertake
EVSL as a package. They also insisted “a big and influential member like
Japan” must participate to show a good example. On the other hand, other
members did not expect the process to proceed that fast. The Japanese MITI
M inister and his staff attended the Meeting, thinking that they had insisted on
the voluntary principle o f APEC enough to ensure m em bers’ freedom to par
ticipate (or not to participate) at Vancouver and also during other available
opportunities. In addition, they thought that “a big and influential member
like Japan” should clearly state its opposition towards the EVSL package for
other members who were potentially against the idea but not “influential, (pp.
21 - 22 )
A t the APEC ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1988, Asian ministers
supported Japan's argument and decided to forward the tariff elem ent o f the nine sec
tors to the WTO. Curtis and Ciuriak (1999, p. 3) state: "APEC's eventual decision to
turn over to the WTO the further work on this initiative [EVSL] marked the first
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significant retreat within APEC."

Economic and Technical Cooperation fECOTECFP

The Idea o f ECOTECH

In comparison to the TILF agenda, the ECOTECH agenda has been largely
ignored by the broader public. As endorsed in the Osaka Action Agenda, the objec
tive o f ECOTECH is "to attain sustainable growth and equitable developm ent in the
Asia-Pacific region, while reducing economic disparities among APEC economies
and im proving economic and social well-being" (APEC, 1995a, p. 26). Part II o f the
Osaka A ction Agenda identified 13 priority areas for economic and technical coop
eration: (1) human resources development, (2) industrial science and technology; (3)
small and medium enterprises, (4) economic infrastructure, (5) transportation, (6)
energy, (7) telecommunications and information, (8) tourism, (9) trade and invest
ment data, (10) trade promotion, (11) marine resource conservation, (12) fisheries,
and (13) agricultural technology (APEC, 1995a).
The idea o f economic and technical cooperation in the APEC process has
been a struggle between developed and developing members o f APEC. As the host
country o f APEC Leaders meeting in 1994, Indonesia emphasized the crucial role o f
development cooperation to be included in the APEC overall agendas in order for
developing members to build capacity to fully embrace the trade liberalization mea
sures. However, some developed members o f APEC feared that too much emphasis
on developm ent cooperation would come at the expense o f TILF agenda and turn
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APEC into another development aid organization. In the end, a compromise has been
reached am ong APEC members to use the term s ‘economic and technical coopera
tion’ instead o f development cooperation (Elek & Soesastro, 1999).

As such the

guiding principles to conduct ECOTECH endorsed by the APEC leaders are o f
"mutual respect and equality, mutual benefit and assistance, constructive and genuine
partnership and consensus building" (APEC, 1995a, p. 26).
In terms o f the policy evolution o f ECOTECH, the work projects had reached
a total o f 320 by the time o f the APEC Leaders meeting in Manila in 1996. According
to Yamazawa (1997, p. 147), these projects were difficult to "go beyond seminars,
studies and research, and information gathering and make a tangible achievement." It
was under this backdrop that Japan proposed the Partners for Progress (PFP) program
to promote ECOTECH beyond information gathering and seminars.

However, this

proposal failed to gain acceptance due to the opposition from the United States. The
U.S. feared that such initiative would divert APEC's attention from trade and invest
ment liberalization and it looked like a Japanese attempt to "buy" Asian members
(Morrison, 1999).
A lthough different APEC members m ay have different attitudes towards the
effort o f ECOTECH, the need o f producing "focused outcomes" instead o f intangible
cooperation has been recognized.

The year o f 1996 saw a more serious effort to

enable ECOTECH to gain equal status with TILF within APEC. Based upon the cru
cial elements o f the Osaka Action Agenda, APEC leaders in 1996 outlined and adopted
the Manila Declaration on an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Framework for
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Strengthening Economic Cooperation and Development, which identified six priority
areas o f cooperation.

These priority areas were: (1) to develop human capital; (2)

develop stable, safe and efficient capital markets; (3) strengthen economic infrastruc
ture; (4) harness technologies for the future; (5) safeguard the quality o f life through
environmentally sound growth; and (6) develop and strengthen the dynamism o f small
and medium enterprises (APEC, 1997).
In their 1997 Vancouver Declaration, APEC leaders endorsed the idea o f mutu
ally supportive pillars among trade and investment liberalization, facilitation, and eco
nomic and technical cooperation:
Recognizing the diverse interests and circumstances o f its membership, APEC
has given rise to entirely new approaches to international economic coopera
tion. Based on three mutually supportive pillars - trade and investment liberali
zation, business facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation - the
APEC members develop the capacity to participate fully in and benefit from
this cooperation. By connecting the community APEC has helped us to build
relationships and share knowledge to improve the well-being of our citizens.
These partnerships enhance our prosperity and progress, enrich our lives and
foster the spirit o f the APEC community (APEC, 1998b, p. 2).
However, the gap between rhetoric and policy performance continues to exist
in the ECOTECH agenda.

According to APEC senior officials' 1999 report on

ECOTECH to the Ministers, "the ECOTECH projects still show a predominance o f
process-oriented activities" (APEC, 1999c, p. 5). A discussion is needed to under
stand why the policy performance o f ECOTECH has difficulty producing more
focused outcomes.
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The Limitations o f the Policy Performance o f ECOTECH

The following surveys o f the limitations o f the policy performance of
ECOTECH (APEC, 1999c; Curtis & Ciuriak, 1999; Yamazawa, 1997) relate spe
cifically to the problems faced by ECOTECH, but they have some general relevance
to the broader APEC process as well.
1. Problem s with producing tangible results.

Unlike the results from TILF

which are im m ediate in time and more certain (for instance, an APEC Visa in trade
facilitation or zero tariffs in trade liberalization), the results from ECOTECH are
distant in time and uncertain. The ECOTECH projects usually involve multi-year
and open-ended objectives.

As such, it is difficult to get short-term and tangible

results. Examples are the APEC Agenda for Science and Technology into the 21st
Century and the A ction Program on Skills Development in 1998.
2. Domestic jurisdiction. APEC is an international regime, and it is likely to
have most impact in areas where there is potential for international coordination.
Unfortunately, m uch o f the ECOTECH activity is behind the border. Therefore, in
terms o f implementation, it involves the concerns o f sovereignty and depends on
domestic conditions.
3.

Funding o f research projects and implementation activities.

very limited funding.

APEC has

It generally relies upon members to fund initiatives.

This

understandably leads to members being more willing to fund initiatives if they are of
direct and immediate political or economic benefit to their own economy.

The

problem, however, is that APEC covers a very diverse group o f economies, ranging
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from the m ost developed, to some much less developed. Although it is clear that
programs and projects to assist ECOTECH in the less developed members will be
critical to the longer term success o f a free trade regime, it is also clear that this is
often not politically attractive to the more advanced economies.

Furthermore, the

norms o f voluntarism allow developed members to justify their little enthusiasm
towards ECOTECH activities.
4.

M inim al coordination and continuity in activities.

M uch o f the APEC

activity relies on meetings o f experts and officials to discuss specific issues. Usually,
only a m inority o f the experts and delegates at these meetings have been involved in
other APEC meetings, and consequently, there is a lack o f continuity in the people
involved. This leads to waste and duplication. Because the APEC secretariat plays
only an adm inistrative role, APEC usually has difficulty providing the continuity
which allows research results to be built into a coherent fram ework which would be
useful to policy makers. APEC is relatively weak institution com pared to other inter
national regim es such as OECD, which has much larger research and secretariat
capabilities.

In 1998 an ECOTECH sub-committee o f the APEC SOM was

established to address these problems.

APEC: External Pressures

This section discusses how APEC adapts to its external pressures. I will exaine two m ajor issues: (1) the Asia financial crisis, and (2) non-governm ental organi
zations. The A sia financial crisis was a test o f the cohesion o f collective identity
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am ong APEC members. I will focus mainly on APEC's response to the crisis and
how the impact o f the crisis affected the members' collective identity.
issue to be discussed is NGOs.

The other

In 1997, Canada proposed an idea o f global civil

society for broader engagement when it took the chairmanship. I will discuss NGO
attitudes and actions toward APEC and APEC's policy on NGOs.

Asian Financial Crisis and APEC

Since the 1980s, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have followed the paths
o f Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore by adopting the outward-looking poli
cies o f economic liberalization.

These countries removed restrictions not only on

international trade but also on international capital movements. By the middle 1990s,
the East Asian region as a whole had become the fastest-growing area in the world.
Then came the Asian financial crisis o f 1997-1998, which began w ith the devaluation
o f the Thai baht and sharp falls in the stock markets, and then spread to neighboring
countries. Despite the persistently positive economic performance o f most East and
Southeast Asian countries (high growth rates, low inflation rates, and high private
savings), global currency speculators attacked Asian currencies and provoked a vola
tile withdrawal o f huge amounts o f short-term capital. Clearly the experiences of
Asian financial crisis demonstrated that long-term flows o f foreign investment could
be seriously undermined by volatile movements o f short-term speculative capital that
had no direct relation to economic fundamentals (Goldstein, 1998; Stiglitz, 1998).
With its huge investments in Southeast Asian, Japan was quick to make an
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initial response. In September 1997 at the Group o f Seven meeting Japan proposed
the creation o f a new regional institution, the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF).
AMF would operate at the regional level to maintain monetary stability.

The

Its total

funding would be about U.S. S100 billion with a major contribution from Japan. The
idea o f AMF indicated Japan's potential to assume the regional leadership in the form
o f a possible regional yen zone. In addition, it has been argued that the AM F would
defend an Asian development model against the Washington Consensus model advo
cated by the IMF.

In terms o f dealing with the crisis, arguably Southeast Asia

nations would prefer the AMF over the IMF because the AM F would be more flexi
ble and less strict than the IMF in providing emergency funds for reform (Higgott,
1998a).
The United States and IMF immediately objected to the proposal on the
grounds that the AMF would compete with the IMF and World Bank for capital and
authority.

According to Higgott (2000), the United States viewed the AM F as

opposed to its interests because the AM F was likely to undermine U.S. ability to
impose structural adjustment programs on Southeast Asian nations and prevent
further liberalization o f trade and finance in those countries.

In the end, Japan

responded to U.S. pressure by withdrawing the AMF proposal. The A M F proposal
was aborted and A PEC’s meeting in Vancouver in November endorsed IM F's leader
ship in the financial rescue plan. But the IMF's operation was too little and too late.
It can be argued that the contagion from the financial crisis in Thailand m ight have
been contained if the AMF proposal with its huge amounts o f funds had been adopted
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in September 1997. Furtherm ore, the United States was accused o f having double
standard in terms o f the conditionality o f the financial rescue programs. In the case
o f the Brazilian financial crisis o f early 1999, the conditionality o f IMF's lending was
much less strict than the one on the Asian nations. As Japanese econom ist Ito noted:
"the irony was that the United States opposed the AM F and did not provide bilateral
assistance to Thailand, but called for such a rescue program for Brazil" (cited in
Leong, 2000).
The East Asian crisis tested regime competencies o f APEC. A P E C 's reaction
to the crisis cannot be considered adequate. On one hand, it can be argued that APEC
was not designed to deal with crises in financial markets.

The nature o f the East

Asian crisis was in the financial area which was not at the core o f APEC agendas.
On the other hand, the reputation o f APEC as the m ajor econom ic regime in the
region has been hurt by the crisis.

The APEC m eeting in K uala Lum pur did not

address the burning problem o f the Asian financial crisis well. Instead, APEC was
pushing on the EVSL at the time. For APEC to push trade liberalization further dur
ing an economic crisis certainly damaged the collective identity am ong themselves.
The impact o f the aborted Asian Monetary Fund on the collective identity was
described by Higgott (2000):
Regional leaders had still not understood the power o f the global financial
markets, but the proposal's [AMF's] most naive failing w as to underestimate
the strength o f the opposition from the United States and the IMF, which felt
it would not only undermine their ability to impose tough conditionality on
loans but also act as a veritable threat to American interests and influence in
A sia...This may, however, be a turning point for APEC. By opposing the
proposal (more) seeds o f polarization in the relationship between the Asian
and Caucasian m em bers o f APEC were sown. (p. 256)
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Indeed, for m any Asian countries, the consequence o f the Asian Financial
Crisis may well be the rising salience o f East Asia identity as opposed to an Asia
Pacific one.

This can be demonstrated by the development o f ASEAN+3.

As

discussed in Chapter V, prior to the ASEM summit in Bangkok in M arch 1996,
ASEAN convened preparatory meetings with Japan, South Korea, and China. But it
did not take long tim e until the framework ASEAN+3 became regular and indepen
dent o f ASEM.

At the sixth ASEAN formal summit in December 1998, it was

agreed on that the ASEAN+3 summit would be an annual event.

The East Asia

Vision Group (EAVG) was formed which consists o f eminent intellectuals to chart a
vision for mid-to-long term cooperation in East Asia in political, economic and social
sectors for the 21st century (Yamakage, 1999). The membership of ASEAN plus 3 is
identical with that o f the controversial idea o f EAEC. W hether or not ASEAN+3 is
an EAEC, it certainly reflects the psychological need to search a collective identity
that would give Asian countries a sense o f institutional autonomy in the wake o f the
Asia Financial Crisis.

Non-governmental Organizations and APEC

The broader and meaningful engagement o f civil society is becoming an
increasingly important challenge for APEC. APEC leaders are aware o f it. The 1996
Subic Declaration by APEC Leaders states:
This vision o f community requires that all sectors o f society develop a stake
in the success o f APEC. We therefore commit ourselves to foster greater
public-private sector partnership in APEC. W e also place great value on
promoting more people-to people linkages. (APEC, 1997, p. 3)
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It was under this backdrop, in 1997, that Canada proposed an idea o f global
civil society for broader engagement when it took the chairmanship. Canada organ
ized an APEC M inisterial on Women and developed the Women Leaders' Network.
However, the interpretation o f civil society is elusive.

Sometimes it was equated

w ith the exploitation o f women, human rights, labor rights, and child labor. At the
M alaysia's Leaders Meeting, Canada proposed the establishment o f an ad hoc task
force to identify the ways to engage NGOs. The idea received little backing from
other m em ber economies. This author interviewed a Canadian APEC related official
regarding why Canada introduced the idea o f civil society into the APEC process,
knowing that it w ould probably bring about some controversy. According to him,
"because Canada is a democracy and the gender issue is less controversial." Still, the
im portant question o f how the state interacts with non-state actors in APEC remains
to be determined.
In terms o f NGOs' attitudes and actions toward APEC, as long as APEC
rem ained primarily a forum for broad regional economic dialogue, it captured little
NGOs' attention. But since 1993, when President Clinton raised APEC's profile by
holding the first economic leaders meeting, a parallel network o f NGOs, unions,
hum an rights and environmental groups rapidly emerged.

Subsequent forums on

APEC have coincided with the timing and location o f the APEC Leader's Summits.
NGO declarations issued from these meetings continued to focus on concerns that
globalization and trade liberalization are more harmful than beneficial in many
different arenas: social, environmental, political. For example, in 1995 more than
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one hundred NGOs and trade unions convened in Kyoto to hold the "1995 NGO
Forum on APEC". They claimed that liberalization o f trade and investment promotes
the rapid expansion o f MNCs, destroys small and medium businesses and deepens
unem ploym ent (James, 1997).
However, not all NGOs speak with one voice. Basically NGOs' attitudes and
actions toward APEC can be divided into two kinds: to engage or not to engage.
M any NGOs support dialogue and participation within APEC, which generally
implies a more rule-based approach.

M any other NGOs, however, oppose such

participation because they believe that would help legitimize APEC. They prefer to
develop independent, people-based strategies to challenge APEC's lack of political
legitimacy, transparency and accountability. Furtherm ore, in som e cases there is the
North-South division am ong NGOs. Many, but not all, NGOs in the North tend to
focus on single issues such as environmental or human rights. M ost, although not all,
NGOs in the South are broader in their concerns.

Southern NGOs are concerned

almost equally with the environment, social equity, economic development, democ
racy and sovereignty, and are opposed to participation in APEC, believing that would
help formalize and legitimize it. For example, while both N orthern and Southern
NGOs are concerned with environmental protection, m ost NGOs in the South are
worried that the pressures to conform to the environm ental standards o f the North are
a protectionist disguise against the entry o f products from the South.
But how does the business community regard the issue o f NGOs?

In the

study o f corporate-NGO partnership, Yamamoto (1999) argues that it is important
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but difficult to involve NG Os in policy-related activities.

Cooperating with NGOs

can be a challenge because o f a fear o f proliferation o f too m any issues, and partly
because it is difficult fo r NGOs to deal with interdisciplinary issues. They are often
criticized as being one-issue oriented and always expecting people to agree with
them.
With regards to APEC's policy on the issue o f N GOs, to date private sector
input into APEC discussions has been primarily from the business sector. Some aca
demic input is obtained via the APEC Study Centers and a num ber o f meetings (the
W omen’s Leaders N etw ork) and APEC Working Groups (H um an Resource Develop
ment) have invited private sector participation (personal interview). But there is no
APEC member with a strong commitment and sufficient pow er to coordinate and for
mulate common policies for action.

It can be argued that institutional structures

within APEC need to be developed to ensure broad participation by civil society in
its decision making processes.

A possibility o f APEC's structural reform is to

develop a civil society equivalent o f the APEC Business Advisory Council.

Still

APEC is an international regime with consensus-based and non-binding rules.
Therefore, APEC is prim arily focused on what its m em ber governments are willing
to do and any suggestion o f what APEC should do remains indeterminate.

Discussion: Implications for Constructivism and APEC

The Nature o f Policy D iscourse

The U.S. am bassador to APEC Sandra K ristoffs explicit threats that the U.S.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

could withdraw from APEC if Japan would not give it what it wants, were typical
strategic actions which sent a message to Japan that the United States was not serious
about the community-building.

It indicated that APEC was only viewed by the

United States as an instrument to assert its trade liberalization agenda. But even if we
turn our mind into strategic thinking, we doubt the creditability o f Kristoffs words
unless the initial motivation o f the U.S. in joining APEC has changed (fear of being
left out). However, the U.S. would not be interested in devoting significant resources
to the ECOTECH agenda since it cannot get what it wants. From a communicative
action perspective, APEC was held together by a voluntary, consensus-based, and
non-binding set o f principles, rather than being tightly rule-based ones.

The

American attempts to turn APEC into a negotiating, comprehensive and binding body
clearly go against preexisting input legitimacy of APEC.
Indeed the interaction between the United States and Japan during the Osaka
year in the APEC setting clearly damaged the collective identity between them as
APEC m embers. A complication was that Japan revisited the idea o f EAEC. As a
continued discussion from the previous chapter, the experience o f the 1995 Osaka
meeting was in part contributing to Japan's policy change o f acceptance o f the idea o f
EAEC. According to a Japanese journalist, "Japan is different now especially after
Osaka w hen m ost Asians rallied behind it on the rice issue" (cited in Leong, 2000). It
probably should be also noted that outside the APEC setting, the American aggres
sive unilateralism targeted on the Japanese automobile industry around the same
time. The USTR threatened to impose a 100 percent tariff on all Japanese luxury cars
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priced over $30,000 if Japan did not take a list o f quantitative measures to correct the
automobile imbalance by the end o f June 1995. Japan appealed to the W TO, claim
ing the retaliatory action clearly violated the specific rules of the WTO. The stakes
were high, as both parties refused to back down from their positions. In the end, as
M oon (2000a, p. 144) notes, "a settlement was arranged, but it was m ore a public
relations achievem ent to allow both parties to save face than a com promise that actu
ally settled any issues." The incident o f the U.S.-Japan automobile dispute was cer
tainly not helpful in improving the relationship between the two countries.

The Interaction Between Input and Output Legitimacy

Clearly the success o f the ITA positively affected the collective identity
among APEC members because both input and output legitimacy were maintained.
The principle o f flexibility was preserved in the process o f the ITA.

On the other

hand, the experience o f the EVSL negatively affected the collective identity among
APEC members because it challenged both input and output legitimacy o f APEC.
For Japan and some other members, the EVSL packaging was an attem pt to alter the
APEC modality. The process o f the EVSL took away the ‘voluntary’ aspect o f the
EVSL because it turned the exercise into a ‘package deal’ which is a typical style o f
the GATT/W TO trade negotiations. This ‘all or nothing’ approach challenges the
input legitimacy o f APEC by ignoring the principle o f concerted unilateral liberaliza
tion and the principle o f flexibility.

For almost two years, the EV SL initiative

absorbed the larger part o f APEC's energy, but produced no concrete results. This
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frustrating experience proved that APEC was not useful in undertaking meaningful
liberalization measures.
Many APEC observers (Morrison, 1999) argue that it is unrealistic to achieve
the Bogor Declaration under the current APEC practices, namely, voluntarism, con
certed unilateral liberalization, and peer pressure. Indeed, it is difficult for countries
unilaterally to remove protection in certain sensitive sectors, for example, textiles in
the United States, agriculture in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and automobiles in
China. Global negotiations involving binding reciprocal concessions could probably
remove this protection. One argument is that APEC should change regime rules from
non-binding to binding if APEC members are serious about reaching the free trade
and investment by 2010/2020. But let us use a counterfactual argum ent here. Would
it have been a Bogor Declaration, had the rules o f APEC's decisions been binding
from the outset? The answer would probably be no. The success o f ITA and the
failure o f the EVSL are clear evidences that it is not the regime rules that affect the
policy performance o f TILF, but the underlying nature o f different liberalization
sectors that are the main concerns. If a certain liberalization m easure is in a state's
interests, it will pursue it with or without binding rules.
The issue o f APEC's engagement o f NGOs is relevant to analyze the Proposi
tion 2.2: The more the regime decision-making processes involve all decisionaffected actors, the more the regime is based upon legitimacy, the higher the proba
bility that regime members will comply with regime norms, and the more the cohe
siveness o f regime collective identity. A challenge for APEC institutional reformers
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is to establish processes o f change which nurture and develop good settings for com
municative actions to take place. Another challenge is to regulate the access o f issues
and participants to such processes. Civil society is likely to make the reform process
more unwieldy.

Empowering new participants m ay possibly lead to a stalemate.

Yet, broadening the participation may possibly provide legitimacy and help redefine
issues so that normative and causal beliefs converge.

APEC's Policy Evolution

Unlike trade liberalization of the TILF agenda where the logical end point
(zero tariffs) is clear, the identification o f goals for ECOTECH is more elusive. For
example, the objectives o f capacity building are likely to be open-ended and long
term measures. Therefore the policy evolution o f A PEC has followed the assertions
o f Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. Expectations for the TILF agenda are more likely to be
used as operational goals to produce measurable perform ance outcomes; and expec
tations for the ECOTECH agenda adaptations are m ore likely to be used to achieve
non-operational learning outcomes such as new ideas and capabilities. From the per
spective o f out-put legitimacy, it can be argued that the experiences of the APEC pro
cess have contributed to the deflation o f expectations by not meeting its objectives in
the EVSL exercise and by not finding an effective w ay to undertake the ECOTECH
agenda.
The Asia Financial Crisis is relevant to an analysis by Proposition 4.

In

turbulent times, regim es’ adaptation to the environm ent is likely to be both enabled
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and restricted by the regime's unique historical path dependence on exploitation and
exploration adaptations.

The idea o f path dependence suggests that institutional

change is not always fast and responsive to external pressures. Change processes
depend to a large extent upon the internal characteristics of preexisting institutions.
APEC is an international regime with consensus-based and non-binding rules. As
such APEC is primarily focused on what its m em ber governments are willing to do
and any suggestion o f w hat APEC should do remains indeterminate. But even before
the financial crisis cam e to Asia, the developing economies in APEC believed that
more open international trade and investment was ju st one of several elements for sus
tained development. Accordingly, they are pressing to move the emphasis away from
TILF to the ECOTECH. The experience o f the Crisis highlighted the urgency. By
not giving primary importance to an urgent problem and instead pushing the EVSL
agenda at an inappropriate time, APEC reconfirmed the perception that developed
members are concerned with TILF only. Such a perception underestimated the poten
tial contribution o f economic and technical cooperation to all o f APEC’s efforts to
enhance the capacity for sustainable economic growth, including trade and investment
policy reforms. As a result, it tended to erode mutual respect and weaken APEC mem
bers' coherence of collective identity or sense of community in the Asia-Pacific region.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

A Summary o f the Study

In an era o f globalization characterized by intensive interaction among differ
ent actors, we begin to enter a world o f complexity. This study takes a constructivist
approach to analyze hum an interactions and their consequences in such a complex
world. Constructivism assigns a crucial role to the concept o f identity in terms of
explaining how actors w ould do in a given situation.

Constructivists would argue

that an important part o f actors taking actions is that they do so according to their
identities. In a given situation, actors must define who they are (identity) before they
know what they want (interests). In discourse or interaction, actors can perceive their
collective identity as either positive or negative. While a positive collective identity
has a tendency to make actors take communicative actions, a negative one is more
associated with strategic actions.
In contrast to rationalist approaches, which assumes that actors’ interests and
identities are constant, constructivism argues that through the social or policy learn
ing, actors' identities and interests might be changed. Actors leam through interact
ing with one another and adjust behavior according to the feedback they receive.
Constructivism takes a dynam ic and indeterminate view o f human actions instead o f
making mechanical and determ inate assumptions. In this sense, enemies can leam to
157
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be friends and friends can turn into enemies.
To return to the central questions of this study posed in the Chapter I, what is
the basis o f shared identity and how does it make an international community cohere?
Is it cultural com m onality or economic interests?

I argue that basing collective

identities among actors upon cultural commonality is not only difficult but also unde
sirable. It is difficult because APEC is a multicultural regime. N or is it desirable to
deliberately create a shared cultural value because each cultural value is legitimate in
its ow n right, and one culture simply cannot impose its values on any others. On the
other hand, if the shared identity among APEC members is based only upon eco
nomic interests, one can expect that the cohesion o f this collective identity will be
unstable. During the heydays o f economic growth in the region, APEC seemed to
have clear ideas and consensus in terms o f policy directions. The Asian financial
crisis, however, opened up the inherent conflicts concealed in the past. The implica
tions o f globalization and econom ic interdependence have com pelled governments to
strike a balance between facilitating market mechanism and protecting society from
instability. Therefore, dom estic consideration may cause states to act inconsistently.
If basing shared identity on economic interests is shaky, and cultural homo
geneity is unfeasible or undesirable for that matter, does that mean shared identity
am ong APEC member is doom ed from the start? I w ould argue that it is not neces
sarily the case. Indeed, different ideas are competing for procedural rules and policy
directions, and they m ay not even be reconcilable; the historical experience o f APEC
cannot suggest otherwise.

But this does not necessarily m ean that the collective
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identity o f APEC is doomed from the start. One simply cannot assume only likeminded actors can cooperate or actors' ideas never change. Keohane (1984) said it
well that if there is no conflict o f interests, there is no need for cooperation. It all
depends on how APEC members deal with their differences. For example the United
States can leam to respect Asian points o f views or vice versa.
But for this to happen, it heightens the value o f in-put legitimacy or proce
dural fairness o f APEC to ensure that all members have an exit option should the
policy decisions go against their cooperate interests. Auid it is this understanding of
input legitimacy as "insurance policy" that communicative action is likely to take
place in the APEC process. An important political development o f APEC has been
the agreement to hold regular meetings o f leaders, ministers and senior officials,
w hich ensures regular interaction at all levels o f government.

Regular interaction

does not ensure that conflicts o f interests will be reconciled or that the collective
identity among APEC members will be positively enhanced.

However, no inter

action is sure to be detrimental to problem solving. The m ost important thing for
APEC members is to realize the "beauty" o f its voluntary, consensus-based, and non
binding rules. And this leads to the major conclusion o f this dissertation: The input
legitimacy o f APEC as a political order makes it possible for members to live peace
fully together with enduring tensions and conflicts because procedural fairness some
how lends legitimacy to outcomes when positive collective identities are lacking.
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Recommendations for Future Research

The policy evolution o f APEC does not simply reflect the internal dynamics
o f its members. As an open system, APEC must respond to its external pressures in
order to sustain. Adding to the com plexity o f APEC's external environment is the
rising salience o f NGOs.

For m any governments, the collapse o f the 1999 WTO

meeting in Seattle demonstrated the importance o f engaging civil society in the trade
liberalization agenda. One can expect that APEC will also increase the scrutiny of
the idea o f civil society in the future. As discussed previously, there are basically
two kinds o f attitudes NGOs have toward their relations with corporate communities
and governments: to engage or not to engage. But as Wendt notes (2001, p. 221):
"Oppositional politics make for fewer messy compromises, but given the weakness of
civil society, refusing to engage states in system reform is in effect saying that we're
not going anywhere."
This leads to my recommendation to international regimes in global public
policy to build up a trilateral network among governments, corporate communities,
and civil society (Reinicke, 1998).

In my view, a trilateral netw ork among these

three stakeholders in an international regime would not guarantee that a reasoned
consensus or a balanced compromise could be reached to solve the problem at hand.
But the more the regime decision-making processes involves all decision-affected
actors, the more the regime is based upon legitimacy. And it is this sense o f legiti
m acy that is crucial for social learning among different actors. In other words, an
international regime provides a setting for governments, business, and NGOs to
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address the issues that no single actor can hope to resolve by itself. Today, in a com
plex world with daunting challenges, every actor needs help from others in some
ways in order to adapt to the environment. Ultimately, the empirical and normative
tasks for social scientists are to find effective and legitimate ways for different stake
holders to peacefully coexist.
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